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Artworks made in New York between 1958 and 1965, the heyday of 
color-field painting, minimalism and pop art, comprise different 
responses to the perceived crisis embroiling advanced art at the time 
--namely, the threat of misinterpretation posed by a rapidly expanding 
consumer audience. It is possible to see the general concern over 
art's relation to its audience in terms of a crisis of metaphor; 
pivotal innovations during this period, especially in painting, mark a 
move beyond metaphor in search of alternative modes of address. These 
different modes can be characterized using the categories provided by 
rhetorical analysis, in particular the schema of the four master 
tropes as proposed by Kenneth Burke and Hayden White. For example, 
color-field painting can be thought of as synecdochic, minimalism as 
metonymic, and pop as ironic. All three offer strategies to ward off 
misappropriation: the first by disallowing any interpretive leeway, by 
shoring up all space between viewer and painting so that the encounter 
seems to happen within "eyesight alone," in the intimate proximity and 
instant of looking; the second involves giving the artworks over to 
viewing while also steeling them against it, so that only obdurate 
surface and irrefutable fact is presented; and the third involves 
artworks that advance more than one meaning, thus undercutting the 
authority of any one over another. By 1965 interchange between these 
modes comes to a halt, as arguments emerge that make differences 
between artistic viewpoints into stark polarities. Naming abusive acts 
of viewing each required an interpretative act of its own, which 
proved the self-same poetic essence of art to be a construction, one 





Poetics and Rhetoric 8
Chapter Two
Modes of Address 53
Chapter Three






1. Kenneth Noland. Beginning. 1958. Magna on canvas. 90" x 90 
7/8".
2. Morris Louis. Untitled. 1958. Magna on canvas. 93" x
168".
3. Lee Bontecou. Untitled. 1958-59. Steel, canvas and velvet. 
13" x 13" x 12".
4. Frank Stella. Installation view. Exhibition at Leo 
Castelli Gallery, New York, September-October 1960.
5. Jasper Johns. Target with Four Faces. 1955. Encaustic on 
newspaper and cloth over canvas surmounted by four tinted-
plaster faces in wood box with hinged front. 33 5/8" x 26" x 
3".
6. Donald Judd. Untitled. 1961. Asphalt and gesso on 
composition board mounted on wood with aluminum pan. 48 1/8" 
x 36 1/8" x 4".
7. Adolph Gottlieb. The Seer. 1950. Oil on canvas. 60" x 72".
8. Container Corporation of America advertisement with 
painting by Willem de Kooning. Fortune, January 1945.
9. Double-page spread from Harper's Bazaar, February 1952.
10. Double-page spread from Life, November 16, 1959.
11. Donald Judd. Untitled. 1962-68. Light cadmium red oil on 
plywood. 19 1/2" x 45" x 30 1/2".
12. Donald Judd. Untitled. 1965. Aluminum and purple lacquer 
on aluminum. 8 1/4" x 253" x 8 1/4".
13. Barnett Newman. The Third. 1962. Oil on raw canvas. 101 
1/4" x 120 3/8".
14. Jackson Pollock. Number 1A. 1948. Oil and enamel on 
canvas. 68" x 104".
15. David Smith. Blackburn: Song of an Irish Blacksmith. 
1949-50. Steel and bronze. 46 1/4" x 49 3/4" x 24".
16. Jackson Pollock and Peter Blake with model for "An Ideal 
Museum." 1949.
17. Double-page spread from Vogue, April 1950.
18. Living room of the Ben Heller apartment on Central Park 
West, New York (from Quadrum 13, 1962).
vii
19. French & Company advertisement, Arts Yearbook 3, 1959.
20. Kenneth Noland. Untitled. 1958-59. Acrylic on canvas. 84" 
x 84".
21. Kenneth Noland. Lunar Episode. 1959. Oil on canvas. 70 
1/2" x 68 1/2". 
22. Frank Stella. Plant City. 1963. Zinc chromate on canvas. 
96" x 96". 
23. Frank Stella. Installation view. Exhibition at Galerie 
Lawrence, Paris, April 1963.
1
INTRODUCTION
If there has been a recent shift in critical method, it 
can perhaps be best characterized as a displacement from 
logical to rhetorical analysis, from a criticism 
concerned primarily or exclusively with the abstract 
truth or falsehood of statements, to one which deals 
with their use in specific social circumstances.... And 
insofar as rhetoric also specifies the proper use of 
contradictory expressions (such as metaphors) it is also 
the site of the ideological.
--Craig Owens, 1985(1)
What is missing in the current scene is more critical 
writing that knows how to mix its modes...such 
sophistication in practice across the whole rhetorical 
field is surely required if we are to follow the 
interplay between abstraction and local knowledge in the 




This dissertation rests on the distinction between poetics 
and rhetoric. It is a distinction I believe to be important 
to the place, period and people I'm investigating: artists 
working in Manhattan in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But 
it is equally as important, if not more so, to myself as the 
investigator. Since 1983 I have worked as an art critic. And 
criticism can perhaps be considered an exemplary site where 
poetics and rhetoric, the object in itself versus its 
discursive appropriation, come into contact, even overlap, 
defining each other while also blurring and undermining those 
very definitions. 
Having been a practicing critic for 20 years, of course 
I am going to see the work of art as a problem not of making 
and self-expression but of communication and reception. I 
have never been able to create a piece of writing for its own 
sake, or for my own sake; I have always dealt with editors, 
with the problem of intelligibility, with second-guessing 
over the reader's response. I then turn around and project 
such conditions onto the artworks I write about.
The moment I return to in this dissertation exists as 
much for me, within my own history, as it exists beyond me. 
As I look back to my own beginnings as a critic in 1983, the 
art criticism that dominated then, and from which I learned, 
was itself focused on the past; it likewise looked over its 
shoulder to a point 20 years earlier. A version of 
postmodernist criticism in the visual arts, fashioning itself 
as a rebuttal of a modernist viewpoint moribund since the mid 
'60s, was being officially codified; the anthology The Anti-
Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, edited by Hal 
Foster, was published in 1983, followed a year later by 
another canonizing collection, Art after Modernism:
Rethinking Representation, edited by Brian Wallis. Both 
volumes advance a schematic characterization of modernism to 
serve as their launching-off point, focusing on a Kantian 
notion of autonomously developing "spheres of culture" and 
how this notion was applied to "postwar or late modernism, 
with its stress on the purity of each art and the autonomy of 
3
culture as a whole" (Foster).(3) The very title of Foster's 
compilation pairs the categories of modernism and aesthetics 
as together defining what it is the project of postmodernism 
aims to exceed. Wallis is more specific: in his introduction 
he names Clement Greenberg, Morris Louis and Kenneth Noland 
as exemplifying a modernism "constantly bound to its own 
formally reductive system."(4) In other words, the 
postmodernism that I was indoctrinated into imagined itself 
to be founded in opposition to the relatively late writings 
of Clement Greenberg and color-field painting--that is to 
say, its origins lie somewhere roughly between 1958 and 1960. 
It is through such accounts as Foster's and Wallis's 
that I came to understand and to refer to modernism as a 
young critic, and by devoting this dissertation to the period 
leading up to and just after 1960, I am thus returning, in a 
sense, to the roots of my roots. But my goal is not to prove 
Wallis and Foster somehow wrong, or to replace their story 
with an entirely different one; I have grown perhaps too 
invested by now in the account they helped entrench. What I 
attempt instead is to tell the story a little more 
elaborately, and a little differently. The result, I hope, 
casts the period of the late '50s and early '60s--and the 
place of Greenberg, Louis and Noland within it--in a new 
light. Most of all, I would like to show how the modernism 
Greenberg and the two Washington D.C. painters came up with 
at the time was new even to them, something devised to a 
large degree in response to the quickly changing 
circumstances of the moment.
Of course, other scholars have already researched this 
"transitional" period in some depth. Two museum exhibitions 
in particular deserve mentioning: Barbara Haskell's "Blam! 
The Explosion of Pop, Minimalism, and Performance, 1958-
1964," which opened at the Whitney Museum in 1984; and the 
Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art's "Hand-Painted Pop: 
American Art in Transition, 1955-62," curated by Donna De 
Salvo and Paul Schimmel in 1992. Both exhibitions address, as 
does this dissertation, the aftermath of Abstract 
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Expressionism and what De Salvo and Schimmel call "the long 
and layered period of evolution which produced both Pop and 
other tendencies."(5) Taking a broader view, Haskell includes 
in her discussion not just pop but also assemblage, 
environments, Fluxus, minimalism and performance art. 
"Examining the emergence of these various styles 
synchronistically," she argues, "reveals the uniquely close 
interaction that existed between artists in all media during 
this period, an interdisciplinary exchange that exerted a 
critical impact on the evolution of the new aesthetic."(6) I 
adopt much the same approach in the following pages, arguing, 
for example, that color-field painting also interacted and 
overlapped with these other styles, sharing their allegiance 
to technical and formal innovation and their rejection of the 
previous generation's inward-turned existentialism and 
studio-based worker's mythos; color field, too, belongs to 
the period's "new aesthetic." Yet Haskell, like De Salvo and 
Schimmel, excludes Louis and Noland categorically; she 
explicitly brackets out "the Color Field and figurative 
painters" from "those artists whose shared origins and 
parallel ideologies formed an intellectually cohesive 
aesthetic."
Haskell is here only being typical of her postmodern 
moment. The reason she omits Louis and Noland is not because 
the two artists never embraced commercial iconography, or 
failed to renounce such traditional materials as paint and 
canvas. If these were her criteria, works by Jasper Johns, 
Frank Stella and Donald Judd wouldn't have been allowed in 
her show either. Rather, the most obvious reason for the 
exclusion of color-field painting has to do with the fact 
that Haskell mounted her show in 1984, during postmodernism's 
heyday, when modernism was being defined, and Louis and 
Noland with it, as belonging to a former world now 
superceded. Like Foster and Wallis, Haskell articulates a 
desired "break with modernism," and then projects it back 
onto the late 1950s.
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Other strategies existed by which critics and historians 
in the early '80s separated out what Greenberg in 1960 called 
modernist painting, characterizing it as conservative, 
tradition-bound and elitist. One could, for example, 
emphasize Greenberg's own Cold Warrior politics (as does 
Serge Guilbault in his book How New York Stole the Idea of
Modern Art, published in 1983). In what follows, I don't wish 
to discount the rightward shift in Greenberg's political 
views during the '50s and '60s, nor the rarefied and 
exceptionalist tone that surrounded color field's initial 
critical reception. But I do not set these in diametric 
opposition to some counter-stance, at once progressive and 
populist, represented by Johns, Stella, Judd or other early 
avatars of pop and minimalism. Rather, I try to align all 
these artists as together confronting a new situation, a 
fundamental shift in the way art was thought to exist in the 
world--namely, that it exists outside of the studio, in 
public, with an audience always in front of it. What Dorothy 
Seckler announced in 1963 in reference to Allan Kaprow's 
happenings applied, in one way or another, to each of the 
artists I talk about: "It is only now that the artist is for
the audience and not against it."(7) 
This was the challenge, the dilemma, the condition 
underlying the practices of the different artists I highlight 
in what follows. Some of the responses to this situation have 
been well noted; pop embraced popular, mass-produced 
iconography; assemblages and happenings mobilized the found 
bric-a-brac of everyday life; minimalism prioritized the 
artwork's exteriority and the actual space it shared with 
viewers. As I try to show, color-field painting also marked a 
"progressive" step toward the integration of art into public 
life, it too helped "modernize" art by adapting it to these 
new circumstances. Namely, it helped find a home for
contemporary art in the academy, giving rise to an accredited 
and disciplined criticism and thus forging the way for the 
eventual professionalization of contemporary art.
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Indeed, by focusing on how art relates to its audience, 
I am only being typical of my own time. It is in terms of 
audience and address that Fredric Jameson has described the 
currently reigning paradigm:
Theories of communication...have come to dominate 
official thinking today...the ideology of communication 
has come to blanket the field and to discredit any 
philosophical representations that fail to acknowledge 
the primacy and uniqueness of language, the speech act, 
or the communicational exchange. ...Communicationality 
has emerged as the central fact of world society in the 
course of a historical process...namely, the 
transformation of capitalism into its third, late or 
postmodern stage.(8)
This is how I identify with my current moment, and identify 
what I do, and have been doing, as a critic. I now look back 
in search of resemblances and origins, for early versions of 
what I take as my present.
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There is as yet only one possible choice...either to 
posit a reality which is entirely permeable to history, 
and ideologize; or, conversely, to posit a reality which 
is ultimately impenetrable, irreducible, and, in this 
case, poeticize. The fact that we cannot manage to 
achieve more than an unstable grasp of reality doubtless 
gives the measure of our present alienation.... And yet, 
this is what we must seek: a reconciliation between 
reality and human beings, between description and 




In 1958 the Washington D.C. painters Morris Louis and Kenneth 
Noland each embarked on what has come to be regarded as the 
mature phase of his career. It was the year when, as legend 
has it, Noland "discovered the center" of the canvas and
settled on the image of concentric circles (fig. 1), and when
Louis ended his brief stint as an expressionist to resume the 
Veil paintings he had abandoned four years earlier (fig. 2). 
Their work quickly assumed a leading role in the development 
of a self-consciously "modernist" approach to painting, 
winning praise and considerable artworld backing from such 
prominent critics as Clement Greenberg and William Rubin. But 
their work, especially Noland's, also became a main source of 
inspiration for the minimalist Donald Judd, whose own 
aesthetic came under attack from advocates of modernist art 
by the mid '60s. Another of Judd's favorite artists during 
the '60s, Lee Bontecou, also discovered the center of the 
canvas in 1958, and like Noland she marked it with a circle, 
only she used scissors rather than paint, leaving a literal 
black hole in the middle of her wall-bound constructions 
(fig. 3). Eventually she would exhibit these works at Leo 
Castelli's in 1960, her debut at the gallery following 
immediately on the heels of the first solo show there by 
another young artist, Frank Stella, who likewise had just 
begun carving and puncturing his paintings (fig. 4). 
Like Judd, Stella would emerge as a pivotal figure in 
the arguments pitting modernism against minimalism, and he 
too was profoundly influenced in 1958, but rather than 
Noland, Louis or Bontecou it was Jasper Johns's debut solo 
show that had the decisive impact. Indeed, Johns's sudden 
rise to prominence in '58 was an event at once responded to 
and amplified by the decision at Art News to feature his work 
on the front cover of the magazine's September issue--the 
work in question being Target with Four Faces, a painting 
that includes, among other things, an image of concentric 
circles radiating from its center (fig. 5).
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All of these artists, even Judd during this period (fig. 
6), made paintings, albeit paintings at the edge of painting,
paintings that radically problematized their own identity, 
that engaged only some of the category's constitutive terms--
brush or canvas or rectilinearity or flat surface--and 
dispensed with the rest. Moreover, all these artists were 
deeply concerned with how their paintings looked, how they 
looked to the viewer or even at the viewer and in some cases 
away from the viewer, and how the viewer looked back at the 
paintings in turn. This stress on looking came at a time when 
claims were being made that looking itself, at least the kind 
of looking typically associated with art--standing at a 
remove, contemplating, interpreting--had become deeply 
problematic, even antithetical to the values of advanced art. 
Many argued that it was up to painting itself to redeem or 
even supercede the normative terms for viewing art, namely
through the adoption of such strategies as "noncomposition" 
(which enforced what Michael Fried called "a point of no 
view") or sheer enormity (resulting in canvases that, as E.
C. Goossen remarked in 1958, "consume the entire wallspace 
and in turn affect the quality of life in the room, pressing 
an emotional experience upon those who used to have to stand 
and peer").(2) By the latter half of the '60s there arose 
more extreme remedies to the artwork's visual aspect--such as 
anti-form, performance, process, dematerialization--compared 
to which painting as a whole was said to be hopelessly passé 
and conservative. Robert Morris, for example, hailed process 
art for being, unlike painting, "based on other terms than 
those of arbitrary, formalistic, tasteful arrangements of 
static forms."(3) Artworld energy and interest were now 
commandeered by these "other terms." 
Sketched here are some of the main outlines of the
argument I wish to pursue in this dissertation. Focus will be 
trained on the discourse on art in the 1950s and a handful of 
artists who emerged into that discourse around 1958 with some 
of the more challenging and consequential paintings of that 
moment, paintings whose proximity, interaction and overlap
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with one another were soon obscured by the differences that 
quickly grew up in the minds of some of their makers, 
defenders and opponents. Tracing lines of influence or 
awarding "befores" and "afters" is not my concern; rather my
task will be to contrive an analytical framework, articulate 
a structure, a scheme of categories and their relations, that 
can best get at the complex interplay that existed between 
these practices, as well as between the discourses that 
surrounded and supported them. To do so I will need to posit 
some shared stakes, common ambitions and threats around which 
these works and discourses seem to both agree and disagree. 
Foremost among what I want to establish: that the sense of 
crisis embroiling art's reception in the late '50s and early 
'60s warrants the deepest consideration when discussing
pivotal innovations in painting practice and its criticism at 
the time.
It was in the '50s that the definitively "modern"
question of art's audience gained new qualifications and a 
new tone, due in large part to the growing awareness of what 
Dwight Macdonald termed "midcult," a mass-marketed, "middle-
brow" culture that both spurred and exploited an interest in 
high art among members of an expanding middle class. The fear 
was often expressed that, although advanced art was no longer 
being ignored, the new audience it enjoyed was appropriating 
it according to terms set by such marketing efforts rather 
than by the art itself. "The middle class in this 
country...is now surging toward culture," Clement Greenberg 
famously announced as early as 1946, although in a tone that 
fully registered his leeriness over the mixed-blessings such 
a surge represented. "The importance of modern art," 
Greenberg clarified three years later, "has become such that 
it is no longer sufficient to oppose it by ignoring its 
presence; its enemies have to fight it actively, and in doing 
so they have made painting and sculpture a crucial issue of 
cultural life."(4) By 1954 the painter Adolph Gottlieb came 
to the realization that "what has been a personal problem for 
me from the beginning, and what is a personal problem for 
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every artist I know, has become a sociological problem which 
seems to concern many people who are interested in art."(5) A 
few years earlier Robert Motherwell and Ad Reinhardt 
introduced the ambitious document Modern Artists in America
with the same observation: "Very recently great attention has 
been paid to Abstract Art in exhibitions and publications. 
Yet, on the whole, this solicitude has been characterized by 
an erratic concern, full of prejudice and confused by 
misunderstanding."(6) Society, it seems, had only replaced 
neglect with misunderstanding, trading one kind of abuse for 
another: "society," Gottlieb's statement from '54 continues, 
"when it does 'use' art, usually does so on levels that to 
the artist are contemptible," so that "one can still say that 
in America and Europe today the artist is to a large extent 
exposed to an ignorant, irresponsible and anonymous public 
whose innate or potential sensibility has been corrupted to 
the point where it is incapable of responding except to what 
is crass."(7) Harold Rosenberg wrote in 1952 that "despite 
the fact that more people see and hear about works of art 
than ever before, the vanguard artist has an audience of 
nobody."(8) 
Little had changed, or so it appeared. The artist was 
still believed to be living and working in isolation. Yet the 
shift was deemed threatening enough to necessitate new 
strategies to safeguard art's integrity and its ability to 
dictate the terms of its own evaluation. Rosenberg, for 
instance, chose to so exalt the act of painting as to make 
irrelevant the image that resulted and that viewers consumed; 
he championed those artists who "decided to paint...just TO 
PAINT."(9) What, of course, his ellipsis paves over is 
precisely a noun, some object to take the verb's action, thus 
rendering the usually transitive "to paint" suddenly 
intransitive. Such a desire to ward off any predication of 
the painter's act appears as only an extreme instance within 
a general tendency during this period to protect painting 
against what Jacques Derrida calls "nominalization," its
appropriation as a semantic unity and metaphoric vehicle. 
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"What is proper to nouns," Derrida writes, "is to signify 
something, an independent being identical to itself."(10)
It was perhaps a similar impulse that, 15 years later, 
motivated the proponents of process and conceptual art and 
other strategies that sought to demote pictorial values and 
static imagery. Bracketed between these two iconoclastic 
moments are the paintings I'll be discussing--paintings that, 
by avoiding (or, in Johns's case, ironizing) traces of 
brushwork and other evidence of the artist's labor, could be 
said to privilege reception over production despite the 
growing anxiety surrounding the former. It will be my 
argument that such artists as Louis and Noland, Judd and 
Johns exemplify different responses to this paradoxical 
situation, that the manner in which they stress the visual 
aspect of their works is shaped to a considerable degree by 
trepidations felt about the viewer. 
This is my outline. The time-frame for what follows 
stretches from the late 1950s through the early 1960s, while 
New York's art scene provides the setting (with Washington 
D.C. and Vermont cast in supporting roles, at once satellites
and safe havens). Within these general parameters focus is 
further narrowed around two sets of phenomena. One is the 
variety of artistic approaches whose emergence in the later 
half of the '50s brought to a close the dominance of Abstract 
Expressionism. The other is the perceived expansion and 
transformation of the audience for art in New York at the 
time, a popularizing trend greeted with much hand-wringing by 
artists, critics and other art "insiders." 
A further reduction occurs in how I characterize the 
emergent variety in art production during this period. 
Painting serves as my area of concentration, and within the 
spread out field of mid-century painting practices I isolate 
only a few examples--the works of Louis and Noland and, to a 
lesser extent, Johns, Judd and Stella. What the work of these
artists and the critical discourse surrounding it are made to 
exemplify are the different directions charted by 
experimentation in painting and the relations between these 
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directions, the fluid exchange that occurred between various 
approaches, as different artists and commentators elaborated 
divergent responses to shared interests and concerns. My 
account concludes in the mid '60s, when this fluid 
interchange comes to a halt. By 1965 arguments emerged (such 
as Fried's Three American Painters and Judd's "Specific 
Objects") that responded to differences between artistic 
viewpoints as representing stark polarities. To an extent 
such divisions have survived to the present in the form of 
stylistic distinctions known as color-field, minimalism and 
pop. It will be the burden of my dissertation to soften 
somewhat these oppositions, and to recover a sense of common 
ground on which initially these various practices intersected 
in their attempts to figure anxieties over and defenses 
against what was imagined to be the conditions of reception 
awaiting them.
Poetics and Rhetoric
The following chapters combine elaboration of analytical 
models with close readings of historical documents and formal 
analysis of artworks to get at the different ways in which 
artists could be said, and were said, to materially 
predispose their work toward or against an imagined audience. 
These different modes of address I will examine using the 
categories provided by rhetorical analysis. In particular, 
two main currents within the discourse on rhetoric seem 
especially well suited to my purposes, paralleling as they do 
the two main phenomena I've chosen to isolate. First, to 
track and describe the mobile field of confluence and 
deviation between the artistic and discursive practices 
highlighted in my account, I will appeal to the schema of the 
four master tropes--metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony-
-as proposed by such theorists of rhetoric as Kenneth Burke 
and Hayden White, in the hope of exploiting the subtlety 
calibrated shifts in emphasis that makes distinguishing 
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rhetorical tropes possible (if also tenuous). Second, my 
reading of the many warnings and denunciations of improper 
forms of art's reception and appreciation that snowballed 
during the '50s and early '60s is informed by the constant 
yet unstable attempts to distinguish between the rhetorical 
and the poetic that pervades writings on rhetoric, in which 
the two by turn overlap, complement and oppose one another.
"Eloquence is heard and poetry is overheard." So goes 
John Stuart Mill's famous definition of the relation between 
rhetoric and poetics.(11) The line has been paraphrased since 
by the likes of T. S. Eliot and Northrop Frye, the later 
writing in 1957 (the same year as the Barthes quote that 
serves as this chapter's epigraph) that "criticism can talk, 
and all the arts are dumb.... Poetry is a disinterested use 
of words: it does not address a reader directly."(12) 
Defending poetry against the advances of rhetoric was the 
task assumed by Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, R. P. Blackmur 
and other apostles of '40s New Criticism. Or such at least 
was the explicit claim made by a young Marshall McLuhan in 
one of his earliest essays for the Sewanee Review, titled 
"Poetic vs. Rhetorical Exegesis: The Case for Leavis Against 
Richards and Empson," in which he writes that "a poet's 
intention is entirely absorbed in the nature of the thing 
he's making [whereas] rhetoric...is incomplete without the 
precise audience for which it was intended."(13) It is a 
distinction that anticipates the one made by Michael Fried 
over 20 years later in "Art and Objecthood," in which the 
presentness of modernist painting is defended against the 
presence of minimalist (or what Fried called "literalist") 
objects. "Literalist work depends on the beholder," Fried 
writes, "is incomplete without him."(14)
Much the same opposition can be found throughout '50s 
and '60s writing on art. "The most satisfactory creations," 
stated Clement Greenberg in 1955, "are those which, like 
Piero's and Cézanne's, remain ineloquent, mute, with no 
urgent communication to make, and no thought of rousing us 
with look and gesture."(15) More often than not the 
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opposition was evoked in terms of art's growing involvement 
with commerce and publicity, as an inward-turned realm of 
artistic integrity was construed as strictly separate from a 
rhetorical realm in the well-established pejorative sense, a 
realm of non-fundamental ornament, where art is perverted 
through outward-turned promotion and acclaim. Indeed, when 
Greenberg was asked, again in '55, to write the forward to a 
(promotional?) brochure celebrating the tenth anniversary of 
the Betty Parsons Gallery, the highest compliment he could 
muster was to praise Parsons for her siding with 
disinterested art over sales. "I've seldom been able to bring 
her gallery into focus as part of the commercial apparatus of 
art," wrote Greenberg; "rather I think of it as belonging 
more to the studio and production side of art.... Mrs. 
Parsons' is an artist's--and critic's--gallery; a place where 
art goes on and is not just shown and sold."(16) Ten years 
later, Thomas Hess wrote an editorial for Art News that drew 
exactly the same distinction, only much more starkly. "There 
are two art worlds: one where painters and sculptors are at 
work, the other where art is seen. The first is the 
fundamental reality: the second...is stuffed with illusions, 
ephemera like headlines, haute-couture, pull, History, 
gossip, cash and other fashions and conveniences."(17) Rather 
than overheard and heard, here the opposition between the 
poetic and rhetorical is characterized in terms of production 
and reception, making (in private and in intimate proximity
with the work) and seeing (in public and through mediations
that distance and disfigure the work). 
Helen Frankenthaler adopted a typical stance when she 
put the matter more simply that same year: "When you're 
really painting, involved in a painting, what goes on in the 
art world doesn't matter."(18) Even curators and dealers 
routinely repeated the same hierarchical ordering of private 
over public. "There is no easy public art," insisted Henry 
Geldzahler, also in 1965, "there is only private, difficult 
art accessible to the public willing to make the effort."(19) 
A year before, the dealer John Myers lamented "the vast 
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enlargement of the art audience" and the commercialization of 
the art world since the early '50s (when he opened his own 
gallery, Tibor de Nagy). Myers's essay, titled "Junkdump Fair 
Surveyed," appeared in Art and Literature accompanied by "six 
pages of private art" (a pictorial spread reproducing works 
by older artists of Myers's generation such as de Kooning, 
Ellsworth Kelly and Joseph Cornell) as well as "six pages of 
public art" (featuring newer works by young pop artists like 
Tom Wesselmann). "One hopes," Myers writes, "there will be a 
deep cleavage between what [the older sculptor] David Hare 
calls public art and private art."(20)
Many of these statements from the early '60s straddle a 
transitional moment. Hess, Frankenthaler and Myers all look 
back nostalgically to a passing era when the poetic work was 
thought to depend upon the artist's sequestered, undistracted 
presence before it. But naming "the art world" as the culprit 
guilty of dividing the artist's attention and corrupting such 
poetics is new. Ten years earlier much the same language was 
used by artists to denounce a much more general notion of 
audience--it was an "anonymous" public, to use Gottlieb's 
word, or simply society at large. "The modern artist does not 
paint in relation to public needs or social needs," was the 
phrasing Gottlieb chose in 1955, "he paints only in relation 
to his own needs."(21) As was habitually recalled in the 
'60s, the number of artists, galleries and onlookers seemed 
infinitely smaller only a few years earlier, too small to 
warrant such a ponderous label as "art world." Or perhaps 
"art world" wasn't nearly ponderous enough; even if one did 
exist by mid-century, the ideology of Abstract Expressionism 
needed something grander lying in wait beyond the studio 
door. Namely, it needed society with its more telling and 
consequential acceptance or misunderstanding. That is where, 
according to Mark Rothko in 1947, "a picture lives by 
companionship, expanding and quickening in the eyes of the 
sensitive observer," and also where "it dies by the same 
token...permanently impaired by the eyes of the vulgar and 
the cruelty of the impotent." The vulgar and impotent were 
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not just artworld operators and gatekeepers, the critics and 
curators and 57th Street gallerists; Rothko meant them as 
representative social camps or hordes, armies at once 
dominant and dominated, empowered with a single paradoxical 
agency--to propagate senseless passivity, or as Rothko 
shrieked, to "extend their affliction universally!"(22)
Of course, the artist's isolation from society was not 
something post-war America invented. But after World War II a 
pronounced shift occurred in the way isolation was 
considered. Ignorance remained, only now it seemed to issue 
from the opposite direction: artists were the ones who 
disregarded society, not the other way around. "The very 
extremity of their isolation forces upon them a kind of 
optimism," argued Harold Rosenberg, "an impulse to believe in 
their ability to dissociate some personal essence of their 
experience and rescue it as the beginning of a new 
world."(23) Once thought an impediment to the aims of art, 
society's negligence and even hostility were increasingly 
seen as something to take advantage of. This becomes a 
familiar refrain during the early '50s, repeated by such 
artists as Gottlieb ("certain individuals need art but 
society or people in the mass get along quite well without 
art"), David Smith ("Nobody understands art but the 
artist...The artist deserves to be belligerent to the 
majority"), Hedda Sterne ("I don't think anybody really has a 
right to know exactly how I feel about my paintings") and 
David Hare ("I see no need for a community. An artist is 
always lonely").(24) Even Rothko came to feel that society's 
"very hostility can act as a lever for true liberation"; it 
left him feeling "freed from a false sense of security and 
community."(25)
There is a homology, of course, between the artist who 
creates for the sake of creation alone and the purposeless 
and disinterested poetic object that results. But artists in 
the '50s were not simply adopting the traditional and 
normative aesthetic attitude of contemplative disinterest; 
there was an active belligerence in their efforts to create 
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what Rosenberg called "a private myth" addressed to "no-
audience." "If you are involved in the world," Barnett Newman 
declared in 1951, "you cannot be an artist. We are in the 
process of making the world, to a certain extent, in our own 
image."(26) If the "enemies" of modern art felt they had "to 
fight it actively," as Greenberg had put it, artists in turn 
grew more adamant in their dismissals of such public 
response. They even devised ways of throwing the public 
deliberately off track, hoping to forestall or frustrate a 
shallow or corrupting acceptance. Ibram Laslow admitted that, 
when coining titles for his work, "I have used combinations 
of words or syllables without any meaning.... Such titles are 
just names, and are not to imply that the constructions 
express, symbolize, or represent anything."(27) Much the same 
strategy was taken up by Gottlieb as well, only he applied it 
not to his titles but to the paintings themselves (fig. 7): 
"I wanted to use ambiguous symbols for my own purposes, to 
prevent people giving them interpretations I didn't
mean."(28) In 1952 Rothko denied the Whitney Museum 
permission to buy and exhibit certain of his works, worried 
that the "real and specific meaning of the pictures would be 
lost and distorted." Two years later he refused to provide a 
statement to accompany an exhibition for fear that "an 
instrument will be created which will tell the public how the 
pictures should be looked at and what to look for."(29)
All such evasions and denials of the public became part 
of the story told by MoMA's 1959 canonizing exhibition "New 
American Painting," the catalog for which finds Alfred Barr 
noting how "the painters insist that they are deeply involved 
with subject matter or content yet as a matter of principle 
do nothing in their work to make communication easy."(30) Yet 
the very same accusation could be leveled at Barr himself. In 
1941, reacting against the increased incorporation of overt 
propaganda into museum displays in Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia, he issued a policy memo to MoMA staff prohibiting 
text from accompanying the exhibition of paintings and 
photographs.(31) For Greenberg, even the titles of artworks 
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often contained too much text: "I wish someone would caution 
modern painters about their titles," he groaned in 1948. A 
few years earlier Rothko had given up on literary titles and 
started using numbers instead. Pollock followed suit soon 
after. Numbers didn't reveal or evoke anything, and neither 
did they conspicuously obscure and mislead. "Numbers are 
neutral," Lee Krasner explained in 1950. "They make people
look at a painting for what it is--pure painting."(32)
As the Abstract Expressionists emphasized the 
individual's antagonism toward society, and with it the 
opposition between private and public, interior and exterior, 
releasing the artwork from the sanctuary of the studio and 
the hand of the artist developed into a tragic drama unto 
itself. Rothko wasn't the only one who felt this way about 
his work--that it was "a risky and unfeeling act to send it 
out into the world."(33) One of the ways this concern gets 
expressed is through tireless deliberation over the question 
of how and when to deem a work finished ("finished" being, 
paradoxically, the work's first predication, the moment it 
emerges as a fully formed subject available to adjectives, 
predicates, nominalization, to being seen as something--as 
finished, for starters). This very question consumed much of 
the first Artists' Session at Studio 35 in 1950. The 
legendary difficulties de Kooning had in deciding a painting 
was done was taken as exemplary. Robert Motherwell posited 
such difficulty--in words that anticipate Robert Morris's 
later impatience with the rhetoric of "tasteful arrangements 
of static forms"--as a defining American trait, in contrast 
to which French paintings "have a real 'finish' in that the 
picture is a real object, a beautifully made object. We are 
involved in process and what is a 'finished' object is not so 
certain."(34) Greenberg had ventured the same comparison on 
numerous occasions in the mid-'40s: French artists tended to 
render "finished performances but very little goes deep"; the 
problem with Chagall was that he "set himself to assimilating 
French cuisine and suavity...he polished, softened, refined 
his art"; the same went for Bonnard, who "can paint 'French' 
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easily enough and turn out any number of sure-fire 
successes."(35) An artwork's finish, accomplished as a 
deliberate feat, was rhetorical, a tacked-on cosmetic 
intended to persuade onlookers; finish stayed on the surface, 
where the work was forced to negotiate an audience, and was 
too much a matter of effect, too easily detachable from the 
poetics of interiority and depth. On the contrary, claimed 
Greenberg, real finish is never an external adjunct or frill 
but grows organically from the core of the poetic object 
itself, is its revealed essence. With great art, he wrote, 
"time alone has done the smoothing and refining." Time 
weathers away exteriority, bringing interiority to the 
surface.(36)
Greenberg deemed Jean Dubuffet the only "truly original" 
Frenchman of the new generation, and in 1947 measured his 
work against that of Pollock, only to find the American's 
paintings "rougher and more brutal," but also less distracted 
and self-divided, "completer...capable of more variety...more 
original," whereas "Dubuffet's sophistication enables him to 
'package' his canvases more skillfully and pleasingly."(37) 
Pollock had a more concentrated, less diluted truth to 
reveal, precisely because he had no audience. "Isolation is, 
so to speak, the natural condition of high art in America," 
Greenberg announced around the same time, and like Rosenberg 
and Rothko he found that "it is precisely our more intimate 
and habitual acquaintance with isolation that gives us our 
advantage at this moment...isolation, alienation, naked and 
revealed unto itself, is the condition under which the true 
reality of our age is experienced."(38) Poetics radiated from 
the very milieu of artistic production in the U.S. "The best 
painting done in this country at the moment," Greenberg 
continued, "does not reach the public eye." French painting, 
on the other hand, had an art world. "The activity that goes 
on in Paris, the talk, the many literary and art magazines, 
the quick recognition, the tokens of reward, the crowded 
openings--all these, which were once signs of life, have now 
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become a means of suppressing reality, a contradiction of 
reality, an evasion."(39) 
Even what little audience Pollock did have he refused to 
play to--his work exhibited "bad taste" and "a willingness to 
be ugly."(40) His paintings could only be overheard (this 
Pollock himself declared: "When I am in my painting, I'm not 
aware of what I'm doing").(41) Greenberg was no fan of what 
he called "the wild artist" ("if art is wild it must be 
irrelevant"); he cautioned against Pollock's lack of 
discipline, complained that his work "does not finish inside 
the canvas," but he also knew that a greater error lay in the 
opposite direction, in too much finish, in "Frenchified 
refinement."(42) "In Paris they finish and unify," Greenberg 
complained in 1953, and again called French art "'packaged,' 
wrapped up to seal it in as an easel painting."(43) 
"Art is a matter of conception and intuition, not 
physical finish."(44) Greenberg's equating of an artwork's 
"finish" with the idea of packaging is telling. Whenever he 
used the latter word it was in reference to the 
rationalizations of late capitalism, its justifications of 
overproduction and the centrality of sloughing off mounting 
surpluses through ever-enhanced sales techniques. In a 1942 
review of recently published art books he complained that the 
reproductions had "something glossy and packaged about 
them...their mode of production was rationalized as far as 
possible, and the result was arranged and corrected with a 
view to its sales appeal."(45) Five years later he broadened 
his complaint considerably: "Today the new mass cultural 
market created by industrialism is seducing writers and 
artists into rationalizing and packaging for mass 
distribution even the most pretentious products."(46) 
Greenberg perhaps meant the word figuratively, but there was 
more than a touch of literal truth to it as well; it was 
during this time that numerous corporations began 
commissioning modern art for their advertisements. Georgia 
O'Keefe painted for Dole Pineapple, Thomas Hart Benton for 
Lucky Strike, while the Container Corporation of America 
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retained the services of Leger, Henry Moore, Man Ray, Richard 
Lindner and, ironically enough, de Kooning, the master of not 
finishing. 
De Kooning's contribution to the Container Corporation's 
marketing campaign appeared in a full-page ad in Fortune in 
1945 (fig. 8), the same year the company exhibited its art 
holdings at the Art Institute of Chicago, in a show called 
"Modern Art in Advertising." The crucial role played by 
design and aesthetics in the making and marketing of goods 
was emerging as a dominant preoccupation for business during 
the '40s. "No product, however well its aesthetic functions 
are fulfilled," wrote J. Gordon Lippincott in his 1947 Design
for Business, "may be termed a good example of industrial 
design unless it meets the acid test of high sales through 
public acceptance. Good industrial design means mass
acceptance. No matter how beautiful a product may be, if it 
does not meet this test, the designer has failed of his 
purpose." Explaining his interest in modern art a few years 
later, Container Corporation's founder and chairman Walter 
Paepcke wrote, "The techniques of modern artists would 
identify us with current developments in applied graphic art 
which were--and are--so important to packaging."(47)
Greenberg was all too aware of the growing coziness 
between commerce and modern art. Only months after the de 
Kooning ad ran in Fortune, in the midst of a tirade against 
"the broad-front retreat of American art at the moment," 
Greenberg pointed to "the increasing practice on the part of 
commercial firms of having what in popular estimation are 
high-art artists illustrate their advertisements."(48) 
Packaging was part of the rhetoric by which high art was 
distracting, dividing and losing itself, being made overly 
concerned with pleasing middle-brow taste and its demand for 
things "not too hard to consume." This was a direct betrayal 
of what Greenberg understood as the modernist project in art, 
which since the late 19th century "asserted that the genesis 
and process of the work of art were what was to be most 
prominently offered to the spectator's attention...this 
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aesthetic repudiated finish, polish, surface grace." Or, as 
he announced in "Toward a Newer Laocoon," central to the 
avant-garde is "the assertion of the arts as independent 
vocations...absolutely autonomous, and entitled to respect 
for their own sakes, and not merely as vessels of 
communication." But often Greenberg would put the matter more 
bluntly: what he wanted were "pictures [that] make no 
gestures to fashion or publicity"; "painting [that] is all 
painting; none of it is publicity, mode, or literature."(49) 
Retreat of Poetics from Society to the Individual and the
Rhetoric of the Lone Artist
Greenberg's denunciations of the rhetoric of packaging and 
finish can be seen as intimately tied up with his construal 
of a theory of the entire program and history of modern art 
and its attempt at securing a relatively stable base or 
sovereignty for its practices. Moreover, the stand-offishness 
of New York School painting might be considered in similarly 
broad historical terms, as a mere updating of earlier modern 
artistic tendencies, especially the notion of the quasi-
mystical Image embraced by romantics and symbolists, which, 
as Frank Kermode has described, "for all its concretion, 
precision, and oneness, is desperately difficult to 
communicate."(50) For the poetic object to adequately "expand 
and quicken" it needs not only an artist but a viewer equal 
to it--one just as fully centered, self-contained and self-
integrated. It "demands," Kermode writes, "an intense 
individuality, a cultivation of difference."(51) But again, 
artists of the '50s considered their difference motivated as 
much by society and its failings as by the inherent nature of 
their vision and their art. There was a bitterness, a 
vindictive quality to their stance, since indeed 
rapprochement between art and society had originally been 
their stated goal. Their isolation was only a measure of the 
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degree to which society shrank from its end of the bargain. 
As Nancy Jachec has recently argued, by 1950
belief in communication through archetypal imagery had 
been completely discredited, and was no longer 
considered either possible or desirable. This is due 
to...the shift to a mass consumption economy, from which 
artists and intellectuals recoiled in a flurry of 
dissent.... The disappearance of the figure, preference 
for the signature style, and the increased individualism 
which this stylistic shift implies all point to the 
collapse of faith in the collective.(52)
Between the mid '40s and early '50s hope among New York 
School artists of a coming socialist utopia all but 
disappeared, and with it the idea of art's full realization, 
as well as the individual's, as occurring within society, 
coincidental with the recreation of society itself through 
its consummation in a fully realized humanity. Socialism was 
to bring about a universalization of the poetic, a communal, 
democratic utopia as the poetic object writ large. "Only 
through the establishment of a cooperative society can poetry 
reach its proper role as the fusing power of collective 
purpose," Harold Rosenberg had declared in 1936.(53) The 
poetic would serve as the basis not for a cult of difference 
but for cultivating commonalities and community. Ad Reinhardt 
spoke of "working toward a synthesis of the arts, to an 
eventual absorption of the imaginative artist in a more 
collective and anonymous job of creating better places for 
people to live in."(54) Mondrian's presence in New York 
helped keep this ideal of art and society's future 
reconciliation foregrounded. "With Marx, [Mondrian] 
anticipated the disappearance of works of art--pictures, 
sculpture--when the material décor of life and life itself 
had become beautiful," Greenberg wrote. "With Marx, he saw 
the true end of human striving as complete deliverance from 
the oppression of nature, both inside and outside the human 
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being. With Marx, he saw that man has to denaturalize himself 
and the things he deals with in order to realize his own true 
nature."(55) Indeed, few spoke of art's relation to the 
socialist ideal as eloquently as Greenberg. "The security, 
leisure, and comfort indispensable to the cultivation of 
taste," the critic claimed in 1946, "only a socialist society 
can provide." And two years earlier: "It will be enough for 
socialism that every human being--his body no less than his 
soul--is regarded as an end in himself...men cannot regard 
each other as ends in themselves unless they are freed from 
the necessity of exploiting and being exploited by one 
another."(56) 
As socialist hopes faded ("who talks of socialism in 
America?" Greenberg was already asking by 1947), post-war 
appeals to the public increasingly conjured images not of 
utopia but of Fascism and herd mentality, of mass marketing 
and bureaucratic anonymity. "One of the aims of culture is to 
transform the private into the public," Greenberg explained. 
"Culture enables individuals to communicate and appreciate 
inwardness, and make it objective. Whereas failure of 
individuals to express inwardness converts them into a 
mass."(57) It was "totalitarian government," as Hannah Arendt 
famously put it in 1951, that "always transformed classes 
into masses."(58) By 1948 Harold Rosenberg was already 
labeling as hopeless all efforts to address a broad public--
whether "by a movie producer, a party cultural official, or 
by the artist himself as a theoretician of social relevance." 
How to reach and effect audiences had become the specialized 
domain of "the mass-culture maker," the master rhetorician. 
As Rosenberg warned, "So deeply is he committed to the 
concept that men are alike that he may even fancy that there 
exists a kind of human dead center in which everyone is 
identical with everyone else, and that if he can hit that 
psychic bull's-eye he can make all of mankind twitch at 
once."(59) Persuasion, the traditional aim of rhetoric, when 
viewed in the context of recent history and advanced 
capitalism's awesome technical capacities, was thus 
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identified with the era's most pressing political and social 
threat.
Greenberg reasoned that, under such conditions, "the 
effort to assert a private life of emotion displaces the 
ambition to externalize and to synthesize a total view of the 
world."(60) He saw all hopes in social change and progress as 
having fallen victim to a growing and pervasive pessimism 
that restricted cultural energy and interest within the 
privacy--and privation--of individuals. Artists now lived in 
"an age whose remaining optimism...has become the private 
affair of individuals," he wrote. "Whereas the cubists 
regarded the disenchantment of the world as a triumph for 
man, later artists...have become so disillusioned with that 
triumph that they now seek new myths and new obscurities 
inside themselves."(61) Modern poetics, as a property of the 
fully integrated, self-possessed individual or artwork, had 
held out a promise of redemption if it could only fold 
society into itself; but this promise also entailed a risk, 
since turning to face society threatened to convert poetics 
into its opposite, rhetoric. Poetics had sought to lose 
itself as it absorbed its opposite and redeemed and 
poeticized society; now poetics feared such a loss of self, 
seeking defenses against being absorbed by rhetoric. If a 
poetic realm still existed, it would be sought no longer on 
the level of society but only within the individual. More 
than that, it would be sought by individuals in active 
opposition to society at large. The new poetic artwork, with 
its lack of figuration and its signature style, would thus 
become modeled on this new isolated and uncommunicating 
individual.
If artists in the '50s didn't worry over the corruptions 
of "the art world," then, it is not only because that world 
hadn't yet bulked up enough to make its presence felt. 
Society still remained a subject for art, if only through old 
promises left unfulfilled and new offenses and estrangements 
it had only just begun to formulate. But an art world of 
undeniable proportion did grow up around the New York School 
28
during the '50s. At the same time, the stereotype of the 
staunchly individual artist was appropriated by society as a 
popular phenomenon, a poetic object with significant box-
office appeal. In February 1957 the front page of the New
York Times reported that in the decade since 1946 (that is, 
between the time Irving Stone's Lust for Life became a 
surprise bestseller and Vincente Minnelli's movie adaptation 
starring Kirk Douglas hit the big screen) there had been a 
500 percent increase in the city's number of art galleries 
and in the volume of its art sales.(62) Within months of the 
report the Metropolitan Museum bought Jackson Pollock's 
Autumn Rhythm for $30,000 and the television show "The Scope 
of Picasso," produced by MoMA, aired on CBS. The following 
January drama critic Robert Brustein, citing the Met's 
purchase, complained in Horizon that "non-communication" had 
itself become a cultural fad, with Abstract Expressionism 
serving as "a pictorial parallel to the mumbling Method 
performance and the stammering San Francisco novel."(63) In 
April Time magazine reported that galleries were happily 
discovering that the absence of finish typical of American 
art was a "look" that attracted the most sales; dealer Rose 
Fried was quoted as saying that "the French can cook up a 
better cuisine, but right now we've got the more vigorous 
stew."(64) As the decade closed George Sugarman admitted at 
the Club that "the artist with no roots but his own 
subconscious, the cult of the primitive, of the immediate, of 
anything that will shock, of the need to be different...once 
so frightening, these values are now so domesticated that 
even the best homes will admit them; indeed, the best homes 
will admit none but them; they are tried and true; they are 
safe."(65)
As Gottlieb, Motherwell, Rosenberg and others remarked, 
society did indeed start paying attention to Abstract 
Expressionism throughout the 1950s. By 1958 concerns were 
rampant among artists and critics that New York School 
painting had become a look, a formula or style, that it had 
congealed into nothing more than a surface effect or finish. 
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Moreover, society trained its spotlight not only on the 
paintings but also on the figure of the lone, inarticulate 
artist who made and was mirrored in them. As a result, the 
poetics of the isolated individual itself became packaged, 
made over into image, caption, headline--that is, a rhetoric. 
The prime example, of course, is Jackson Pollock, who "burst 
forth as the shining new phenomenon of American art," as Life
proclaimed in 1949.(66) Three months later, the opening of 
Pollock's third solo show at Betty Parsons's attracted a 
larger than usual crowd, well beyond the always reliable 
group of fellow artists (even though Parsons had mounted a 
Pollock show less than a year earlier). The collectors Roy 
Neuberger and Burton Tremaine were there, as were Alfred Barr 
of MoMA and Edgar Kaufmann, Jr., director of the museum's 
Department of Industrial Design, which was just then putting 
the finishing touches on the first of an upcoming series of 
"Good Design" shows, "the most extensive exhibition program 
in the applied arts The Museum of Modern Art has ever 
undertaken."(67) In addition to paintings, the Parsons show 
included a small model for "an ideal museum," the result of a 
collaboration between Pollock and the architect Peter Blake. 
Marcel Breuer, who was at the time designing a new house for 
Mr. and Mrs. Bertram Geller in Lawrence, Long Island, came to 
see the show at Blake's urging. Impressed, Breuer immediately 
arranged for the Gellers to commission a "mural" from Pollock 
for their new home.(68)
Also at the opening was Alexey Brodovitch, art director 
of Harper's Bazaar and head of the influential graphic design 
workshop in New York called "Design Laboratory." A fan of 
Pollock, Brodovitch convinced one of his more skeptical 
students, Hans Namuth, to give the show a second look. A few 
months later Namuth approached Pollock about permitting a 
photo shoot of the artist at work.(69) The now famous 
photographs that resulted were first published by Brodovitch 
in 1951, in the third issue of the short-lived Portfolio
magazine. That summer MoMA screened Namuth's film. The 
following February Brodovitch again published more of 
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Namuth's work on Pollock, this time in Harper's Bazaar, 
accompanied by a short essay, "Jackson Pollock's New Style," 
by Clement Greenberg (fig. 9). Brodovitch, Barr, Kaufmann, 
Breuer and Blake all knew each other (Brodovitch designed 
books on modern architecture by Blake and Breuer, and his own 
chair designs won third prize in Kaufmann's first project for 
MoMA, the 1948 "International Competition for Low-Cost 
Furniture Design").(70) Together they stood at the Pollock 
opening, in the midst of this otherwise outcast milieu, as 
agents of social integration, an elite of stylists, 
trendsetters, tastemakers, master-builders and facilitators, 
a braintrust of the kind of misappropriation that Hess would 
list off in '65--"headlines, haute-couture, pull, History, 
cash, fashion." "There were a lot of people there I'd never 
seen before," recalled Milton Resnick, who attended the 
opening with de Kooning. "Look around," de Kooning replied. 
"These are the big shots. Jackson has finally broken the 
ice."(71)
Even if the verb "to paint" had lost its object, it 
still had a subject, a painter, a noun serving as actor or 
agent. Indeed, the more poetic--the more isolated, mute, 
oblivious and introspective--an artist like Pollock appeared, 
the more purely iconic and logo-like the figure he cut. "In a 
persistent effort to find a voice for America, to find a 
language, vocabulary, and intonation peculiarly our own, we 
have come temporarily to settle for no voice at all," Robert 
Brustein chastised. It was as if, like the method actor, 
Pollock had taken literally Northrup Frye's terse 
prescription about the poetic--if "the arts are dumb," 
Pollock would be too--and yet he found that it only 
transformed him all the more into a stereotype, a mascot, a 
celebrity. Fellow painters noticed it: "He was so involved 
with his uncontrollable neuroses and demons," Motherwell 
remarked, "that I occasionally see him like Marlon Brando in 
scenes from A Streetcar Named Desire."(72) No less than the 
dense webs of paint that he created, the photographs of 
Pollock flailing in the private studio seemed, in their very 
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curiosity and unintelligibility, to cry out for explanation, 
to necessitate a supporting language, a caption. Of course, 
the popular culture had plenty in store. Pollock became a 
mere reflection of a popular trend, despite the fact that he 
may have been that trend's very source: it has been suggested 
that the character of Stanley Kowalski was based in part on 
Pollock, whom Tennessee Williams met in 1944.(73) 
"Since the painter has become an actor," Harold 
Rosenberg wrote, "the spectator has to think in a vocabulary 
of action: its inception, duration, direction--psychic state, 
concentration and relaxation of the will, passivity, alert 
waiting."(74) Even if unhinged from a direct object, the verb 
"to paint" could still be qualified by adverbs. Yet it was 
these very qualifiers that Namuth's photographs of Pollock so 
effectively objectified, made iconic, perhaps even more so 
than the painter's finished canvases. Indeed, Namuth's 
action-photographer approach, his use of motion, sequence, 
blur--all these were tropes that Brodovitch and other art 
directors had already made dominant within the aesthetics of 
'40s fashion photography. Alexander Liberman, Brodovitch's 
counterpart at Vogue and himself a part-time painter, began 
in 1951 to run his own photographs of the studios of such 
veteran European moderns as Utrillo, Kupka and Braque; by 
1954 what Liberman called his "photo-essays" on European 
artists at work became a recurring feature in Vogue's pages. 
At the end of the decade MoMA hosted an exhibition of 150 
prints from Liberman's project, with the show, titled "The 
Artist in His Studio," preceding by months Viking Press's 
publication of Liberman's coffee-table book by the same name. 
This photo-documentary trend may have in fact been 
propelled by Art News, which in 1949 launched its own series 
of pictorials of artists at work, each issue capturing 
another poetic act in mid-performance. As Walter Benjamin 
famously put it a decade before, such uses of photography 
answered "the desire of contemporary masses to bring things 
'closer' spatially and humanly...to get hold of an object at 
very close range by way of its likeness...to pry an object 
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from its shell, to destroy its aura."(75) By way of a 
metonymic slide, nonfigurative artworks focused solely on 
process and the materials of their own making were being 
supplanted precisely by figures--that is, the figures of 
their lonely makers and the behind-the-scenes anecdotes of 
their studios. The artist's inner turmoil, the studio as 
inner sanctum, the undivided devotion of the painter's act to 
the moment and the space of creation--all these interiors 
were being excavated, flushed out and circulated by publicity 
and mass reproduction. Moreover, all were being staged for an 
"anonymous" audience that seemed to be growing exponentially. 
"Society nowadays," Alan Kaprow would come to observe in 
1964, "pursues the artist instead of exiling him.... 
Attracted to art by the mass mediums, they come to an artist 
with enthusiasm, and, of course, little grasp of what he's 
doing.... The artist can no longer succeed by failing. 
Deprived by his classic enemy society, he cannot comfort 
himself in his lack of recognition...now his only opponent, 
if he has any, is the competition."(76) Defensive tactics 
such as non-communication and the iconoclasm of pure action 
hadn't solved the problem--more people than ever were 
looking, and there was more and more for them to look at. 
Spectating and spectators couldn't be denied or avoided any 
longer, but had to be confronted directly.
This was an argument Greenberg repeated often, notably 
in the sarcastic 1962 essay "How Art Writing Earns Its Bad 
Name," in which he chided Rosenberg directly for not being 
able to "explain why the painted left-overs of 'action,' 
which were devoid of anything but autobiographical meaning in 
the eyes of their own makers, should be exhibited by them and 
looked at and even acquired by others."(77) By 1960 
Greenberg's views had risen to dominance, superceding 
Rosenberg's: Greenberg was widely recognized as "the dean of 
postwar American critics," his claims for the most prosperous 
tendencies in recent abstract art credited with 
"extraordinary prescience and accuracy."(78) Foremost among 
those tendencies was the development of what Greenberg would 
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come to call post-painterly abstraction, exemplified in his 
mind by the work of Morris Louis and Kenneth Noland. But 
already by the mid-'50s others beside Greenberg were calling 
for a re-evaluation of action painting, at the very moment of 
its apotheosis, and for fresh approaches to be considered. Al 
Held, for one, reasoned in 1958 that "the rigid logic of a 
two-dimensional aesthetic binds us to the canvas surface 
making it an end in itself, not a means to an end." But from 
this observation he segued into an argument against the 
Action Painter and his cherished privacy. In his very next 
sentence, Held states that "I would like to develop from this 
not by going inwards toward the old horizon but outward 
toward the spectator. The space between canvas and spectator 
is real--emotionally, physically and logically.... I would 
like to use it as such and thus bridge the gulf that 
separates the painting from the viewer."(79) A year earlier 
Marcel Duchamp had similarly announced the need to 
acknowledge the spectator, since "the spectator brings the 
work in contact with the external world by deciphering and 
interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his 
contribution to the creative act."(80)
A generation of younger artists would soon follow 
through dramatically on these ideas. It was in 1958 that 
Jasper Johns first developed an intense fascination with 
Duchamp; and a year later, when Frank Stella showed his Black 
Stripe paintings at MoMA, it seemed as if Held's and 
Duchamp's programs had been fused into one. Neo-Dada is what 
many reviewers labeled both Johns's and Stella's debuts. "The 
paintings themselves need spectator reaction--shock, chagrin, 
amusement--in order to exist," Irving Sandler complained 
about Stella's approach. "They are public works... It would 
be difficult to imagine them glowing in the privacy of the 
studio."(81) The '60s would witness a growing demand 
precisely for a more public mode at the expense of the 
"privacy of the studio." "Art is a social profession, not an 
anti-social phenomenon," Brian O'Doherty declared in 1966. 
Two years earlier Kaprow had written, "A picture remaining in 
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the studio neither exists as Value nor exists at all for an 
art hungry public which no longer dreams of the romance of 
Bohemia.... The way from here is not so much Up as Out...out 
of that inner-man who has been bled to death or reduced to 
impotence from over-indulgence."(82) One way Kaprow himself 
went public was by authoring formal essays for publication, 
and he wasn't alone. A distinguishing feature of the '60s is 
how much writing by artists filled art magazines. Another 
example is Robert Morris, who famously advocated "the non-
personal or public mode" of recent sculpture.(83) Perhaps the 
most extreme denunciation of the private studio came from Dan 
Flavin, who wrote in 1969 (a year after Art News ceased 
running pictorials of artists "privately" at work), "The 
romance of days of belabored feeling, of precious, pious, 
compulsively grimy studio-bound labor by haphazardly informed 
neurotic 'loners,' often verging on mental illness, relying 
desperately on intuitive good sense, is passing from art. The 
contemporary artist is becoming a public man, trusting his 
own intelligence, confirming his own informed ideas."(84) But 
by this late date Flavin was only stating what was plainly 
obvious.
Many members of the older generation--like 
Frankenthaler, Hess and Myers--agreed that art had assumed a 
more public mode, although they certainly weren't as giddy in 
their analyses. "Gone are the days when artists stood aloof 
from the mainstream of American life, votaries of sensibility 
defending precious and exalted principles against boorish 
complacencies and the bad taste of the majority," Hilton 
Kramer sighed in 1964.
Nowadays artists...are marvelously adept at this 
venerable American pastime of substituting the word, the 
claim, the noise, for the difficult deed. It is now the 
dotty and outrageous, the loudest voices and most 
extravagant of showmen who become the most talked about, 
and therefore--by means of that curious cultural alchemy 
that turns publicity into respectability--the quickest 
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to be accepted into the world where reputations are made 
and styles are accepted, praised and given instant 
historical significance. ...Sparkle, dazzle, dash--any 
sort of brightness and high jinks--are given high marks 
without a moment's (and certainly not a season's) 
reflection, whereas intelligence, decorum, and the 
values of the cultivated sensibility tend, if not 
actually to inspire contempt, certainly to be taken for 
granted.(85)
Myers also named publicity--moreover, publicity as aligned 
with cosmetics--as that which had superceded the poetics of 
privacy. "Stronger social contacts and extra dividends in 
publicity...these are regarded as the two most important 
problems facing Today's Artist....publicity is a basic 
necessity and nothing should be overlooked--certainly not 
radio and, above all, TV. The artist feels he needs TV 
appearances and the Telly has been going in for art more and 
more... at the Cedar Bar one hears how splendid Mrs. Jackson 
Pollock looked televised, or what a lousy make-up job they 
did on Henry Geldzahler."(86)
Television had indeed been "going in for art." For 
example: on "Bat Masterson," Bat's friend Teresa Renault 
bought a painting claimed to be a fake; on "Bourbon Street 
Beat," lead detective Rex Randolph was hired by an art dealer 
to find a stolen painting; a deliberately hidden painting was 
at the center of "Command Performance's" presentation of "The 
Intolerable Portrait"; while "The Margaret Bourke-White 
Story" was aired on "Sunday Showcase." And this was all in 
one night (Sunday, January 3, 1960).(87) News shows, 
documentaries and educational programming also focused on 
art: in 1962 Mike Wallace interviewed Robert Rauschenberg 
while in his studio making Barge, and Thomas Hess and John 
Canaday debated Abstract Expressionism on "The Nation's 
Future"; meanwhile, twice a week Aline Saarinen (nee 
Louchheim) did eight-minute spots every two weeks as the 
"Today Show's" art critic. Especially in the early '60s, art 
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was everywhere on TV, and TV was everywhere (by 1965 only 
eight percent of homes in the U.S. didn't own a television 
set; 20 percent of homes had two or more; the average family 
watched five hours of television a day). Artists watched it 
too, bringing TV sets into their studios. "I don't want my 
personality to come through the piece, that's why I keep TV 
on all time," Rauschenberg told Barbara Rose in the late 
'50s. Lee Bontecou remembers that the set she had in her 
studio during the late '50s and '60s was "one of the last 
oval ones."(88) Modernist painting, too, made it onto TV. The 
two part documentary "The New Abstraction," featuring Louis, 
Noland, Stella and Larry Poons, aired in the spring of 1966, 
with the voice-over narration written by art historian and 
curator Alan Solomon.(89) Television, labeled a "vast 
wasteland" in 1961 by Federal Communications Commission 
chairman Newton N. Minow, was not only hounding out of 
seclusion the brooding artist and the studio-as-sanctum by 
turning them into mass-circulated stereotypes, but it was 
enlisting those very stereotypes in its invasion of yet 
another, more expansive private realm--the domestic interior. 
Andy Warhol foresaw the loss not only of the private but of 
any personal feelings in the triumph of TV, with its outloud 
broadcast, over literary culture, with its silent, individual 
reading. "Books will go out, TV will stay," he announced in 
1966. "When I got my first TV set I stopped caring so much 
about close relationships with other people."(90)
From Poetic Individual to the Poetic Object
It is not that poetics disappeared entirely in the 1960s, 
only that it seemed to no longer reside in the usual places. 
Michael Fried, for one, devoted an entire 1963 essay to the 
relation between poetry and the work of Morris Louis. 
"Louis's paintings," Fried argued, "ask to be related with 
Symbolist poetic theory and practice."(91) In particular, the 
quality Louis's work shared with that of Mallarme and Hart 
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Crane was "the appearance, or illusion, of a sovereign 
impersonality." As Fried explained, Louis's "best paintings" 
succeed by "seeming to have come into existence as if of 
their own accord...as if the paint expressed itself upon the 
canvas through the painter, and not at all as if the painter 
expressed himself through the medium of paint."(92) Such an 
evaluation exactly inverts the terms Rosenberg had set out a 
decade earlier: no longer is poetic integrity sheltered 
within the individual artist at the expense of the finished 
work of art, but rather it is the work of art, in all its 
visual display, that attains poetic status precisely as it 
absorbs and eclipses the figure of the artist. Furthermore, 
as the phrase "sovereign impersonality" makes clear, it is no 
longer the action painter who must shun society for the sake 
of art, but rather the poetic artwork itself that must shun 
not only society but the artist as well in order to stand all 
the more impervious and indifferent. The artist as outcast 
seemed no longer credible, nor could the artist be trusted in 
public; instead the artwork, at the very moment of its 
unveiling, would defeat publicity by remaining only itself, 
alone, in public view. As Fried quotes Mallarme, "The pure 
work implies the elocutionary disappearance of the poet, who 
yields place to the words."(93)
In contrast to the '50s cult of the inarticulate artist 
opposed to society, the '60s would establish a poetics of the 
indifferent object, a shift that perhaps reached its climax 
with minimal art. But already in 1958 the change was well 
underway, and painting was pointed to as providing evidence--
especially the tendency at the time for artists to make 
paintings the size of which expanded well beyond the limits 
of the easel format. As E. C. Goossen described the effects 
of what he called the Big Canvas, "The picture itself is now 
a thing, and as such refers less to extraneous 'subject 
matter' and illusions of the same. Almost as much as the 
Pyramids, it speaks of itself and itself alone. It is no 
longer a window to a world, but the world, immanent and 
autonomous." The autonomy of the work is bound up with its 
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sheer existence, which overrides its status either as a 
picture of some other object or as the product of some 
subject. Rather than mirror or window, painting is now a 
wall, and at the same time has walled itself off. The only 
predicate to be given such a painting is that it is itself. 
"It has size, and thus dignity, a dignity no longer intruded 
upon by fictitious agents in human attire. The figure was 
forced out of the picture...."(94) 
Like Fried's symbolist painting, Goossen's Big Canvas 
divorces itself from, among other things, the painter--he is 
among the "figures" to be forced out. Yet, the painter who 
either is forced out or "disappears" within the canvas 
doesn't find in such exile the same privacy and sanctuary as 
was offered by the studio and its walls. For the painting--as 
surface, sign, image--has no hidden interior, but rather is 
all public. This was the point Geldzahler made in 1965, 
echoing Fried's words from two years earlier. "For the 
painter limiting himself to a self-imposed and invented 
vocabulary, simple shapes and their relationships, there is 
literally no place to hide.... All is out in the open for 
everyone to see. That doesn't make it easier to see, but, 
paradoxically, more difficult. There is no anecdote, no 
allusion except to other art, nothing outside art itself that 
might make the viewer more comfortable or give him something 
to talk about."(95)
Since art is inherently visual, so the logic ran, an 
artwork that is poetically, mutely just itself will 
necessarily be entirely open to eyesight. But precisely by 
coming to grips with visibility in this way, the artwork was 
thought to also stay resolutely within itself, to not pander 
to viewers, to avoid rhetoric. This was the tenuous 
distinction much art in the early '60s staked itself on. It 
is what differentiated '60s art from that of the '50s, what 
led to a typical kind of '60s visual effect that Lawrence 
Alloway called "not a struggle against signification but the 
description of its absence."(96) Roland Barthes observed the 
same thing in a 1964 essay in Art and Literature (quoted two 
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years later by Mel Bochner when writing on "systemic" art): 
"Lovingly--and exclusively--to paint surfaces that mean 
nothing at all amounts to a very up-to-date aesthetic of 
silence."(97) Art would somehow be visible strictly on its
own terms, as if its visual aspect had "come into existence 
of its own accord," in total disregard of both artist and 
audience, and thus it would supposedly transcend the problem 
of audience without any trace of the tactics or struggles by 
which the artist actively opposes such an audience. Thus many 
of the pivotal statements on art in the '60s are at one and 
the same time scientistic disquisitions on the very essence 
of visuality and also attempts to reform or restrict or even 
bypass altogether the role of the artwork's reception. 
For example, various types of viewer-object relations 
were made into a kind of negative criteria. Stella, for one, 
complained that "people...always end up asserting that there 
is something there besides the paint on the canvas.... What 
you see is what you see."(98) Fried solved the problem of the 
viewer by having him or her do like the painter and 
"disappear" into the artwork. Correct viewing obligated a 
particular self-annihilating stance and attitude: "As 
beholder, one occupies (or ought to occupy) a position... 
analogous to that occupied by [the artist] in relation to his 
work in progress--a position, that is, which may be called a 
point of no view." On the one hand, Fried didn't want to be 
made conscious of the painter's presence before the work--
"individual paintings suffer," he wrote about Louis, "when 
one comes to feel that particular shapes or contours have 
been 'drawn' with the wrist rather than that they have 
somehow come about as if of their own accord"--and yet 
neither did he want to be aware of his own presence as an 
onlooker--thus a work also fails when it "distances us" or 
"we distance it," when "one becomes a spectator."(99) From 
Fried's "theatricality" to Susan Sontag's "against 
interpretation" to Judd's claim that "things that exist 
exist...the values and interests they have are only 
adventitious," a common aim was to isolate out what is at 
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base rhetorical, what is exterior or imposed or added-on and 
therefore not fundamental to artworks, to segregate what is a 
show of truth from what is just for show.(100)
On the other hand, it is also true that the issue of 
where to draw the line between inner and outer realms could  
itself never be settled, as the very prescriptions to limit 
reception prompted furious debate. Judd, for example, 
counseled the defeat of rhetoric by purging artworks of any 
trace of metaphor (by, to paraphrase Goossen, forcing the 
figure, or figuration, out). Fried, on the other hand, 
thought the way beyond rhetoric lay in an intensification of 
the poetic, according to which artworks would be so 
"subordinated to an aesthetic order and logic of metaphor" as 
to produce "an optical ambience of their own making."(101) 
The minimalist Judd, wanting no evidence or "figuring" of 
such an order or logic, which he considered to be an 
imposition from without, remained distant from his work (thus 
a factory could make it); Fried's modernist painter, wanting 
as much poetics as possible, kept such a close proximity to 
the work ("a point of no view") as to disappear into it. Both 
wanted to fend off rhetoric, Fried through poetic fullness, 
resulting in a work that figured itself, Judd through an 
absence of metaphor, resulting in a work devoid of any 
figurative dimension whatsoever. Each found the other's 
alternative to be no alternative at all, rather only another 
kind of rhetorical effect.
Puzzling out what was deficient or abusive in the act of 
viewing and interpretation itself required acts of 
interpretation, revealing in turn differing viewpoints. The 
essence of the poetic, its self-evident, self-same character 
by which it maintains its integrity above and beyond the 
advocacy and arguments of rhetoric, was itself shown to be a 
construction, one needing to be argued for. It would be one 
thing if, to repeat Frye's terms, an insistence on keeping 
art "dumb" simply led to the production of a lot of "talk." 
Then the artwork could still be thought to remain invariably 
itself, centered and resolute, no matter how turbulent the 
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ideological fray surrounding it. But for the work to be only 
itself, inviolate, its identity and integrity secure, it must 
stand separate, bounded, with space or an interval before, 
after and to the sides of it. Herein lies the problem, 
precisely in that unalterable gap upon which the coherence of 
all the arguments about poetics rest: the gap between the 
original and the uses to which its put, its appropriations 
and representations; the gap between the self-evident and the 
pretended, the real and the ideological, the actual and the 
advertised. The problem, of course, is that the dividing line 
itself should never have to be drawn; it should be a given, 
not construed; it should be discovered innocently outside and 
prior to the argument's unfolding. It should lie, that is, on 
the side of the poetic, generated by it organically like a 
skin or crust. But the gap instead always lies on the other 
side, is itself a representation, or rather the advent of 
representation. It is an "original" predication. Securing for 
the poetic object a sovereign border is at once its condition 
for being and an "imposition" indivorceable from the act of 
representing it; the emergence of that border, the activation 
of that gap or interval, even if supposedly "by the object 
itself," is what at the same time leaves the object 
unanchored, appropriated, victim to what Derrida calls "the 
possibility of its extraction and grafting."(102) By 
maintaining a bounded identity the work has already yielded 
to being severed from one (its "own"?) context, logic, 
ideology, and shuffled into others, wrested, compared, 
repeated, made "iterable." Just as with "every sign, 
linguistic or nonlinguistic...[the bounded work] can be 
cited, put between quotation marks." Derrida goes on: "I will 
not conclude from this...that there is no effect of the 
performative [as in action painting]...no effect of presence 
[as in the sovereign color-field canvas].... It is simply 
that these effects do not exclude what is generally opposed 
to them term by term"--call it rhetoric, representation, 
mediation--"but on the contrary presuppose it in 
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dissymmetrical fashion, as the general space of their 
possibility."(103)
As discussion over the poetics of '60s art circulated, 
so did its object seem to move and multiply; each argument 
conjured yet another model of art's essential nature and thus 
invaded and dispersed what it meant to consolidate and 
defend. The more the poetic was safeguarded from its 
instrumentalization by rhetoric, severed from society and 
even its individual maker and forced to retreat into the 
sanctuary of the unendorsed, indifferent object--all this 
made its social identity increasingly dependent on "outside" 
explanations and captions, and so the more arbitrary such 
explaining and captioning appeared. Being mute and 
indifferent left the artwork all the more vulnerable, unable 
to locate, orient or mean itself. Protecting the privacy of 
art was inseparable from its simultaneous disclosure, just as 
surely as outward publicizing marked a simultaneous inward 
violation. There were different ways of conceiving or 
figuring the native state of the artwork before its 
appropriation and disfiguration by rhetoric. There were 
different ways of figuring even supposedly nonfigurative art.
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As soon as you recognize a thing as a face, it is an 
object no longer, but one pole in a situation of 
reciprocal consciousness.
--Leo Steinberg, 1960(1)
The beholder, always there, gazing, is the silent motor 
that drives the history of modern painting forward...
--Stephen Melville, 1981(2)
One well-known abstract painter said to me, "Oh, the 
public, we're always worrying about the public."
--Leo Steinberg, 1960(3)
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A Crisis of Metaphor
The struggle to distinguish poetics from rhetoric has a long 
history, one stretching perhaps all the way back to the very 
inception of the terms themselves.(4) During modernism, this 
struggle has often been staged as an effort to expunge 
rhetoric entirely from artworks, so much so as to render them 
"impenetrable, irreducible" (Barthes), "absolutely 
autonomous, entitled to respect for their own sakes, and not 
merely as vessels of communication" (Greenberg), so as to 
leave "nothing outside art itself that might make the viewer 
more comfortable or give him something to talk about" 
(Geldzahler). But a problem then arises: namely, how, in the 
course of avoiding the reduction of the poetic to the 
instrumentalities of communication, propaganda and ideology, 
and to the criteria of result and gain--how to not also 
thereby drain away all meaning, all the suggestive fullness 
that accounts for the poetic's unique power in the first 
place. 
This is an argument running through much modern 
criticism. For example, in 1947 the literary critic Cleanth 
Brooks famously coined the axiom "The Heresy of Paraphrase" 
to vilify any assumption that a "poem constitutes a 
'statement' of some sort," since "all such formulations lead 
away from the center of the poem," its poetic core.(5) 
Fifteen years later Stanley Cavell voiced his objection to 
Brooks, arguing that paraphrase, especially in its lengthy 
approximations and their obvious inadequacy, "registers what 
William Empson calls the 'pregnancy' of metaphors, the 
burgeoning of meaning in them."(6)
Like content and communication, metaphor proved a 
contentious term by mid-century. Often artists and critics 
would formulate a position on metaphor that hedged between 
retaining and banishing it in works of art. Speaking of the 
Abstract Expressionists of his generation, David Smith stated 
that "their communication objective would be something like 
this: if I am to paint in the most ethically good way 
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possible, this striving has a metaphorical consonance with 
other men attempting to act ethically in their form of life, 
and may have an actual effect on their lives, but I cannot 
sacrifice my individual struggle to the kind of 
generalization required for guaranteed direct moral effect on 
their lives."(7) Existing somewhere between the specific and 
the general, the work of art--as formal exercise, figure, 
model--counts for more than just its own literal, 
quantifiable, material instance, and yet at the same time its 
singularity safeguards it from being too easily or entirely 
generalized or paraphrased, made merely illustrative of 
already existing, accepted belief systems and patterns of 
meaning. Metaphor can describe the burgeoning of meaning that 
is the hallmark of the artwork's poetics, the way in which it 
exists as more than its literal self; but being made into a 
metaphor is also a means of rhetorically abusing an artwork, 
which is too much itself to be generalized, too individual to 
be made into something it is not.
This would be one way of describing the difficult burden 
put on art under modernism, the struggle to reconcile 
aesthetic experience's internal contradictions, its demand 
for both empirical particularity and symbolic unity. Since it 
was first conceived, modern aesthetic theory has complimented 
a middle-class model of subjectivity; it orients the poetic 
toward the body and its appetites, toward individual 
experience and immediate sensation, and yet the aesthetic 
realm has nevertheless held out the promise of stemming the 
social dispersion encouraged by the perpetual stoking of 
appetites under capitalism. Through its alchemy the aesthetic 
converts divisive greed into shared tastes, self-interested 
pursuits into disinterested pleasures, sensory distraction 
into felt connection. It was thought to save the individual 
from total mute privacy on the one hand and the false 
rhetorical communities of ideology and rationalized 
consumption on the other. As recently as 1983 this was how 
Hal Foster defined aesthetic experience, as "effect[ing] a 
world at once (inter)subjective, concrete and universal--a 
56
symbolic totality" and "as a necessary negative category," 
its poetic integrity and singularity proving "a critical 
interstice in an otherwise instrumental world."(8) The view 
expressed here is not far from the one voiced 30 years 
earlier by R. P. Blackmur, like Brooks a self-proclaimed New 
Critic who, while decrying instrumentality and the fact "that 
we live in a rhetoric-sodden world," simultaneously looked to 
the analogy-making powers of metaphor for that world's very 
salvation. "It is indeed by analogy that I believe the mind 
makes its richest movements," Blackmur wrote in 1950, "and it 
is by analogy that I believe the mind makes its deepest use 
of what it has understood.... It is through analogy, if at 
all, that the falcon can again hear the falconer, that things 
can come together again, and that again the center can 
hold."(9) Similarly Hannah Arendt wrote in 1967, in a New
Yorker appreciation of Walter Benjamin and his "poetical" 
mode of thought, that "metaphors are the means by which the 
oneness of the world is poetically brought about"--and this 
despite Arendt's keen awareness of modern society's 
tendencies toward decidedly nonpoetic, instrumental forms of 
oneness such as massification and totalitarianism.(10)
Much dramatic art criticism of the postwar period 
likewise bears witness to the difficulties of holding 
together such opposed impulses within modern poetics. 
Greenberg, during the years just before and after 1950, 
admitted intense ambivalence about Pollock and the sheer 
experiential onslaught, the "hallucinated uniformity" of his 
allover paintings, which the critic admitted may "answer 
something deep-seated in contemporary sensibility" but which 
he also hesitated to call an aesthetic achievement 
("uniformity--the notion is antiaesthetic," he wrote in the 
1948 essay "The Crisis of the Easel Picture").(11) In 1967 
Fried saw the tension between the general and particular, 
between symbolic unity and experiential intensity, made 
manifest in modernist painting's relationship to minimalist 
objects, both of which form "a response to the same 
developments" but nevertheless find themselves "in direct 
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conflict," so much so they had to be split apart in--and as--
"Art and Objecthood."(12)
For Greenberg and Fried, an artwork that wagers 
everything on material intensity (whether a Pollock or a 
Judd) threatens not only to privatize experience but to do so 
for too wide an audience, offering up cheap sensory thrills 
to be had by any shock-craving viewer. The poetic object, if 
too mute and intractable, may succeed at luring spectators 
but can't in turn provide them with any leads on how to 
figure their experience and make it over into social 
meanings, and thus make themselves over into a cultural 
community. On the other hand, an artwork more exacting in the 
kind of audience it summons and anticipates, that tightly 
specifies a cogent set of communal values, runs the risk of 
being overly narrow and exclusive--precisely the accusation 
leveled at Louis and Noland and the modernist hero-worship 
heaped on them during the '60s. 
Cavell, like Blackmur a teacher of Fried's, felt that 
the modernist avoidance of rhetoric and its drive toward "the 
object itself" risked more than just neglect of metaphor and 
its fullness. Indeed, Cavell went so far as to reject in 
large part the standard distinction between poetry and 
rhetoric, insisting instead that the poetic work is, like 
rhetoric, intended for an audience. Cavell appealed not to 
Mill but Kant: "Kant's aesthetic is, I take it, supposed to 
be formal, but that does not deter Kant from introducing 
intention (anyway, 'purposiveness') and a certain kind of
response ('disinterested pleasure') in determining the 
grounds on which anything is to count as art."(13) Intention 
for Cavell is itself one of the most basic qualities that an 
artwork figures--and, moreover, figures metaphorically. That 
is, it is not important to know the artist's specific
intentions--in order to enjoy the work it is not 
"necessary...to get in touch with the artist to find out the 
answer." Rather, the quality of intention is generalized: 
"When I experience a work of art," Cavell writes, "I feel 
that I am meant to notice one thing and not another, that the 
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placement of a note or rhyme or line has a purpose."(14) 
Fried was in full agreement; he wrote the same year that, 
when it comes to understanding one's encounter with a work of 
art, "the relevant comparison is with human 
relationships."(15)
Leo Steinberg would also insist on the importance of the 
work's relation to its audience, and also argue against the 
reduction of that relation down to a question of the artist's 
specific intentions. Yet at the same time he saw it as more 
than a matter of comparison or analogy. In his view, artistic 
form contains within itself some predisposition toward 
audience. "All works of art or stylistic cycles are definable 
by their built-in idea of the spectator," Steinberg wrote 
during the course of a discussion of Noland's paintings from 
the mid-'60s. For Steinberg, it was no knock against the 
poetic integrity of Noland's work to find that, "like all art 
that ostensibly thinks only about itself, it creates its own 
viewer, projects its peculiar conception of who, what and 
where he is."(16) Stressed here is a point even the young 
McLuhan conceded back in the '40s, that the poetic couldn't 
entirely purge itself of an awareness of audience; rather, as 
distinct from rhetoric, the audience of the poetic work must 
exist not externally but as one of the work's internal 
elements. "The audience is in the poem."(17)
The argument advanced by Steinberg is not far from the 
one elaborated during the 1930s by Mikhail Bakhtin in his 
efforts to theorize what he called the "dialogical" space of 
artistic production. "Between the word and its object, 
between the word and its subject, there exists an elastic 
environment of other, alien words about the same object, the 
same theme." Any "utterance," as Bakhtin called the artwork, 
"is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of 
view, alien value judgments and accents...[it] weaves in and 
out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils 
from others, intersects with yet a third group." Bakhtin 
intended his view to run counter to the conventional idea of 
the poetic or "monological," of "the artistic work as a 
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whole...a self-sufficient and closed authorial monologue, one 
that presumes only passive listeners beyond its own 
boundaries," listeners who can only ever "overhear" the 
poetic utterance. As Bakhtin notes, "the work as a rejoinder 
in a given dialogue...the polemical style, the parodic, the 
ironic...[is] usually classified as rhetorical and not as 
poetic."(18) The kind of blurring of poetics and rhetoric 
enacted by Bakhtin's notion of the dialogical has been 
remarked on recently by T. J. Clark, who, in a discussion of 
Pollock, writes that "the so-called context of a work of art 
is therefore not mere surrounding, separable from form; 
...context is text...all utterances anticipate answers, 
provoking them, eluding them, orienting themselves toward an 
imagined future in which something is said or done in reply; 
and works of art, being specially elaborate, pondered cases 
of utterance, are most of all shot through with such 
directedness."(19)
What particular features distinguish the "directedness" 
or "intendedness" of postwar American painting? What 
conception of the viewer does such art create or build into 
itself? "The future that works of art envisage," Clark's 
discussion of Pollock continues, "is very often, at least in 
the modern period, one of misuse and misunderstanding." 
Motherwell and Reinhardt had also chosen the word 
"misunderstanding"--along with "erratic," "confused" and 
"prejudiced"--to apply to the scene of reception they 
imagined awaited their work. The sentiment wasn't limited to 
romantic painters, though; even such a champion of public-
minded and socially useful art as Walter Gropius could 
complain in 1961 that "communication from person to person is 
at an all time low today in spite of, or because of, our 
tremendous technical means of communication, and most 
individuals are driven into shallow superficiality in all 
their relations with other people, including their own 
friends."(20) 
What lies in the offing is superficiality, prejudice, 
confusion--such was the assumption shared by many postwar 
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artists. As was shown in the last chapter, some artists tried 
to resist meaning altogether, to avoid any sort of figural 
reading of their work. As Clark argues, given the dialogical 
space of art production and the building into artworks of 
responses to an imagined scene of their reception, such works 
"may either try to contain and figure that future in an 
effort to control it, or attempt instead--as certain 
Pollock's do--to annihilate the very grounds of misreading 
and shrug off past and future alike, making the work turn on 
some impossible present, thickened to the point where it can 
dictate its own (unique) terms."(21) 
One way of thickening the work's poetics and 
obliterating both past and future--both the subject and the 
object of, say, "to paint"--would be to have the artist and 
viewer alike disappear into the work of art. Or to have 
artist and viewer not be at all relevant to it, leaving the 
work to exist alone, as if it had come into existence of its 
own accord. Plenty of early reviewers of Pollock's work 
remarked on how it left them feeling ignored, walled off, at 
a loss, confronted by "an elaborate if meaningless tangle of 
cordage and smears," by "mere unorganized explosions of 
random energy."(22) Yet Robert Coates also determined that, 
while "the threads of communication between artist and 
spectator are so very tenuous...some [of the paintings] have 
a good deal of poetic suggestion about them."(23) Similarly, 
Parker Tyler wrote that "the spectator does not project 
himself, however theoretically, into these works; he recoils 
from them, but somehow does not leave their presence." This 
was because "Pollock 'wrote' non-representational 
imagery...an alphabet of unknown symbols," so that "any 
system of meaning successfully applied to them would at the 
same time not apply."(24) Even Pollock seems to have felt 
estranged from the work, unable see himself or project into 
the images he created. He couldn't predicate them; he 
reportedly asked Lee Krasner not whether his work was any 
good, or whether it conveyed anything, but whether it was 
painting at all.(25)
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Years later Mel Bochner answered with a resounding no 
the same question Pollock posed to Krasner. Bochner found 
that Pollock's canvases were so materially specific that, not 
only did they forestall metaphorical projection, they 
resisted being generalized whatsoever, to the point of not 
even being analogous to other paintings. "The late large 
Pollocks are unlike any other things ever called paintings 
before, and legitimately could be said to end painting as a 
differentiated category of art." According to Bochner, 
Pollock "made painting itself the object"; in place of the 
intransitive, objectless verb "to paint," posited here is the 
object unhinged from a verb, self-made and unendorsed.(26) 
Yet, at the same time, Bochner found the work comparable to 
all art; "Everything is still measured against Pollock," he 
writes just a few lines earlier. Thus is rendered a deadpan 
'60s update of David Smith's argument that whatever 
metaphorical reach works of modern art claim depends on their 
very individuality and unlikeness. Except that, in Bochner's 
revision, the object of comparison is no longer the ethical 
integrity of the endeavoring individual, but rather the 
factual integrity of the materially alien thing.
No doubt Pollock's example loomed large for the art of 
the '50s and '60s, but to a great extent what he exemplified 
was the desire to "control" if not "annihilate" (borrowing 
Clark's words) the relationship between poetics and rhetoric. 
Pollock was best at both. Greenberg, Fried and Rubin made 
Pollock's achievement a measure of all modernist art that 
followed it; but so did Kaprow, Judd, Bochner, Morris and a 
host of others. How to define Pollock's achievement, to 
determine the basis on which his work could serve as a source 
of comparative value, to make it generally applicable, became 
an open question. "Pollock's line bounds and delimits
nothing," Fried remarked; "the dripped paint in most of 
Pollock's paintings is just dripped paint," Judd added; work 
this poetic--this sovereign and raw--seemed indifferent to 
the evaluations attributed to it. Intentions, specific ones, 
were attributed--"he looked hard," Greenberg insisted, as if 
62
forcing the painter to claim his work.(27) Yet everything 
both did and didn't apply, as Parker Tyler diagnosed. With so 
much disagreement over the nature of Pollock's achievement, 
the only certainty was the achievement itself. Whatever it 
was, Pollock's work was effective publicity; like any good 
scandal or stunt it grabbed attention. Moreover, this fact 
needn't have anything to do with poetics, let alone 
aesthetics. Even Greenberg admitted bitterly that "the people 
who admire [Pollock] most on the New York scene today don't 
take him as a painter. They take him as an example of an 
artist in the line of Duchamp, someone who knocked you flat 
with his arbitrariness." To succeed through arbitrariness is 
"to break with aesthetics, with good and bad," since scandal 
has no ties with poetic interiority, but rather is judged 
purely on exteriority, on effect and results: "people reach 
for the far-out as a context and a category when there's not 
enough inside them, not enough inspiration or impulse."(28) 
Pollock pushed poetics to the point of its seeming 
disjuncture and liberation from rhetoric. Yet, rather than 
making rhetoric go away, this only granted it equal liberty 
in turn.
All of this perhaps lends support to Clark's assertion 
that, given the myriad and incompatible readings that seek 
but can't attain a definitive purchase on Pollock's 
achievement, "his painting is a work against metaphor."(29) 
The issue raised here involves far more than mere coyness or 
a reluctance to take a stand. Rather, Pollock's attack on 
metaphor gets at the heart of something profound about 
modernism. At least for Clark, it relates to what he calls, 
in another context, the "lack of consistent, repeatable 
meanings" in modern society.(30) It is one thing to claim, 
along with Arendt and Blackmur, that metaphor holds out the 
promise of restoring "the oneness of the world," in which 
"things can come together again, and again the center can 
hold"; or to assert, along with Theo van Doesburg, that "the 
(truly exact) work of art is a metaphor of the universe 
obtained with artistic means."(31) But lacking any strong 
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over-arching belief system, what in the disenchanted modern 
era can metaphor work with to achieve such wholeness and 
universality? 
"A society, as it becomes less and less able, in the 
course of its development, to justify the inevitability of 
its particular forms, breaks up the accepted notions upon 
which artists and writers must depend in large part for 
communication with their audiences," Greenberg established in 
his first published essay on art, and it was a point he 
returned to again and again.(32) "There is so little left in 
the world that one can take seriously and sincerely enough to 
write poetry about," he sighed a few years later.(33) Modern
society had at its symbolic center not a network of abiding 
metaphors holding it together but an absence, a scorched void 
left in the wake of its liberation from such abiding 
metaphors. "The present age...lacks an operative notion, a 
viable concept of the human being," Greenberg asserted in 
1945, "a lack that is one of the 'still centers' around which 
the crisis of our time revolves." The problem, again, was one 
of generalizing the specific, in this case drawing out 
continuities between the individual isolated in his or her 
vocation and the human species at large. "The great 
theoretical, social and psychological need of our age," 
Greenberg continued, "is a means of centralizing the various 
separate departments of human activity to which the wholeness 
of life and the collective interests of humanity are not 
being immolated."(34)
The problem was two-fold. On the one hand, there was too 
much specialization, competition and fragmentation, too much 
turn-over in scientific paradigms, democratic consensus and 
the marketplace of values; in a capitalist, technological, 
historically self-conscious world there was no literal or 
symbolic axiomatic figures (no gold standard even); the only 
certainty was flux itself. Theories of process, perhaps, but 
these only further eroded the stability of the figure or 
sign. "Incomprehensibility in the arts is inseparable from 
the fragmentation of the public through the expansion of 
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professionalism," Harold Rosenberg concluded in 1956.(35) 
"The more we learn about man," Greenberg argued, "the more 
contexts we discover him to exist or function in, the less 
able are we to make up our minds about him." And this applied 
not only to the human subject. "Objects are no longer 
docile," Greenberg wrote in 1940, "they are enmeshed in a web 
of contradictory and controversial contexts, which makes it 
difficult for us to find a common, neutral attitude towards 
even a piece of fruit."(36) On the other hand, such symbolic 
fracturing was itself partly a result of too much 
unification, a by-product of massification and 
centralization. No matter how symbolically contested and 
unstable, modern society still had to integrate, had to 
accommodate more and more people migrating to cities, 
receiving an education, "surging" toward culture. Indeed, 
avant-garde artists now faced their own integration. To 
borrow a line from the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, 
"The unification of the linguistic market means that there 
are no doubt more and more meanings for each sign."(37) As 
society and the economy expand their reach, the culture 
becomes increasingly embroiled in problems of integration, 
rationalization, competition and pacification. If, as 
Greenberg put it, "the question of what is a corporeal object 
can be answered in many different ways," and if "society does 
not circulate an adequate notion of the human personality," 
such a state of affairs makes for weak metaphors, for 
"limited intellectual and spiritual objectives...after Hegel, 
for instance, philosophers stopped constructing world 
systems." As for artists, such a situation compels many to 
"try to make up for it by over-expressing whatever half-
baked, stereotyped conceptions they themselves happen to 
have." Little wonder then, Greenberg concluded, that "the 
result...is either fulsome or banal."(38)
Many of the Abstract Expressionists, of course, 
expressed contempt for the culture of the fulsome and banal 
which they saw thickening around them, and so posed their art 
in opposition to notions of communication and conventional 
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meaning, and thus to the figure. "Direct sensual experience 
is more real than living in the midst of symbols, slogans, 
worn-out plots, clichés," Ibram Lassaw declaimed.(39) Rothko 
advocated that "the familiar identity of things has to be 
pulverized in order to destroy the finite associations with 
which our society increasingly enshrouds every aspect of our 
environment."(40) A generation later Noland distanced his own 
work from Abstract Expressionism and what he felt was its
vestigial over-reliance on symbolic associations. "We didn't 
want anything symbolic," he said about himself and Louis, "no 
subject matter other than the making of paintings."(41) Yet 
these painters would in their turn be opposed by another 
group even more dead-set on banishing metaphor. As Robert 
Morris summed up his project in the '60s, "I was out to rip 
out the metaphors."(42) 
What perhaps made metaphor problematic was the distance 
and difference it preserves between the entities it brings 
into association. "To metaphorize well," as Paul Ricoeur 
translates Aristotle's formulation, "implies an intuitive 
perception of the similarity in dissimilars."(43) Metaphor 
allows interpretation some leeway, grants content a separate 
identity from form, at once expands or extends as well as 
displaces its object. Because it opens up an angle by which a 
figure is seen as both distanced and bridged by its 
predication, metaphor's action foregrounds viewpoint and 
perspective; as Kenneth Burke wrote in 1945, "for metaphor we 
could substitute perspective."(44) But this is precisely 
where problems arise: by casting the figure as itself and 
more than itself, metaphor generalizes the specific, it 
promises to enlarge the poetic but in doing so threatens to 
invade and disperse its singularity. It must have indeed felt 
like an invasion when in 1959 Life magazine, "undertak[ing] 
to explain how abstract expressionism developed and what it 
aims to communicate," ran a two-part pictorial feature (fig. 
10) about how "the restless flickering of flames (below) 
recurs in the jagged, fluctuating shapes of a painting 
(opposite) by Clyfford Still," and how the work of Franz 
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Kline "recalls the dynamic thrusts and angles of the steel 
girders of a bridge," and how de Kooning's work "suggests the 
breadth, rugged force and endless variety that characterize 
not only vast scenes of nature but the tiniest patch of grass 
(top, right)."(45) Shortly after, Ad Reinhardt used the 
occasion of a panel discussion (the transcript from which was 
published in early 1961 in Scrap magazine) to complain about 
the Life feature and how "Still, de Kooning, and 
Rothko...permitted their work to be treated as flames, 
girders, grasses, and sunsets." Yet Reinhardt didn't just 
find blame in the artists, but also in the art:
Now does the art permit this? ...A kind of art, perhaps 
that seems to excite or entertain...is involved in 
quickly exhausted values, in a kind of built-in 
obsolescence.... The artwork itself is the problem along 
with the artist.... The artwork itself doesn't seem to 
have a limit to that which can be read into it.... There 
is something wrong about an art that permits everybody 
to project their personal wishes into it.(46)
Indeed, opening interpretive space and entrusting 
viewers to fill it was exactly the formula touted by a 
booming postwar advertising industry; according to the 
infamous Dr. Ernest Dichter, pioneer of marketing or what was 
called "motivational" research (and a featured villain in 
Vance Packard's 1957 bestseller The Hidden Persuaders), "a 
sculpture, a painting, or a poster is better if it is 
somewhat incomplete, if the onlooker is invited to fill [it] 
in."(47) On the other hand, the kind of metaphors available 
to flesh out and complete cultural objects were, like Life
magazine's, more often than not "fulsome or banal," "involved 
in quickly exhausted values." Especially so if a 
distinguishing feature of modern industrial culture is its 
fragmentation, its lack of any truly completing metaphors, 
any "consistent and repeatable meanings." "A poem by Eliot 
and a poem by Eddie Guest--what perspective of culture is 
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large enough," Greenberg shook his head, "to enable us to 
situate them in an enlightening relation to each other?"(48)
Kenneth Burke and the Theory of Tropes
Harold Rosenberg also mourned the fate modern society held in 
store for Burke's notion of metaphoric perspective. 
"Competition forces our participating gestures into isolated 
atomic groups, each with an 'incongruous perspective' of its 
own; and style, becoming, as soon as it attempts to 
communicate meanings, an instrument of competition, is 
depleted of its poetic qualities."(49) This is from a 
sympathetic review Rosenberg wrote of Burke's 1935 anthology 
of essays Permanence and Change. Rosenberg had written about 
Burke dismissively four years earlier, but soon after the two 
developed a mutual and lasting admiration (indeed, Rosenberg 
later claimed that his own writing in the early '30s 
profoundly influenced Burke's intellectual growth). Like most 
everyone else around mid-century, Rosenberg acknowledged the 
importance of Burke's theories on art and literature, but 
also recognized them as being erected on the very faultline 
between rhetoric and poetics. Often labeled a New Critic for 
practicing strong formal analysis of literary works, Burke 
also suffered admonishment from more orthodox New Critics 
(including McLuhan and Blackmur) for his overly rhetorical 
interest in art as "symbolic action," as a grouping of 
figurative elements corresponding to a repertoire of 
psychological and social effects. This was pretty much the 
accusation leveled by Greenberg, who reviewed Burke's 
Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action for 
Partisan Review in 1941. While applauding the book for its 
ability to "stimulate, provoke and unsettle," Greenberg 
ultimately judged that it "fails to deal enough with the work 
of literature, the object itself."(50) All the same he, like 
Rosenberg, also maintained a collegial relationship with 
Burke, the two occasionally dining and socializing together. 
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Up till the late '50s Burke was a constant if somewhat 
inconspicuous presence within Manhattan's avant-garde milieu. 
After dropping out of Columbia in 1918 he lived with Stuart 
Davis and Berenice Abbott in Greenwich Village, and 
throughout the '20s worked as a writer and editor at The Dial
(for which he famously handled the first U.S. publication of 
Eliot's The Waste Land). During the '30s he turned his 
energies away from fiction and criticism (he wrote on music 
as well as literature, serving as the music critic for The
Nation from 1934 to '36) and toward the building of a self-
made comprehensive philosophy he termed "dramatism." Burke's 
reputation peaked in the late '40s with the publication of 
the sister volumes A Grammar of Motives (1945) and A Rhetoric
of Motives (1951). From 1943 to '61 he taught philosophy at 
Bennington, the progressive liberal arts college for women 
with a studio-art department headed by Paul Feeley and 
involving, at one time or another during the late '40s and 
'50s, such high profile artworld figures as David Smith, 
Gottlieb, Goossen, Alloway and Greenberg.
It was no doubt Burke's wide-ranging philosophical 
approach to the arts and strong belief in their profound 
social significance that led to his being invited--along with 
such cultural luminaries as Marcel Duchamp, Robert Goldwater, 
Arnold Schoenberg, Mark Tobey and Frank Lloyd Wright--to 
participate in "The Western Roundtable on Modern Art," the 
transcription of which was published in Modern Artists in
America. In the same document that quotes Gottlieb, 
Motherwell, Newman, Hare and Stern all inveighing against the 
call for art to communicate to a general public, Burke is 
found insisting that no matter what "there is always 
communication.... The communication is there the minute the 
painting is done." Such a position was immediately countered 
in all the now familiar ways: Tobey responds, "But the 
artist, when he is painting, is not thinking of 
communication," to which Wright adds, "Not if he is a true 
artist." "It is wrong," Schoenberg chimes in, "for a serious 
composer to write or include in his works such parts which he 
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feels would please the audience." And Goldwater asks, "That 
division between communication on the one hand, which 
presupposes a public to whom the artist is talking, and 
integrity on the other, which presupposes that the artist is 
concerned only with himself...is it not a basic problem, not 
only for the artist in contemporary society, but for the 
individual--as individual?"(51) 
Burke knows the argument well, and promptly sets it in a 
larger perspective:
Poetic deals with the work in itself, its kind, its 
properties, the internal relations among its parts. 
Rhetoric deals with the work's persuasiveness, its 
appeal, and eventually involves ethical 
considerations.... Along about the beginning of the 19th 
century...aesthetics was conceived largely in terms of a 
flat antithesis to the practical. Hence, if the 
practical realm included the useful and the moral, then 
the aesthetic became, by the dialectics of the case, 
useless and nonmoral.(52)
Burke was also fully aware of the tension inherent to 
modernism between fragmentation and integration, a tension 
that conspired to further drive apart poetics and rhetoric 
and undermine the possibility of metaphoric communication. 
"Our culture," he continued, "will always be shifting between 
the norms of universal appeal on one side, and the 
requirements of specialization on the other. Occasionally you 
can expect a happy accident where the work meets both tests 
at once, but these moments will be comparatively rare." And 
yet, even while acknowledging how much the odds were stacked 
against the modern artist's attempt to metaphorically balance 
the general and specific, Burke insisted, like Cavell and 
Steinberg, on the artwork's directedness and intendedness. 
"Certainly [the artist] is not talking to himself, is he?" 
Burke kept arguing during the roundtable. "He is using a 
communicative structure of terms."(53) 
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Such a "communicative structure of terms" is precisely 
what Burke had committed his adult life to theorizing. 
According to Burke's system, this structure breaks down into
four main modes of address, or "master tropes": beside 
metaphor, there are synecdoche, metonymy and irony. If, as 
Burke has it, "there is always communication," then any 
attempt to move beyond one mode of communication or address 
will only lead in the direction of another mode. Indeed, the 
basic ways in which metaphor is typically faulted seem to 
suggest a predilection for one of the three alternative 
tropes. The complaint that metaphoric association lacks the 
binding strength of religious meaning points toward 
synecdoche; the argument that metaphoric meaning lacks 
science's necessary motivation, objectivity and verifiability 
would move it toward metonymy; and those who look with 
suspicion upon the credibility of any meaningful equation 
between disparate entities would tend to favor irony. 
Generally, metaphor aligns with poetry, synecdoche with 
religion, metonymy with science, and irony with criticism and 
philosophy. 
A brief glance at Burke's writing would make it seem 
that he hewed closely to the traditional conception of 
rhetoric as an art of persuasion, except that his definition 
of persuasion turns out to be broad indeed. If rhetoric 
concerns language in use, Burke, like Cavell and Steinberg, 
was quick to define use far beyond the bounds of intention. 
"The linguistic motive," he writes, "involves kinds of 
persuasion guided not by appeal to any one audience but by 
the logic of appeal in general." Dreams utilize rhetoric 
("Freud's psyche is quite a parliament"); and the individual 
can be his own audience, though never can he achieve total 
isolation (rather he must "strive to form himself in 
accordance with communicative norms that match the 
cooperative ways of his society").(54) As Burke elaborates 
his system, the different tropes come to stand for basic 
predispositions toward formalizing or granting sense and 
shape to the world of things and their relations. In the 
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words of Hayden White, whose own writing in the '70s and '80s 
did much to adapt Burke's theories to poststructuralist 
debates, rhetoric allows one to "penetrate to that level of 
consciousness on which a world of experience is constituted
prior to being analyzed."(55) In this view, rhetoric deals 
with not only how things are presented for understanding--
with how to build arguments and make them persuasive--but 
with how understanding treats or figures those things 
presented to it, with how things like arguments and artworks 
are received. Rhetoric, defined this broadly, is inseparable 
from poetics, is "built" into it, to paraphrase Steinberg: 
rhetoric here describes the different postures that 
sensibility assumes when reckoning with experience, the 
various kinds of orientations or "directedness" by which 
artists and artworks define themselves and the world in which 
they take their stand.
Modes of Address in the Late '50s and Early '60s
Following the Burkean "structure of terms," it is possible to 
see much of the visual art made in the late '50s and early 
'60s--that is, made in the wake of Pollock's "attack on 
metaphor"--as adopting the last three of these master tropes. 
Within this scheme, color-field painting can be seen as an 
attempt to move beyond metaphor toward synecdoche. If what 
distinguishes metaphor is the awareness it maintains of a 
difference between the two things it nevertheless associates, 
synecdoche is that mode of representation that stresses not 
difference but proximity, identification and sameness between 
entities. It is that class of tropes or figures in which, 
according to Burke, "part [stands] for the whole, whole for 
the part, container for the contained, sign for the thing 
signified, material for the thing made," that implies "an 
integral relationship, a relationship of convertibility... 
proclaiming the identity between 'microcosm' and 
'macrocosm.'"(56) Describing his work in the '60s, Noland 
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constantly stressed the themes of connection, inclusion and 
convertibility. He likened the relationship between viewer 
and image to the one between a romantically involved couple: 
as he put it, "You're involved with someone as long as 
something is developing, changing or insightful. Painting is 
the same way." Connection, as if without resistance or 
remainder, was paramount: it is "that quality of connection
I'd like those colors to have."(57) Here is echoed Burke's 
description of synecdoche as emphasizing "the connectedness
between two sides of an equation...from quantity to quality 
or from quality to quantity" (a quote which itself recalls 
Paul de Man's observation that "the continuity from part to 
whole makes synecdoche into the most seductive of 
metaphors").(58)
The paintings of Noland and Louis, with their colors 
soaked evenly into and across expanses of canvas, emphasize 
their constituent materials but only to equate those 
materials with the vital, exacting capabilities of modernist 
viewing. In Louis's Veils, for example (fig. 2), pigment 
spreads along and reinforces the painting's material surface, 
but it also rises and falls in accordance with gravity, as if 
to provide a surrogate figure for the viewer; each Veil is 
thus both figure and landscape, identified at once with the 
lateral reach of the painting as object and the centering 
line of the viewer's eyesight. What results is a fusion 
between distant and proximate vision, and, beyond that, a 
harmonizing of overview and close-up, the many and the one, 
the general and the specific, not to mention the poetically 
figured and the literal contingencies that such figuration 
depends on if only to transcend.
By denying the importance of brushwork and minimizing 
traces of the artist's labor, both of these painters can be 
said to have privileged the act of reception over production, 
looking over making. But that doesn't mean they weren't also 
wary of the abuses that had become associated with art's 
afterlife in exhibition and interpretation. Both often spoke 
of the immediacy and directness they sought in their work; 
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for them, reception was thought of not as a locale opposed to 
the studio but as having no locale at all, as happening 
within "eyesight alone." "I believe in working quickly and 
simply," Noland asserted, "it's all direct."(59) In their 
pursuit of immediacy both followed closely the Abstract 
Expressionists before them. "The need is for felt 
experience," Motherwell claimed; for "direct sensual 
experience," to quote again Ibram Lassaw. Rothko used the 
word "clarity," which for him meant "elimination of all 
obstacles between painter and idea and between idea and 
observer." "To achieve this clarity," Rothko continued, "is 
inevitably to be understood"--or, put another way, to defend 
against misunderstanding.(60)
For Louis and Noland, however, this "idea" that Rothko 
sought to clearly reveal was itself deemed an obstacle to 
immediacy. According to Noland, color-field painting "was a 
new way to make abstract art without having some 
preconception of what your art was to be like or to be about: 
subject matter, figuration, symbolism, allusion or things 
outside."(61) Not even subject matter stood between painting 
and viewer; all surrounding space separating the two was 
squeezed out by the intimate proximity of their encounter and 
the instant of looking. Here was a safe place where a kind of 
looking could occur without threat of misappropriation and 
misunderstanding, where interpretation wasn't allowed any 
leeway, where the viewer either identified with the painting 
and melded with it--"disappeared" into it--or was left at a 
loss, feeling distanced by so much blank linen and spilt 
paint. "One is either in or out," as Michael Fried described 
such work in 1965.(62) 
But this wasn't the only defense available to painters--
or rather, this mode of address suggested a related but 
different mode. One could instead make paintings that 
purposely distanced the viewer, gave themselves over to 
viewing while also deliberately steeling themselves against 
it, in which only mute and irrefutable fact was presented, in 
which "what you see is what you see." The direction in which 
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many minimalists took Pollock's example was toward metonymy. 
Rather than suggest a complete fusion between the realms of 
the material and immaterial, inside and outside, as with 
synecdoche, with metonymy a reduction occurs in only one 
direction, toward the material, from intrinsic to extrinsic, 
from quality to quantity. Whereas Louis and Noland equated 
eyesight and painted field, subject and object, Donald Judd 
and Frank Stella assimilated art to the latter. "The inner 
glow that illuminates Reinhardt's works becomes a mechanical 
surface shine in Stella's," Irving Sandler complained in 
1960.(63) Hilton Kramer had much the same reaction to Judd's 
first solo show three years later: "One is again made 
conscious of the shift away from the analytic and 
metaphorical style to the more literal mode of utterance 
making itself felt at the present time."(64) Mel Bochner also 
noted minimalism's "conscious avoidance of anthropomorphic 
metaphor and the consequent tragic outlook."(65) It "struck 
one as the difference between a poet and a reporter," Kramer 
wrote of the gap he perceived between the new literalism and 
the "older metaphorical bias...utterly personal and yet 
expressive of a more general philosophy of art in which 
visual metaphor and imagination dominated the brute donnée of 
the artist's material." 
By shifting all emphasis to exteriority, the minimalist 
object expects to be viewed from a distance, even by the 
artist; it didn't matter if someone else made the work. 
Unlike Fried, for whom "stepping back is what's wrong...[it] 
ruins the work," Judd treated distance as a measure of 
success, as if it were the necessary condition for any 
artwork's full assertion of itself; as if, in order to 
thrive, to achieve originality and independence, to present 
things in their own right, an artwork had to disassociate, 
even oppose itself to its viewer, had to remain to a certain 
extent unknowable.(66) Indeed, when writing criticism early 
in the '60s it was this quality that Judd praised in the work 
of others. About Lee Bontecou's wall reliefs Judd wrote, "The 
object is at eye level...it has to be dealt with as any 
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strange object...as would be a beached mine or a well hidden 
in the grass."(67) Although Bontecou's art glares directly at 
the viewer, it does so with a dead eye, thus establishing not 
connection or empathy but rather distance and guardedness.
As for his own works (fig. 11), which Judd called 
"specific objects"--a decidedly anti-general generalization--
their aggressive materials, blocky, inert shapes and bland 
repetitions all combine to obscure any sense of their having 
a definable frontal aspect by which to present themselves, a 
face with which they welcome viewing. Judd himself explained 
in an interview that "in most of my pieces there are no front 
or sides--it depends on the viewing position of the observer. 
It's obvious that the floor pieces have no front."(68) The 
result was a "a menacing anonymity," as Lucy Lippard wrote in 
a 1964 review.(69) Even Judd's wall-reliefs (fig. 12), which 
seem to have frontality forced on them, actually turn their 
attention sideways, perpendicular to the line of sight, 
extending themselves laterally or horizontally, repeating 
their component parts either up and down or across the wall. 
As was often noted, both Judd and modernists like Noland 
shared a preoccupation with the artwork's framing edge, only 
their concerns couldn't be more different. Whereas Noland 
fretted over how the literalness of his paintings' edges--
where the image turns a 45-degree corner and reveals the 
three-dimensionality of an object--threatened to mitigate 
synecdochic fusion by reducing the pictorial too thoroughly 
to the material, much of Judd's impatience with painting had 
to do with how its framing edge forced a frontal orientation, 
an invitingness, on whatever it circumscribed. For Judd, the 
picture frame inherently induced illusionism by establishing 
stage-like sight lines, defining the pictorial field as 
belonging entirely to the viewer's gaze--thus the frame 
itself figures human vision, and by extension thought and 
belief, already flooding the rectangle with representation 
before a single mark gets laid down. Instead Judd wanted his 
holistic shapes to evade that system and to sit as if outside 
it, in what his nemesis Fried called "an indeterminate, open-
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ended and unexacting relation" to the viewer.(70) Judd aimed 
for his work to both impose itself on its audience and remain 
indifferent, to aggressively occupy the viewer's space yet 
turn away, offering vision only blunt objectivity, the 
artwork as perfect stranger.
Finally, no rhetorical portrait of the '60s would be 
complete without a mention of irony, the most exemplary 
manifestation of which was pop art. Hayden White has 
described irony as "a self-conscious use of metaphor... 
designed to inspire second thoughts about the nature of the 
thing characterized."(71) Often irony is produced through a 
contradictory pairing of two or more other tropes, thus 
calling into question the adequacy or legitimacy of figuring 
certain things or of figuration in general. Roy Lichtenstein, 
for instance, would use the rigid regularity of Benday dots 
to depict a spontaneous, excitable brushstroke; Warhol's 
portraits invite metaphoric investment in the celebrities 
they depict and at the same time confound that investment 
through the metonymic, production-line repetition and coarse 
printing of each celebrity's image. Like the minimalist 
object, pop assumes a certain detachment from its viewers, 
but unlike minimalism it doesn't offer in return the 
certainty of objective fact. At the same time, if pop 
reinstates the metaphors Pollock had banished, it also 
insists that those metaphors not be taken too seriously.
As such, pop irony could be considered as yet another 
manifestation in the '60s of an artistic strategy mixing 
visual assertion and defense. That at least was how Susan 
Sontag saw it in her 1964 essay "Against Interpretation," in 
which she explicitly aligns pop art with color-field painting 
and minimalist objects. Sontag writes, "Pop Art works by 
using a content so blatant, so 'what it is,' it, too, ends up 
being uninterpretable."(72) Fred Orton has recently reached a 
similar conclusion in his tropological analysis of Jasper 
Johns's work; Orton describes Johns as mixing metaphor and 
metonymy so as to produce "meanings...that are publicly kept 
at a distance."(73) Johns's art, like that of Lichtenstein 
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and Warhol, beckons identifications explicitly avoided by 
much of minimalism and color-field painting; not only does it 
make use of representation, it also references the studio and 
assigns hand-wrought brushwork a prominent role. Yet what 
Johns ends up producing are slippages between brushwork and 
image, making and looking. As Greenberg wrote in 1962,
Johns is interested in the literary irony that results 
from representing flat and artificial configurations 
which in actuality can only be reproduced...the 
painterly paintedness of Johns's picture sets off, and 
is set off by, the flatness of his number, letter, 
target, flag, and map images.... Everything that usually 
serves representation and illusion is left to serve 
nothing but itself, that is abstraction; while 
everything that usually serves the abstract or 
decorative--flatness, bare outlines, allover or 
symmetrical design--is put to the service of 
representation.(74)
Such an ironic mode of address results, once again, in 
artworks that can be taken as both assertive and guarded. 
Looking back, it would appear that by the mid '60s irony 
became the dominant of the four modes in art making--and has 
remained so to this day.(75) Even color-field painting came 
to be seen with a degree of detachment and irony. The 
synecdochic transparency and directness that someone like 
Noland sought for his paintings quickly grew cloudy and 
opaque; it was as if that transparency had "silted up," to 
borrow the description Rosalind Krauss used in response to 
Noland's 1966 show at Andre Emmerich. To feel the immediacy 
of such paintings now seemed to require some form of 
indoctrination, a mediation, something like a study guide: as 
Krauss put it, "access to them can only be achieved by a long 
chain of explanation."(76) The synecdochic modernist defense 
against misinterpretation grew into an interpretation in its 
own right; and suddenly it was the modernist viewer, not just 
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journalists and scene-makers, who drew suspicion, who was 
regarded as someone who could only misappropriate artworks. 
During the '70s and '80s postmodernist critics would theorize 
misappropriation as unavoidable; whether labeled ideology, 
myth or allegory, this new form of misinterpretation 
instituted a distance once again between the sign's 
components, between the reality of the signifier (whether it 
lay within the unconscious, the mode of production or a 
materiality as formless and alien as Pollock's flung paint) 
and the misrecognitions of the viewer's signifieds. But 
unlike with metaphor, that distance was now unbridgeable. 
Indeed, the inaugural moment of postmodernism, of the 
sense of the always unavoidable possibility--the 
inevitability even--of the misunderstanding and prejudice 
that Motherwell, Reinhardt et al. feared, could be located at 
just this juncture in the '60s and the attempt then to make 
direct, univocal, intensely poetic art that opened 
nevertheless onto multiple and conflicting interpretations, a 
cacophony of rhetoric. But the clear-cut division between 
modernism and postmodernism itself suppresses the sociality 
and polyvalence of the rhetorical, and indeed institutes new 
"pure" monological forms (the floating signifier, the index, 
the informe, etc.). Unlike such rigid dualisms as modernism 
versus postmodernism, the four master tropes represent more 
fluid modalities. Here Kenneth Burke and Hayden White prove 
exemplary in the way they approach rhetoric so as to resist 
the dualistic, including the dualism that rhetorical analysis 
itself has so often been reduced to over the course of the 
20th century--namely, a reduction to metaphor and metonymy. 
Although this collapse of distinctions between the many 
rhetorical modes had already begun in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, establishing the dominance of the metaphor-
metonymy pair is often credited to the work done in the 1920s 
and '30s by the Russian Formalists Boris Eichenbaum and 
especially Roman Jakobson. Thus simplified, these dyadic 
terms have since been superimposed onto a number of 
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ideological oppositions, including modernism and 
postmodernism. As Gerard Genette has observed:
In the metaphor-metonymy couple, it is tempting to see 
the opposition between the spirit of religious 
transcendence and the down-to-earth spirit, dedicated to 
the immanence of the here-below.... Horizontal versus
vertical. Minds could be classified in the same way as 
"materialists" (the prosaic), those who--like Freud--
privilege "contact" and see in similarity only its pale 
reflection, and "spiritualists" (the poetic), driven on 
the contrary to elude contact, or at least to sublimate 
it in terms of analogy.(77)
Furthermore, many see the metaphor-metonymy reduction as 
a means to subsume rhetoric within Saussurian linguistics, 
with metaphor mapped onto the paradigmatic pole of language 
(langue) and metonymy onto its syntagmatic axis (parole).(78) 
In this way, the shift away from modernism toward 
postmodernism has--ironically, as it were--kept in tact a 
privileging of poetics (now characterized in terms of highly 
abstract linguistic models such as "floating signifiers") and 
a denial of rhetoric (once again denigrated as social 
instrumentalization through simplistic referentiality). As
Thomas Crow has argued, with the postmodernist adoption of 
semiotics and structuralism, 
the universal language of [this] new theory...made it 
possible to continue without a break the modernist 
preoccupation with inherently abstract processes of 
sign-making and sign-receiving. The values and forms of 
attention fostered by the critics of the 1960s had in 
fact prepared the ground thoroughly for the new French 
models. The [postmodernist] writers centered around the 
journal October have generally been just as vigilant 
against any return to "the referent" in art...as Clement 
Greenberg and Michael Fried had been before them.(79)
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It was a commonplace in the 1960s for formalist critics 
to adopt linguistic analogies, especially when it came to 
analyzing abstract art in terms of its "grammar." In 1965, 
for example, Fried wrote about the tendency of painters like 
Noland, Louis and Stella to work in series, thereby 
"mark[ing] significant alterations of pictorial structure; 
...[serial paintings] signify related transformations of 
syntax in the interest of saying something new (or perhaps in 
the interest of saying something at all)."(80) As in his 
discussion two years earlier of the impersonal "logic of 
metaphor" at work in Louis's paintings, Fried's appeal to 
pictorial syntax assumes a model of poetic, monological 
utterance that is decidedly antagonistic to rhetoric. "Pure 
grammar," as Paul de Man explains, "postulates the 
possibility of unproblematic, dyadic meaning, and pure 
logic...postulates the possibility of the universal truth of 
meanings."(81) Yet such an appeal to grammar must be seen in 
the context of Fried's worries over modernist painting's 
relationship to minimalist objects, how both form "a response 
to the same developments" and yet stand "in direct conflict." 
Claiming the sanction of grammatical correctness in such a 
situation becomes strategic precisely because the situation 
is so rhetorically fraught, so prone to deflected meanings 
and misappropriations. "The series," Fried admits, "has 
become one of modernist painting's chief defenses against the 
risk of misinterpretation--a risk that has grown enormously 
during the past 20 years in direct proportion to the success 
of modernism itself." "Rhetoric," de Man continues, 
"radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous 
possibilities of referential aberration...when it is 
impossible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic 
devices which of the two meanings (that can be entirely 
incompatible) prevails." Rhetoric accounts for this 
undecidability and aberration not just because it involves 
persuasion and external actions between people but also 
because it is "an intralinguistic figure or trope."(82) That 
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is, it is both text and context; it is an opening out of the 
poetic from "in the poem." 
The master tropes of rhetorical analysis, when restored 
to a four-fold schematic, exhibit a much greater flexibility 
than is found in binary oppositions, a flexibility to which 
their "undecidability"--the fact that tropes are incredibly 
hard to keep separate from one another--testifies. Metonymy 
and synecdoche, for example, are notorious for their 
simultaneous overlap and divergence, and perhaps for this 
very reason are so often simply collapsed. As Paul Ricoeur 
notes, the confusion stems from the fact that, much more than 
metaphor, both synecdoche and metonymy "connect objects prior 
to connecting ideas"; that is, they deal almost entirely in 
the realm of nouns, whereby "one object is designated by the 
name of another."(83) Both synecdoche and metonymy are 
commonly said to establish this connection between objects by 
way of their physical contiguity, but this is strictly true 
only for metonymy. Synecdoche, Genette argues, "concerns in 
fact an inclusion, or belonging...and of a logical rather 
than spatial type." He continues:
It is not at all certain that one can legitimately 
regard inclusion, even in its most crudely spatial 
forms, as a particular case of contiguity. This 
reduction no doubt has its origin in an almost 
inevitable confusion between the relation of the part to 
the whole [synecdoche] and the relation of this same 
part to the other parts that make up the whole 
[metonymy]: a relation, it might be said, of the part to 
the remainder. The sail is not contiguous to the ship, 
but it is contiguous to the mast and the yard and, by 
extension, to the rest of the ship.(84)
Calling both synecdoche and metonymy tropes of contiguity 
thus favors the latter and anticipates the former's reduction 
to it, a move that renders synecdoche redundant and 
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foreshadows the only survivors being the binary opposites 
metaphor and metonymy. 
If metonymy and synecdoche are kept distinct, however, 
their frequent intersections prove more often contradictory 
and tense than complimentary and mutually reinforcing. 
Indeed, their uneasy interplay can be seen sparking many of 
the arguments that raged over '60s art. Judd, for example, 
agreed that his art and that of the modernists formed "a 
response to the same developments" (his enthusiasm for 
painters like Noland led Philip Leider, editor of Artforum at 
the time, to remark on how Judd's "writing in many cases made 
similar judgments [as Greenberg and Fried] but from an 
utterly different point of view").(85) Both Judd and 
Greenberg constantly stressed modern art's materiality. "A 
shape, color, surface are things themselves," Judd asserted; 
"things that exist exist, and everything is on their 
side."(86) Here Judd echoes Greenberg's earlier argument that 
"the superiority of the medium over what it figures... 
expresses our society's growing impotence to organize 
experience in any other terms than those of concrete 
sensation, immediate return, tangible datum.... Modern life 
can be radically confronted, understood and dealt with only 
in material terms. What matters is not what one believes but 
what happens to one."(87) For Greenberg only such intense 
materialism could "cut through to the ultimate truth of life 
as it is lived at present...life reduced to solely empirical 
considerations and without the deception (but also 
protection) of faith in anything." "Of course, finally," Judd 
wrote, "I only believe my own work."(88)
No doubt it was Judd's demand for metonymic reduction 
and material specificity--for, in his words, "definite 
structure, defined color, developed texture and consequent 
validity of expression"--that led him to give up on over 10 
years of painting on canvas and in 1962 turn to 
nontraditional materials like aluminum and Plexiglas, 
materials that the artist admired for their "obdurate 
identity."(88) Greenberg and Fried, on the other hand, never 
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went so far as to propose surface and material as sovereign 
facts, parts to be taken as wholes onto themselves. "The 
flatness toward which modernist painting orients itself can 
never be absolute flatness," Greenberg insisted; painting's 
material conditions--"the deliberate choosing of a flat 
surface and the deliberate circumscribing of it"--these 
"limiting conditions are altogether human conditions," 
themselves figures of sensibility, thought, intent.(90) Or, 
as Fried put it, "There's no distinction one can make between 
attending to the surface of the painting and to the illusion 
it generates; to be gripped by one is to be held, and moved, 
by the other."(91) Here the material and immaterial gain 
definition only as parts contributing to a larger ensemble, a 
greater and more complete whole (to which Greenberg and Fried 
would give such names as medium, quality, self-criticism, 
tradition, or simply "modernist painting"). "What is at 
stake," Fried wrote of the differences between modernists and 
minimalists, "is whether [the works] in question are 
experienced as paintings or as objects."(92) Whether, that 
is, the art is able to make its metonymic object-status 
vulnerable to synecdochal connection, capable of yielding 
insight, of being pressed into by motivated perception and 
pressing back in turn, challenging, informing, shaping the 
disposition and will of the perceiver. "A great work of art 
is the result of an interaction between the artist and his 
age," Greenberg wrote of the synecdochal relation between 
art's parts and wholes, "whereby the personality of one and 
the content of the other receive their most appropriate, most 
spiritualized or 'ideal' expression and thus touch, by a kind 
of dialectical process, that which is profoundly common to 
all humanity in all ages." Thus the material and immaterial, 
the external and internal, the literal and figurative, the 
contingent and transcendent come together and expand into a 
greater summary or order, as "pigment, canvas, stone, bronze 
are resolved into forms that belong purely to human 
consciousness."(93) 
84
The difference emerges clearly when comparing the 
favorable reactions both Fried and Judd had to the work of 
Barnett Newman (fig. 13). When Fried confronted the flatness 
of one of Newman's paintings, he felt its "field begin to 
give way, to yield--palpably, as it were--to the probings of 
the eye."(94) But when Judd looked at the very same work, he 
found its "openness concomitant with chance...the work 
doesn't suggest a great scheme of knowledge; it doesn't claim 
more than anyone can know; it doesn't imply a social 
order."(95) Judd's praise of Newman's paintings unveils a 
scene of estrangement; he and the artwork greet each other in 
their mutual isolation from anything greater than themselves, 
from any grand scheme or mystery that might connect them; 
each pays respect to the other's sovereignty and 
separateness. Yet it can also be argued that Judd, in his 
turn, couldn't keep such an approach to art, or even his own 
work for that matter, entirely immune to metaphor. His praise 
for specific objects, for artworks isolated within their 
literal materials and circumstances and from each other, was 
to a certain extent a way of modeling his anarchist political 
beliefs, his vision of a world comprised of sovereign and 
separate individuals. "Instead of making cathedrals out of 
Christ, man, or 'life,' we are making it out of ourselves," 
he approvingly quotes his fellow anarchist Newman.(96)
Indeed, the need to keep things separate, independent 
from sweeping generalizations, was one of the few general
pronouncements Judd ever allowed himself to make, as when he 
wrote in 1964 that "categories are only categories by the 
common presence of a single very general aspect. A person 
could select other common elements which would make other 
groups. The proportion of things not in common far exceeds 
the things that are."(97) Judd's metonymy expressed his 
distrust of the presumed higher laws or underlying orders 
that authorized the collecting together of disparate things 
through analogy. An example of such an analogy, one that 
Greenberg used, is that "a painting must breathe...its breath 
is to be made of the texture and body of canvas and 
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paint."(98) Richard Shiff has elaborted on "Greenberg's 
metaphoric description":
the painting surface breathes its color out, the applied
pigment having insinuated itself as an integral feature 
of the painting's physicality. The analogy is to the 
human body, of course; it draws its air in and out, and 
can never be entirely devoid of air, which, as a 
consequence of birth, becomes as essential an element of 
the body as is flesh.(99)
Another common analogy that Greenberg employed was that 
"a painting [is] like a living organism" in that it "exists 
by the simultaneous relation of its parts."(100) But this, 
for Judd, is "like Poussin saying order underlies nature. 
Poussin's order is anthropomorphic."(101) To avoid the vast 
induction of things into such colonizing analogies, Judd 
emphasized the specific over the general, the local over the 
universal, surface over depth. Each specific, local part 
would be treated as a whole in its own right, not as a 
gateway to some greater commonality; association between 
units would be established only through external contact, 
without their yielding to some deeper, shared, more 
authoritative essence. Any "order" resulting from such 
association is thus "not rationalistic and underlying but is 
simply order, like that of continuity, one thing after 
another."(102) This became Judd's artistic program:
All I'm interested in is having a work interesting to me 
as a whole.... Anything that is not absolutely plain 
begins to have parts in some way...[and] the more parts 
a thing has, the more important order becomes, and 
finally order becomes more important than anything 
else.(103)
According to such a metonymic view, artworks are no 
longer to be compared to living organisms or to any other 
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general order of being, not even to other artworks. "The new 
art," wrote Mel Bochner, "deals with the surface of matter 
and avoids its heart."(104) Irving Sandler nodded in 
agreement: "These artists describe only the surface of the 
world around them, impervious to any system of meaning."(105) 
But at this point, there begins to emerge yet another overlap 
between tropes, this time between metonymy and irony. 
Bochner's line was written in response to the three-
dimensional abstract geometries that filled the "Primary 
Structures" show at the Jewish Museum in 1966, while 
Sandler's line was devoted to the representational pop art 
featured in the 1962 "New Realists" exhibit at the Sidney 
Janis Gallery. "Underlying much of New Realism is a 
metaphysic similar to that of such French 'objectivists' as 
[Alain] Robbe-Grillet," Sandler writes a sentence earlier; 
Bochner borrows a quote from Robbe-Grillet's "For a New 
Novel" ("there is nothing behind these surfaces, no inside, 
no secret, no hidden motive") to begin his minimalism review. 
(Brian O'Doherty also cited Robbe-Grillet in a 1966 overview 
of minimalism, calling the French novelist "the theoretician-
in-residence" for the new abstract sculpture.)(106) What 
metonymy and irony can be said to share is a mutual 
opposition to the kind of commonalities and connections that 
metaphor and synecdoche confidently erect from one object--or 
attribute or facet or state--to another. But whereas metonymy 
goes no further than the object's obdurate externals, 
treating surface as a legitimate, "final" destination in its 
own right, irony only ever returns back to the surface since 
every association it launches from there leads astray. Leo 
Steinberg gets at the distinction when describing Johns's 
works and particularly their ironic surfaces, which for 
Steinberg serve as scenes not of boastful wholeness, 
declarations of objective fact, but rather of abandonment and 
resignation: 
When Franz Kline lays down a swath of black paint, that 
paint is transfigured. ...Paint and canvas stand for 
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more than themselves. Pigment is still the medium by 
which something seen, thought, or felt, something other 
than pigment itself, is made visible.... But [Johns], if 
he wants something three-dimensional, resorts to a 
plaster cast and builds a box to contain it. When he 
paints on a canvas he can only paint what's flat--
numbers, letters, a target, a flag. Everything else, it 
seems, would be a childish game--"let's pretend." 
...There is no more metamorphosis.(107)
As the tropic flexibility and interplay of the late '50s 
and early '60s demonstrate, no one mode of address has an 
inside track on pulling off aesthetic effect; the four modes 
represent--are themselves metaphors for--basic ways of
perceiving and engaging the world, and as such they can be 
thought of as cognitive templates or schema, each with its 
own capacity to resonate pleasurably when struck by an 
artwork that meshes just so with its particular 
specifications. Such a view of rhetoric could be called 
Kantian ("I will not apologize for this Kantian element in my 
thought," writes Hayden White), but it is also very 
synecdochic.(108) Indeed, descriptions of aesthetic 
experience often rely on extended synecdoches, on conjuring 
integral, organic, continuous connections between inner and 
outer realms. At the same time, it could be argued in turn 
that using rhetorical modes to figure cognitive 
predispositions may be advantageous in that they make so 
blatant their status as figures, as metaphors, and thereby 
infiltrate into our definitions of aesthetic perception the 
play of textuality, the unavoidable slipperiness of figural 
identity. That would be a more ironic view of the matter.
Countering White, Paul de Man perhaps best articulates 
this more ironic view. For de Man, the figures of rhetoric 
subvert consciousness even as they constitute it. He, too, 
assigns figuration a dual role, seeing it as the basis for 
what he calls our "cognitive" as well as "performative" 
activities. On the one hand, at a "pre-ideological" level of 
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cognition, consciousness figures perception of the world of 
objects and their relations; on the other hand, it also 
figures those expressions we put back out into the world in 
the form of arguments and artworks. De Man stresses how this 
division parallels the opposition between grammar and 
rhetoric (or, borrowing again from Mills, the "overheard" and 
"heard"), the former bound by the "impersonal precision" of 
logic and the assumed naturalness of sensibility, while the 
latter is aligned more with deliberateness and calculation, 
with "the self-willed and autonomous inventiveness of a 
subject." But de Man sees in each side of this opposition the 
other's undoing. For him, what we take to be cognition of a 
pre-existent world is itself a performative act of naming and 
labeling; figuration doesn't describe or denominate but 
actively posits; its action is not substantive but semiotic. 
At the same time, what might appear a deliberate act of 
rhetorical argument is itself a dutiful following of tropic 
laws; the rhetorician doesn't persuade through figures but is 
persuaded by them; the "self-willed" subject is in fact an 
effect of language, not its manipulator. Neither the 
performative subject figuring, nor the cognated object that 
is being figured, is able to comandeer figures for its own 
sake. Both only follow the dictates internal to figuration, 
and these dictates offer up neither logical certainties nor 
humanist revelations.(109)
Burke and White on Tropic Interaction
Even among those devoted to theorizing the four tropes, such 
as Kenneth Burke and Hayden White, there proves to be a good 
deal of room for disagreement over how these modes of address 
and their interaction should be defined and distinguished. 
For example, White, as a historian, tends to see the four 
tropes as interacting chronologically, in what he calls "the 
archetypal plot of discursive formations." White describes 
tropic transformations as following a fixed sequential order: 
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"The characteristic 'I' of the discourse moves from an 
original metaphorical characterization of a domain of 
experience, through metonymic deconstructions of its 
elements, to synecdochic representations of the relations 
between its superficial attributes and its presumed essence, 
to, finally, ironic reflection on the inadequacy of the 
characterization with respect to the elements which resist 
inclusion in the hypotactically ordered totality."(110) On 
the other hand, Burke, a literary critic, tends to privilege 
what he calls logical derivation over chronological descent, 
essences over existence. But what Burke finds in essences are 
precisely resources for logical transformations, and for this 
reason he too seems to grant priority to metaphor, which he 
calls at times simply perspective but at other times 
"perspective by incongruity." Metaphor is crucial to his 
overall analytical procedure; it is the first move, the 
seeing of one thing through, or from the perspective of, 
another. By generating distinction out of nondistinction it 
is the first transformation. 
But already complications begin to arise. For metaphor 
to retain its identity, there is a sense in which it can't 
come first, radiating other terms, but instead must come 
after or come alone. That is, if metaphor stands as the 
founding and hence also summational or titular term, then it 
becomes the representative part that stands for the whole of 
tropics, and thus transforms into a different trope, 
synecdoche. Indeed, representation is Burke's synonym for 
synecdoche, which at times he even designates as "the 'basic' 
figure of speech," citing the common use of representation 
when speaking of political, artistic, and sensory or 
cognitive matters.(111) Unlike synecdoche, what metaphor 
can't be basic to is language as order--it is too wily for 
that. It can't become titular or constitutional, since, as 
Burke points out, when its perspective is incongruous it 
"interprets new situations by removing words from their 
constitutional setting."(112) Metaphor has no allegiance to 
congruity or incongruity, which can be ascertained only 
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through considerations of context; it simply spans and 
connects, and in this way it is basic: its movement is the 
basis for--depending on the context of existing 
relationships--both synecdochic commonalities and ironic 
incongruities, as well as for their transformations; it is 
transformational movement itself. But this basicness or 
neutrality exists only in theory. That is perhaps why 
granting metaphor chronological priority poses such problems: 
doing so means having to conjure up a pure origin, outside 
any prior set of relationships or context, thus outside 
history itself. 
If at times Burke is prone to view synecdoche as basic, 
it is because synecdoche best characterizes what he imagines 
is communication in its purest state, from which it derives 
and towards which it aspires, language or figuration as our 
second nature ("there is always communication," he tells the 
Western Roundtable on Modern Art) wherein both our particular 
contingencies and our general, common or even higher 
aspirations are harmonized, where communication becomes 
communion. Running counter to this movement, Burke pits 
metonymy as misrepresentation. Metonymy is a type of 
linguistic transformation that seeks clarity by trying to 
eliminate transformation per se; it is a reduction rather 
than an expansion, reducing whole to part, the figurative to 
the literal, text to context (or, as Burke would put it, 
"act" to "scene"). Burke treats metonymy as synonymous with 
reduction, since it strives to boil things down to the kind 
of material and mechanistic contingencies that characterize 
the local, thus localizing the general, reducing the common 
to the specific. It ends up as misrepresentation by trying to 
avoid representation itself. In the end, metonymy is the 
trope Burke eyes with the greatest suspicion.
All the same, it is important to remember that the 
relationship between synecdoche and metonymy shouldn't be 
phrased as too starkly oppositional. Pierre Bourdieu, for 
instance, remarks on the fraught overlap between the 
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synecdoches of religion and the metonyms of science in their 
common claim to universality: 
The polysemy of religious languages, and the ideological 
effect of the unification of opposites or denial of 
divisions which it produces, derive from the fact 
that...it manages to speak to all groups and all groups 
speak it--unlike, for example, mathematical language, 
which can secure the univocal meaning of the word 
"group" only by strictly controlling the homogeneity of 
the group of mathematicians. Religions which are called 
universal are not universal in same sense and on same 
conditions as science.(113)
Representation and misrepresentation share close quarters, as 
do summation and reduction (Burke even concedes at times to 
the familiar definition of metonymy as "a special application 
of synecdoche").(114) In its promise of perfect union, 
synecdoche can be just as anti-transformational as metonymy. 
While Burke often speaks glowingly of the synecdochal, he 
also at times strikes an apprehensive note; as a summational 
or titular figure synecdoche can often lend itself more to 
contemplation than action, it can appear static, 
"statuesque."(115) Indeed, some of Burke's most chilling 
cautionary passages seem to curiously blend synecdoche and 
metonymy, communion and reduction. From the vantage of the 
late 1940s, at the end of the depression and World War II, 
Burke writes of how men can "commune with carnage, how they 
love the sheer hierarchal pageantry, the Stoicism of the 
disciplinary drill, the sense of unity in the communal act of 
all the different military orders marching in step, or the 
pious contemplation of the parade made static and 'eternal' 
in the design of a military burial grounds."(116) Here the 
synecdochal communion of different orders commingles with 
metonymic lockstep and the most brute, untransformed elements 
of human behavior.
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Metonymy and synecdoche (or what White might call the 
"paratactic" and the "hypotactic") are in fact posed by Burke 
as the twin dangers facing an overly technological and 
bureaucratized society, a society suffering simultaneously 
from too much fragmentation and too much integration, that is 
too specialized as well as too massified. "To what extent," 
he asks, "can we avoid the piecemeal response of dissipation 
(a response content simply to take whatever opportunities are 
nearest at hand) and the response of fanaticism (that would 
impose a terminology of motives upon the whole world 
regardless of the great dialectic interchange still to be 
completed)?"(117) Here society teeters between two fates: 
either a metonymic contiguity, an inability to see beyond 
individual, partisan needs and motives, beyond the piecemeal, 
literal and local (those "opportunities nearest at hand"), or 
a prematurely synecdochic, fanatical global summation. Of 
course, the real fear was that modern society was doomed to 
suffer both fates at once, in the form of Fascism, whether 
communist or capitalist, whereby, as Rosenberg put it, "there 
exists a kind of human dead center in which everyone is 
identical with everyone else," so that "all of mankind" can 
be made to "twitch at once." Burke and Arendt expressed this 
fear often, as did scores of others, including Greenberg:
Now that Western industrial capitalism [Greenberg wrote 
in 1944] is in the process of establishing a global 
economy with coordinated methods of production on all 
continents, the possibility of a global Culture appears. 
Only socialism can realize such a Culture, and it could 
do so only by accepting and even encouraging regional 
variations. Meanwhile...the colonial Cultures...are 
being done to death by mass-produced, ready-made 
commodities exported from New York and California. There 
will soon be little diversity of Cultures for Mr. 
Eliot's common religious faith to unify. There will be 
just greater and lesser degrees of backwardness; and the 
unifying agents will be movies, comic books, Tin Pan 
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Alley, the Luce publications (with editions in all 
languages), Coca Cola, rayon stockings, class interests, 
and a common boss. These are all quite compatible, 
incidentally, with religion, but not at all with 
socialism.(118)
The socialism Greenberg imagined as an alternative--
wherein society nurtures rather than liquidates individuality 
and community as ends in themselves--is close to what Burke 
called the "great dialectical interchange." This is where 
Burke placed his hopes. Synecdoche must be complemented by 
dialectic--that is, by movement, interaction and debate. If 
synecdoche represents figuration or communication in its 
fullest potentiality, its most lyric state, it is still only 
the inactive ground and resource from which action and 
transformation dialectically arise. An emphasis on dialectic 
as movement is what aligns it with metaphor, making it into a 
kind of generalized and temporalized metaphor-of-metaphors 
(or, as Burke sometimes calls dialectic, a "perspective of 
perspectives"). But for Burke dialectic is instead a synonym 
for irony. If synecdoche is constitutional, dialectical irony 
is Burke's parliament; it is the interaction of metaphoric 
perspectives; it amplifies and generalizes what is implicit 
in metaphor, what Burke calls "the paradox of substance": 
that A, by being defined through not-A, equals not-A. Only 
this kind of dialectical irony can do the work of, can truly 
prepare the ground for, a harmonizing of the different 
orders, of higher and lower, intrinsic and extrinsic, general 
and specific, scene and act. 
Synecdoche and metonymy most dramatically shed their 
apparent oppositional relation when teamed against the 
counter-duo of metaphor and irony. The former pair can be 
considered tropes of simplicity: whereas with synecdoche all 
elements share in one ultimate common identity, with metonymy 
each element is seen to possess its own unique identity. 
Either way, there is no difference or friction within 
identity per se (recalling Bourdieu's comments, synecdochic 
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religion can to be seen to claim universal identity through 
its accommodation and assimilation of all cultural 
connotations, whereas metonymic science achieves universality 
through its elimination of connotation altogether). Irony and 
metaphor, on the other hand, accommodate or privilege 
disparities and complexities within identity. While Burke at 
times sees dialectic as leading the way to transcendence (he 
gives the example of the worker who identifies not with his 
local miseries over his job but with the goals of the 
proletariat, and thus generalizes and makes representative 
his situation, which becomes both individual and not-
individual, local and not-local), most often he characterizes 
irony as making dialectics impossible to complete and 
finalize once and for all. Thus irony turns out to be Burke's 
most temporalized trope, vigilant and tireless, in constant 
motion in relation to static balance, always moving away from 
a previous balance toward a newer one, weaving together the 
"part of" with the "apart from."
It is in their discussions of irony that Burke and White 
reveal one of their sharpest disagreements. According to 
White, writing from deep within the postmodernist '70s, "as 
the basis of a world view, irony tends to dissolve all belief 
in the possibility of positive political actions...to 
engender belief in the 'madness' of civilization itself and 
to inspire a Mandarin-like disdain for those seeking to grasp 
the nature of social reality in either science or art."(119) 
White here sees irony as leaning toward apathy, while Burke, 
writing under the pressing threat of totalitarianism, sees 
irony as precisely political (as parliamentary) in that it 
holds out hope for breaking up totalitarianism's prematurely 
synecdochic certainties through the introduction of 
difference and mobility. Yet Burke too speaks at times about 
ironic impasse and frustration: if within an ironic 
perspective identifications are challenged by an awareness of 
counter-identifications and competing perspectives, a 
generalized sense of irony can lead beyond a self-critical 
attitude to a total loss of belief in identification per se. 
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Unlike an ultimate or synecdochic order, a "dialectical order 
would place...competing voices in a jangling relation to one 
another...[whereas] the 'ultimate' order would place these 
competing voices themselves in a hierarchy, or sequence, or 
evaluative series...there would be a 'guiding idea' or 
'unitary principle' behind the diversity of voices."(120) In 
other words, an overly generalized irony can result in a 
piecemeal metonymic relativism, a localizing of the general, 
with only contiguous "voices confront[ing] one another as 
disrelated competitors"--a situation in which, as Judd would 
put it, there is only "one thing after another."
The problem can perhaps be clarified by borrowing a favored 
tactic of Burke's, one he used often in drawing out what he 
called "the paradox of substance." If the substance of irony 
lies in its being a perspective of perspectives, 
transformations will occur as emphasis is shifted from the 
first to the second of its related terms; that is, if stress 
is placed on the first, singular term "perspective," irony 
can be seen to prepare dialectically for synecdoche, an 
ultimate, singular perspective that orders the diversity of 
perspectives under its gaze. But if stress is instead 
switched over to the second, plural term, then the result is 
metonymy, the relativity of disparate perspectives defeating 
the validity of any one of them (as Burke writes, "relativism 
is the constant temptation of dialectic").(121) There is 
perhaps a third option, suggested by the conspicuous overlap 
in Burke's definitions of both irony and metaphor (both 
similarly perspectival and based on transformational 
movement). This third approach would emphasize both terms in 
alternation, "perspective" and "perspectives," stressing the 
back-and-forth movement between the two, between the general 
and the specific, temporarily merging perspectives for the 
sake of unity only to then critically undermine unity through 
recognition of perspectival incongruity, preparing the way 
for a self that is also self-differing. Indeed, Burke seems 
to conceive of irony as a metaphoric approach to context: if 
metaphor is a single instance of perspectival association, 
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irony then associates a plurality of recognizably different 
perspectives, a shuttling between belief and skepticism. 
Herein lies what is probably the most glaring disagreement 
between Burke's logical system and White's archetypal 
narrative form: for Burke irony and metaphor exist in logical 
proximity, while for White they exist as chronological 
extremes. 
Metaphor, in its nondiscerning creation of both 
continuities and incongruities, can perhaps be seen as the 
most neutral of the four tropes. In the end, it could be 
argued that metaphor achieves priority in Burke's thinking 
for reasons neither historical nor even logical (language, 
after all, is for Burke "basically" or "grammatically" 
synecdochic) but having more to do with rhetoric's proper 
context within a social world of partisanship and "wrangle"--
that is, for political reasons. Metaphor, being the most 
neutral, may also be the most nonpartisan trope. Burke's more 
rhetorical and socially oriented view of literature in the 
end could never wholly line up behind the dictum laid down by 
Cleanth Brooks--that a poem is a "unification of attitudes 
into a hierarchy subordinated to a total and governing 
attitude."(122) Literature and politics were too intimately 
intwined, and Fascism still too pressing a threat, for Burke 
to propose such a "prematurely" synecdochic recipe for art. 
Rather, something closer to Burke's thinking was expressed by 
René d'Harnoncourt, who, in the February 1948 issue of Art 
News, phrased the relation of art and politics in terms of 
parts and wholes, and in so doing seemed to promote a 
metaphoric rather than synecdochic model, or, as Harnoncourt 
put it
an order that reconciles freedom of the individual with 
the welfare of society and replaces yesterday's image of 
one unified civilization by a pattern in which many 
elements, while retaining their own individual 
qualities, join to form a new entity...a society 
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enriched beyond belief by the full development of the 
individual for the sake of the whole.(123)
If synecdoche is Burke's linguistic ideal, it is nevertheless 
a static ideal, language in an ultimately lyric state, and 
even he strongly warned that the human drama should not yet 
be drawn to such a premature close. Metaphor instead pledges 
its allegiance to the active, to the full transformational 
resources of language; its movement participates in 
synecdochic orderings, dialectical or ironic interactions, 
and metonymic dissipations, yet it can't be reduced to any 
one of these. It is both a part of each and apart from each. 
To use White's terms, the flexibility of metaphor aligns it 
with the "syntactic," the source of language's health in 
action, as opposed to the hypotactics of synecdoche and the 
paratactics of metonymy.
Greenberg, not unlike Burke, also voiced his opposition 
to rhetorical extremism in art, to too much exclusive 
emphasis placed on either the metonymies of immediate 
sensation or the synecdoches of fanatical belief. American 
artists, he complained in 1947, "are less capable of 
detachment and irony than of almost anything else; therefore 
they are incapable of varying and extending themselves."(124) 
A decade later Johns's art would emerge before the public 
chock full of ironies; as Richard Shiff has described it, 
using terms reminiscent of both Burke and Greenberg, Johns's 
art "extend[s] perspectives" and in doing so "establishes no 
standard or non-deviant position from which to assess the 
degree of movement that occurs."(125) Greenberg would wait 
until 1962 to respond to Johns, and when he did, rather than 
praise the artist's irony for its expansiveness, he instead 
called it, of all things, "narrow" and "limited."(126) But, 
as we will see, by this time Greenberg had shifted his 
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CHAPTER THREE:
MODERNIST PAINTING AND ITS
SCENE OF RECEPTION
There has been a breakdown of cultural authority. 
Socially and culturally unified in former times, the art 
public since the 19th century has been expanded to 
receive a middle class that becomes less and less 
willing to abide by the judgment of connoisseurs. People 
are no longer so ashamed as they used to be of bad 
taste; rather, without going to the trouble to improve 
it, they now defend it aggressively.
--Clement Greenberg, 1949(1)
There is a great deal of intention in painting; it's 
rather unavoidable. But when a work is let out by the 
artist and said to be complete, the intention loosens. 
Then it's subject to all kinds of uses and misuse and 
pun.... Meaning is determined by the use of the thing, 





The hostility with which fellow critics initially greeted 
Kenneth Burke's writings converged on one point. Almost 
unanimously they faulted Burke for being too much a 
rhetorician. "Burke must have found it his first cradle-
word," was Blackmur's verdict. "In Mr. Burke rhetoric always 
does all the work, and in order to do so it has to...become 
very abstract--so abstract that Kant's categories become 
immediate sensations; and with its abstractness it also has 
to become neutral."(3) If nothing else Burke's writing 
demonstrated a rage for system, elaborating a clockwork of 
labels and their relative specifications and coordination, 
their valences and functions. Thus, despite his distrust of 
science and its literal-minded metonymies, his work was 
routinely excoriated precisely for being too scientistic. 
"There is nothing to arrest him: there are no obstacles," 
Blackmur continued. "The articulate organization has absorbed 
the material organized." Greenberg agreed: "Instead of 
discussing the processes by which we think about works of 
literature," he wrote, Burke "discusses the terminology of 
these processes.... It is all superstructural.... He has a 
weakness for that awful pseudo-scientific jargon that has 
become familiar to us from the activities of progressive 
educators, psychologists and efficiency experts."(4) 
Burke's system may have been labyrinthian in its 
complexity, but its primary concern seemed to be with its own 
internal coherence, making the turns and operations of its 
logic appear inexorable and mechanistic. This foreshadowed 
what mid-century critics almost across the board saw as the 
danger looming over modern civilization--that quantification 
and calculation were generally displacing sensibility and 
cultivation of the soul. Or, as F. R. Leavis put it, "the 
efficiency of the machinery becomes the ultimate value, and 
this seems to us to mean something very different from 
expanding and richer human life."(5)
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The argument here, pitting literature and art against 
science for the responsibility of stewarding the new 
industrial, democratic age, has a long, storied history. 
Matthew Arnold and T. H. Huxley squared off over it in the 
1880s, and in the 1950s it was taken up anew in C. P. Snow's 
book The Two Cultures and in Leavis's ferocious attack on 
Snow's pro-science position.(6) More generally, an antagonism 
between scientific rationality and aesthetic intuition was 
said to have effected a division not just within the culture 
but within the modern subject itself, creating what T. S. 
Eliot famously called "a dissociation of sensibility." 
Writing in The Art Bulletin in 1943, John Alford quoted from 
A. N. Whitehead's Science and the Modern World that "between 
1500 and 1900 'the world had got hold of a general idea it 
could neither live with nor live without,' the idea, that is, 
of the universal validity of mechanistic principles."(7) The 
result, according to John Crowe Ransom, was that "we do not 
know how to feel a thought."(8) In 1950 Greenberg took issue 
with Eliot's diagnosis that "in the seventeenth century a 
dissociation of sensibility set in from which we have never 
recovered" only in that the onset of the disaster should 
actually be dated a little earlier, having already been well 
established by the time of its institutionalization with 
"Descartes' claim that the subject receives his surest 
guarantee that he exists from the presence of his own 
thought."
Thought [Greenberg continued] becomes the prima facie
evidence of truth and throws out of court whatever is 
reported by direct perception or intuition or affect 
without being manipulated by "the categories of 
understanding." The truth is not what is felt but what 
works and is consistent with itself. The result is a 
split in consciousness, between the conative and 
cognitive, the subjective and the objective. In the end 
we fall prey to a kind of collective schizophrenia. This 
schizophrenia is part of the discomfort of our 
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civilization. It is painful to be unable to assent to 
the data of immediate awareness and to be compelled to 
act only upon that which is derived from the operations 
upon experience of "objective," detached reason. How 
intense by comparison is the comfort of believing what 
we feel. And how richer seeming.(9)
The idea that not only the culture but each and every 
individual within it falls victim to a war between the 
intuited and the ratiocinated, that modern feeling cowers and 
mutters under the heavy censorship of the "categories of 
understanding," that industrialism's demand for practicality 
and functionalism has all but eclipsed the instinct for 
beauty--all this no doubt exacerbated greatly the perceived 
opposition between poetry and rhetoric. 
"Culture means cultivation," Greenberg wrote, echoing 
Leavis.(10) In this macro-micro equation, the individually 
refined sensibility is made to stand as a synecdochic part 
representing the whole of the society's culture. By the same 
token, the culture itself is rendered as a mirror image of 
the well-rounded, whole individual. Furthermore, as a mirror 
of the individual, the culture gains the dimension of depth: 
rather than a set of functional material practices and 
interlocking group transactions, culture modeled on the 
individual acquires an interiority, and hence a morality, a 
sense of "center" that must "hold"--culture doesn't just 
proceed routinely or change genealogically but matures, 
refines and perfects. "When a poet's mind is perfectly 
equipped for its work," Eliot wrote, "it is constantly 
amalgamating disparate experiences. [T]he ordinary man's 
experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary...[he] falls in 
love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have 
nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the 
typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the mind of the poet 
these experiences are always forming new wholes."(11) The 
individual, especially if he or she is a poet or artist, or 
at least attuned to poetry and art, is always greater than--
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not just the sum of--the parts; and what is greater is 
precisely wholeness itself, its unity, comprehension, fluency 
and integrity, which are hence made supreme values--values 
for both poems and persons. "It is not the 'greatness,' the 
intensity, of the emotions, the components," Eliot argues, 
"but the intensity of the artistic process, the pressure, so 
to speak, under which the fusion takes place, that 
counts."(12)
The reciprocity between the individual, cultivated 
sensibility, which fuses piecemeal experiences into always 
greater wholes, and the unified, well integrated artwork is 
such that each can be seen as simultaneously producing and 
being produced by the other. In encounters with works of art 
the individual opens him or herself to the experience and in 
turn opens the work to sensitive, probing judgment--this 
would be such an occasion when pressure is applied to fuse 
parts into wholes, creating fluent interchange between the 
specific instance of perception and the criteria and 
standards generalized over time by the perceiving subject. 
Especially for the critic: ascertaining the relative value of 
an artwork in the felt experience of it is as close as 
criticism gets to the poetic. This, it turns out, is 
precisely what the rhetorician is said to be incapable of or 
unwilling to do. According to the young Marshall McLuhan, a 
critic like Burke, as he appropriates and breaks down 
artworks in his analytical wheelhouse, can't say whether the 
work's constitutive parts "are aggregated, excogitated or 
genuinely fused in a unifying vision which makes of them a 
dramatic integrity."(13) In its spread of flat and functional 
categories, Burke's system is like a machine, an ensemble of 
operational terms lacking interiority and depth, a set of 
exteriorities clanking against each other like dominoes, one 
thing after another.
Critics in the mold of Eliot and Leavis complained about 
people like Burke (and also Northrup Frye) for devising 
critical systems that could dissect equally well a Joyce 
novel and a newspaper headline without saying anything about 
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the relative "human" merits of the two. Even Harold Rosenberg 
wrote early on of Burke that "there is almost no point in his 
theory...which could not be shown to touch equally upon 
Oedipus and a Broadway hit."(14) The distinction made here--
between criticism as the judgment of quality and criticism as 
the application of a technical and "neutral" methodology--
hews closely to the difference between modernism and 
postmodernism as characterized by advocates of the latter 
such as Rosalind Krauss, who used precisely such terms in the 
introduction to her 1986 Originality of the Avant-Garde and
Other Modernist Myths. The interest of postmodernist 
criticism, Krauss argues, lies not in a search for quality 
but "almost entirely in its method."(15) Inside this long 
history is a story of criticism's professionalization and 
absorption into academia: certainly the shared subtext to 
Frye's and Krauss's arguments is the securing for criticism 
of a more rigorous method and hence greater respect within 
the university. But the shift of focus from "quality" to 
"method" also marks a shift in criticism's fundamental basis, 
from being rooted in a certain historicist notion of 
the subject to being rooted in a certain structuralist notion 
of signification. For Leavis and Greenberg, culture meant 
cultivation, the development of the faculties, passage from 
intuition to understanding, balance between feeling and 
thought. The threat to this developing body, whether 
the culture's or the individual's, is discontinuity, the 
splintering, stunting and decentering brought on by too much 
specialization and the collapse of any over-arching belief 
system, any fused whole. Hence all the handwringing over "the 
two cultures" and "dissociated" sensibility (or think again 
of the line that starts "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," that no 
perspective is large enough to relate a poem by Eliot and a 
poem by Eddie Guest). To snap sensibility back into alert 
unison, one exercised judgment. Postmodernists like Krauss, 
who borrow from structuralist anthropology a view of culture 
as a system of binary terms, see an exactly opposite threat. 
They stress not modern society's fragmentation but its 
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compensatory other side, its overly enforced unification: for 
them, the worst that could happen is that culture becomes too 
congealed, implacable, unassailable, that there exists no 
loose joints in the meaning system, no slippage between 
signifiers and ideological signifieds. To sow fissures in 
such a system, one exercises ideology critique. Disunity 
threatens modernism, whereas unity is the threat perceived by 
postmodernism. Thus it only makes sense that modernists place 
emphasis on the integrity and wholeness of the poetic, 
whereas postmodernists seek to upset the smooth functioning 
of cultural rhetoric (through a "strategy of interference," 
to borrow Hal Foster's phrase).
Parts and Wholes
To repeat, modern society builds and maintains itself on both 
fragmentation and unification at once--the two working as 
mutually interdependent and ongoing processes. "The 
professional mass keeps expanding," Harold Rosenberg wrote in 
Art News in 1956, "and as it expands it divides."(16) 
Moreover, these two processes operate at both the level of 
the culture and that of the individual. As professions 
proliferate, the culture breaks up into increasingly smaller 
and numerous groups, with such groups admitting only those 
individuals who conform by becoming specialists themselves. 
This, in turn, breaks up the wholeness of the well-rounded 
individual subject. "In surrendering the totality of oneself 
to a professional role," Greenberg lamented, "you give up 
being a friend, a lover, a gossip, an attractive person, the 
life of the party, in order to be that much more poet, actor, 
boxer, doctor, businessman. Instead of completing yourself by 
work you mutilate yourself."(17) 
The modern professional is not a whole but only ever a 
part of some larger ensemble or scheme beyond his or her 
comprehension. The slight ambiguity in the title of 
Rosenberg's 1956 essay, "Everyman a Professional," 
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encapsulates the problem. Such individuals have no internal 
center to which they add new experiences; they do not submit 
experience to a centripetal and internalizing pressure so 
much as are themselves submitted to pressures from outside; 
the professional only finds a sense of wholeness and center 
in the abstraction that a highly administered, bureaucratic 
society presents itself as. The result is typically "a man 
the epidermis of whose brain functions better than its core," 
as Greenberg sarcastically put it, "a man highly sensitive as 
only the superficial can be to the changing moods of the 
international, up-to-date, and literate milieu in which he 
circulates and according to which he cuts his figure.... The 
task of such a talent is...to post us on the appropriate 
reactions of the day."(18) 
Concerned primarily not with an individual reality, a 
private core that judges and amalgamates experience, but with 
how to fit into a surrounding social apparatus and 
competently circulate its signs, such a subject is encouraged 
to develop an exterior rhetoric, a surface look--agreeable 
manner, aptitude to get along--at the expense of a poetic 
interior. Various names were coined for this new modern 
individual: Erich Fromme's term was "the marketer," C. Wright 
Mills's "the fixer." In his 1950 book The Lonely Crowd, David 
Riesman described the type as "other-directed," as opposed to 
the "inner-directed" personality common to an earlier 
entrepreneurial age and, before that, the "tradition-
directed" character of the old aristocracy and rural clan. 
According to Riesman, as society becomes more administered 
and bureaucratic, and the basis of the economy shifts from 
extraction and production to communication and services, 
"other people [become] the problem, not the material 
environment."(19) The other-directed personality is worried 
"not so much about violation of inner standards as about 
failure to be popular." The same year that Rosenberg wrote 
"Everyman a Professional," Greenberg used much the same 
language to describe the modern "American personality," which 
he found to be "a standardized one":
117
Without a standardized personality, we doubtless would 
not manifest that 'unity and diversity' which is 
frequently remarked upon...without it we probably would 
not get along with one another as well as we do, given 
our ethnic, racial and regional heterogeneity.... A 
personality, ostensibly declaring the whole of oneself, 
leaves too little of the self over for self-cultivation 
or self-development.... Americans exhaust their selves 
in their personalities.... We do in this country behave 
as though intent on Hegel's millennium, when the public 
and the private shall be as one, and the outside of a 
man declare everything about his inside.(20)
Exactly how inside and outside, part and whole, relate 
to each other--whether a synecdochic transparency obtains 
between the two, or interiority and individuality are to be 
liquidated for the sake of surface exterior and the mass--is 
what worried commentators. Riesman described the newly 
dominant other-directed type as immanently malleable and 
chameleon, susceptible to systematic yet intimate suggestion, 
influence and programming: "Keeping in touch with others 
permits a close behavioral conformity, not through drill in 
behavior itself, as in the tradition-directed character, but 
rather through an exceptional sensitivity to the actions and 
wishes of others." And these others weren't confined to 
family and community but included mostly the disembodied 
apparitions of the media. Indeed, the new service economy 
ushered in a world of such rhetorical "others." As Riesman 
tells it,
Education, leisure, services, these go together with an 
increased consumption of words and images from the new 
mass media.... Increasingly, relations with the outer 
world and with the self are mediated by the flow of mass 
communication...experienced through a screen of words by 
which the events are habitually atomized and 
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personalized--or psuedo-personalized. For the inner-
directed person who remains still extant in this period 
the tendency is rather to systematize and moralize this  
flow of words.... What is common to all the other-
directed people is that their contemporaries are the 
source of direction for the individual--either those 
known to him or those with whom he is indirectly 
acquainted, through friends and through the mass 
media.(21)
It was a common complaint by the late '50s that citizens 
were growing too conformist, becoming too easily swayed by 
external forces. John Kenneth Galbraith (in the early '40s 
the editor of Henry Luce's Fortune) lamented in 1958 that 
"these are the days when men of all social disciplines and 
all political faiths seek the comfortable and accepted; when 
the man of controversy is looked upon as a disturbing 
influence; when originality is taken to be a mark of 
instability; and when...the bland lead the bland."(22) 
Furthermore, the external forces that most swayed individuals 
were themselves impersonal, large-scale and industrial--mass 
education, governmental social engineering schemes, public 
relations, advertising. Urban centers were where other-
directed types congregated; according to Riesman, "The other 
director person is cosmopolitan." Three years earlier 
Greenberg had also used the word "cosmopolitan" when 
describing the industrialization of culture: "America, in two 
or three big cities, is being rapidly divested of its 
provincialism, but the cosmopolitanism replacing it is the 
product of a leveling out and rationalization of culture, 
which we now import or imitate the way we do French wines and 
British cloth."(23) Harold Rosenberg argued that the labor 
and techniques of sowing conformism and gluing together the 
atomized professions had itself become a profession, or 
rather a kind of meta-profession. "Popularization, which acts 
as journalistic or educational intercessor between the 
isolated mind of the theorist-technician and the fragmented 
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psyche of the public, is the most powerful profession of our 
time and gaining daily in numbers, importance and 
finesse."(24) The industries of mass communication did not 
together make a whole; they were instead only more 
professions, just doing their jobs. Nevertheless they took 
over the work of amalgamating otherwise disparate 
experiences, providing the connections between, say, the 
theories of Spinoza and the smell of cooking, a task 
individual professionals no longer had the time or even 
capacity to do on their own. A well-rounded life now arrived 
prepackaged through various media and commercial outlets, 
something to consume as a finished product like any other 
commodity. "The cultured American," Greenberg sighed, "has 
become more knowing than cultivated, glib in a kind of 
fashionable koine but without eccentricity or the distortions 
of personal bias, a compendium of what he or (more usually) 
she reads in certain knowing magazines--anxious to be right, 
correct au courant, rather than happy and wise."(25)
If it was now up to the various sectors of the mass 
communications apparatus to unify society's otherwise 
dispersed shards, to effect what would at least be a 
functional surrogate for a common culture, that task could 
not possibly be performed poetically. Itself built under the 
dictates of calculation, rationalization and efficiency, mass 
media could not "genuinely fuse" parts into wholes; it was as 
bereft of an interiority as the mass audience in whose image 
it was conceived. As Greenberg noted, "Only the enormous 
productivity of American industrialism could lead any society 
to think it possible to cultivate the masses."(26) Mass 
education and mass communication were outfitted for quantity, 
not quality: they could not discriminate, could not judge, 
neither in terms of their contents nor their audience members 
("a million people may file past a painting in a museum: they 
do not in the least reduce its power or beauty," Alvin 
Toeffler crowed in 1964, a year after it was announced that 
museum attendance had surpassed that of major league 
baseball).(27) Like any other industrial process, such a 
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system aimed to reduce friction and increase results by 
averaging everything out, exploiting the common denominator. 
"Midcult" is what Dwight McDonald famously called it--neither 
low nor high culture, serious or superficial, but somehow 
blandly both. McDonald pointed to Luce's Life magazine as an 
example:
Life is a typical homogenized magazine, appearing on the 
mahogany library tables of the rich, the glass cocktail 
tables of the middle class, and the oilcloth kitchen 
tables of the poor. Its contents are as thoroughly 
homogenized as its circulation. The same issue will 
present a serious exposition of atomic energy followed 
by a disquisition on Rita Hayworth's love life...nine 
color pages of Renoir paintings followed by a picture of 
a roller-skating horse.... Somehow these scramblings 
together seem to work all one way, degrading the serious 
rather than elevating the frivolous...just think, nine 
pages of Renoirs! But that roller-skating horse comes 
along, and the final impression is that both Renoir and 
the horse were talented.(28)
The serious is degraded precisely because it is not fused 
through judgment into a greater whole, rather only jumbled 
with other parts that remain only ever parts, disconnected 
and distracting. Midcult most worried people like McDonald 
and Greenberg because, by collapsing the divide between high 
and low, it propagated nondiscrimination, an abdicating of 
judgment. Here the sum is always less than the whole. 
Moreover, the very notion of cultivation no longer had to do 
with developing the individual's poetic sensibility but was 
made "other-directed," a means for people to fit into a 
social order, or to effect the appearance of moving upward 
within it. Cultivation was now the concern of salesmen, 
polltakers and status-seekers, an industry with expanding 
markets and growing demand, a prime indicator of relative 
status in an anxiously competitive society. "The bitter 
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status struggle that goes on in a thoroughly democratic 
country," Greenberg continued, "would itself have served by 
now to put self-cultivation on the order of day--once it 
became clear to the commonalty, as it has by now, that 
cultivation not only makes life more interesting 
but...defines social position."(29) Cultivation was used as 
means to impress others, a show to put on, a rhetoric.
This made a mockery of the socialist ideal of culture as 
Greenberg and others had earlier envisioned it. "One of the 
aims of culture is to transform the private into the public," 
Greenberg had explained. But such a culture privileges the 
public not in spite of the private; rather, the public is 
nothing more than an extension and elaboration of the 
private, an overflowing of individual cultivation beyond the 
private, its full flowering, with the integrity of the 
individual and its poetics serving as society's very 
foundation. Here the poetic pulses back and forth equally 
between parts and wholes, communicating between the inner and 
outer, the one and the many, the specific and the general. 
Rhetoric is subsumed and redeemed in the process. "Culture 
enables individuals to communicate and appreciate 
inwardness," Greenberg continued, "and make it objective." 
Thus the public becomes predicated on the private. Mass 
bureaucratic society is the exact opposite; here people 
depend on each other like cogs in a machine; the individual 
disappears into the social not to enlarge and transcend him 
or herself but to forfeit the interiority of the self; 
unification is achieved through a metonymic reduction of the 
individual to society. "Failure of individuals to express 
inwardness," Greenberg warned, "converts them into a mass." 
The result of such a reduction is that "we as the most 
rationalized human products of industrialism come closest to 
the insect kingdom--too much at the disposal of our trades 
not to maintain enough the claims of what only seems 
extraneous."(30)
It would seem that, given society's antagonism toward 
the poetic, it would be left all the more to each and every 
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individual to exert and cultivate individuality per se. 
"Expressing inwardness" took on the force of a political 
crusade: in 1949 McLuhan charged corporate media giants like 
Luce of "taking political initiative" and mandating other-
directedness by "vigorously thrusting an emotionally-charged 
spectator role" on his magazines' readers. McLuhan called for 
a revolt in the form of "the untrancing of millions of 
individuals by millions of individual acts of the will."(31) 
That individual center, that single point of view that brings 
into alignment thought and feeling, faculties and sense, that 
"genuinely fuses" what one undergoes and what one 
understands--that inward core would have to be all the more 
exercised and externalized if total massification was to be 
forestalled. To do so meant exerting equal effort in the 
opposite direction; it meant withstanding pressure to conform 
to social codes and behavioral disciplines that, if 
internalized, would corrupt and atrophy genuine inwardness. 
Even Greenberg at times seemed to cheer painters to "just 
paint," just express themselves: in a mostly positive review 
from 1944, for example, he warned Robert Motherwell to "stop 
watching himself, let him stop thinking instead of painting 
himself through."(32)
But here a new problem arose. If expressing inwardness 
was privileged exclusively, then what would keep such 
expressions from themselves separating out as fitful and 
disconnected fragments? It wasn't enough to respond to the 
widening gap between fragmentation and unification by siding 
with just individuals in their state of deprivation and 
ignoring as best as possible the bureaucratized whole. Nor 
would modern dissociation be cured by simply extolling 
feeling to the exclusion of thought, or practice minus 
theory. That would only exacerbate dissociation and produce 
more disparate parts, spontaneous blurtings without any 
larger comprehension, any fuller, more general sense of the 
poetic that transcended mere specific instances. This is what 
opponents of much '50s art complained about, that, in the 
words of Robert Brustein, "in these 'action' paintings we are 
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confronted with the painter's dreams before he has reflected 
on them, sometimes before he even knows what they are...it is 
often difficult to distinguish between self-expression and 
self-indulgence."(33) For younger artists and critics of the 
'60s this became a standard charge; Barbara Rose, for 
instance, casually dismissed the "inept art that resulted 
from the elevation of mindless 'action' over self-conscious 
and critical deliberation."(34) Even Kenneth Burke, 
participating on the roundtable for Modern Artists in
America, had to insist to his colleagues that the artist was 
more than a wellspring of unfiltered expression. "What of an 
artist who revises his work?," Burke asked. "Is he not 
criticizing himself? ...A critical function is integral to 
the creative act."(35)
Greenberg went back and forth, if only because in the 
end he wanted an art at once felt and thought. On the one 
hand, as his ambivalence over Pollock demonstrated, he 
admitted that it required an almost complete obliviousness 
regarding socially prevailing taste for an artist to achieve 
anything truly original and vital. In 1956, he applauded 
David Smith for eluding the problem of self-consciousness 
that Motherwell had symptomized 12 years earlier. "Smith... 
can afford bad taste and an incapacity for self-criticism.... 
The inability or unwillingness to criticize himself...enables 
him to accept the surprises of his own personality, wherein 
lies his originality. Which is to say that he has been 
triumphantly loyal to his own temperament and his own 
experience in defiance of whatever precedents or rules of 
taste might have stood in the way."(36) At the same time, 
Greenberg was cautious not to overestimate what such presumed 
immediacy could purchase. He dreaded the myth of the wild 
artist and of painting as action, and bristled at attempts by 
painters to escape into nature or esoterica and thus avoid 
reckoning with prickly realities such as urban industrialism 
or even painting's historical grounding and limits. "An 
artist working in New York or Paris still cannot introduce 
Oriental, archaic, or barbaric elements into his work without 
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modifying them radically to fit the terms of easel painting 
as established by a tradition that goes back to the Middle 
Ages and is not yet dead," he protested in 1948. "The greater 
the artist's awareness of those terms, the greater is his 
power of self-criticism.... The failure of self-
criticism...accounts for some of the most serious 
shortcomings of contemporary advanced American art as a 
whole."(37)
Greenberg, who often appealed to Kant in his writings 
and conversation, made clear he subscribed to the definition 
of taste as the exercising of judgment and not as a mere 
pleasurable sensing. He wanted both immediacy and reflection, 
unfettered expression and self-criticism. Indeed, this was 
the problem he had with the debate surrounding Eliot's notion 
of dissociated sensibility: Greenberg thought that Eliot's 
own prescribed cure, a return to religion, put too much 
emphasis on synecdochic immediacy and denied the importance 
of ironic detachment. As early as "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," 
Greenberg had warned of the seductions of immediacy; with 
avant-garde art "values...are derived at a second remove, as 
the result of reflection upon the immediate impression left 
by the plastic values," whereas kitsch asks that there be "no 
discontinuity between art and life...identifications are 
self-evident immediately and without any effort on the part 
of the spectator."(38) In response to Eliot, Greenberg wrote 
that "Romanticism and all the revivals of religion and 
religiosity since the 18th century are attempts to restore 
the validity of the data of feeling." But while he 
sympathized with those who desired immediacy, desired "the 
comfort of believing what we feel," it was precisely irony, 
he felt, that "remains literary art's last defense against 
the disassociation of sensibility. And woe to the poet who 
lets this irony lapse."(39)
Only an ironic viewpoint, it seemed--or, to borrow 
Burke's phrase, "a perspective of perspectives"--had a chance 
of forging an albeit provisional whole out of the piecemeal 
and disparate experiences offered up by the world as it 
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exists; religion solved the problem by avoiding reality in 
favor of a patinaed fantasy. Time and again Greenberg 
advocated an engagement with life's harsh realities that was 
at once passionate and skeptical, detached in the sense not 
of being aloof or withdrawn but of being sober, unswayed by 
illusions. Detachment for Greenberg was bound up with his 
praise for empiricism and positivism; it meant brutal honesty 
and openness, unblinking assessment, willingness to face 
truths straight-on, resistance to narrowing enthusiasms and 
self-deception. "The great modern painters and sculptors are 
the hard-headed ones," he wrote; he admired "such relatively 
cold, hard heads as Matisse and Picasso"; Matisse in 
particular appeared detached and cold--he was "cold, 
undistracted and full of arrogant purpose," he practiced a 
"cold hedonism."(40) But more was needed than just a 
willingness to gain experience unshielded by convenient 
beliefs; one also needed to come at the world with a force 
equal to its. So as not to be too overwhelmed one needed "to 
externalize and to synthesize a total view of the world," to 
always judge experience by measuring it against one's sense 
of totality. Greenberg called for "strong-mindedness," 
"serious bias," and an "intense constant perception of tasks" 
as a way to fuse parts into wholes, to not just submit to 
pressures but exert pressure in return. 
A constantly reappraised sense of the whole was required 
for rendering judgment, for placing and evaluating sensation 
and feeling; without it an artist was too easily overcome by 
experience, succumbing passively to it, leaving it "as is," 
isolated and disconnected. Such was the price of immediacy--
an unwillingness to even try to be detached enough to 
comprehend the world's unifying forces meant being unified 
all the more efficiently by them. No matter how heartfelt, 
one's fitful, immediate expressions were left too vulnerable 
to misappropriation; one's differences and novelties were too 
easily made to fit in. Especially given the "breakdown of 
cultural authority," when distinctions were "be[ing] blurred 
if not entirely obliterated," Greenberg feared that artists 
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"in this period tend to be aggressively anti-intellectual--
become reluctant to insist on preserving the distinctions, 
because the contemporary cultural elite, on whom high art 
presumably depends, can furnish them with neither 
intellectual and moral support nor markets. Given the 
temptations of attention and money, even the best of the 
artists find it difficult amid the present confusion of 
standards not to surrender to Mr. Luce." Again in 1953, 
Greenberg insisted on the need to keep indivisible feeling 
and thought, writing that "sensibility may not be identical 
with intelligence, but prepossessions of feeling can become 
premises of thought, and limitations of thought, limitations 
of emotion and experience."(41)
Greenberg first clearly articulated this argument as 
early as 1941, but in relation to contemporary poetry rather 
than painting. "The unity of [Marianne] Moore's work," he 
shook his head, "is too exclusively a unity of sensibility, 
without intellectual consistency, without large opinions, 
without a felt center of convictions. Miss Moore makes only 
aesthetic discriminations; otherwise everything seems to 
exist on the same single plane." Greenberg found this 
shortcoming pervasive among poets at the time--it inflicted 
the work "of W. C. Williams, E. E. Cummings, H. D., and even 
Ezra Pound and Wallace Stevens." All shared "an outlook that 
has to break things into small pieces in order to see them, 
that has to destroy the organic unity of everything it 
treats. Its makers have neither inherited nor acquired enough 
cultural capital to expand beyond the confines of their 
immediate experience and of a narrowly professional 
conception of poetry." In the end such poetry, in its 
"failure to discriminate between the important and 
unimportant," suffered from "a sensibility that is too 
private and that has no means of transcending itself."(42)
Greenberg unleashed this argument upon contemporary 
visual art with particular force and clarity in one long 
passage from 1947, when writing about "The Present Prospects 
of American Painting and Sculpture": 
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The art of no country can live and perpetuate itself 
exclusively on spasmodic feeling, high spirits and the 
infinite subdivision of sensibility. A substantial art
requires balance and enough thought to put it in accord 
with the most advanced view of the world obtaining at 
the time. Modern man has in theory solved the great
public and private questions, and the fact that he has 
not solved them in practice and that actuality has 
become more problematic than ever in our day ought not 
to prevent, in this country, the development of a bland, 
large, balanced, Apollonian art in which passion does 
not fill in the gaps left by the faulty or omitted 
application of theory but takes off from where the most 
advanced theory stops, and in which an intense 
detachment informs all. Only such an art, resting on 
rationality but without permitting itself to be 
rationalized, can adequately answer contemporary life, 
found our sensibilities, and, by containing and 
vicariously relieving them, remunerate us for those 
particular and necessary frustrations that ensue from 
living at the present moment.... Balance, largeness, 
precision, enlightenment, contempt for nature in all its 
particularity--that is the great and absent art of our 
age.... We stand in need of a much greater infusion of 
consciousness than heretofore into what we call the 
creative. We need men of the world not too much amazed 
by experience, not too much at a loss in the face of 
current events, not at all overpowered by their own 
feelings, men to some extent aware of what has been felt 
elsewhere since the beginning of recorded history.(43)
What Greenberg wanted was culture as a whole--not just 
individual expressions, unfused parts no matter how intense, 
nor just a cultural marketplace unified by a mass 
"popularization" industry. Part of the problem had to do with 
gaining perspective, detachment--not easy for a competitive 
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society in which misunderstood artists struggle to survive 
and audience members are "anxious to be right." "The 
difficulty remains," Greenberg sighed, "our failure to relate 
this high conception of contemporary art to our own lives, 
our inability to be detached about either art or life, 
detached and whole as people are who are at home in the world 
of culture." Another problem was more plainly logistical; it 
had to do with how to support this ambitiously conceived 
culture, where to locate it, how to fund and feed and 
populate it. "The task facing culture in America is to create 
a milieu that will produce such an art--and literature--and 
free us (at last!) from the obsession with extreme situations 
and states of mind."(44)
A whole culture, a place where people can feel at home 
with culture, a home for culture--how to fill this absence 
was a question Greenberg would return to again and again. 
Already in 1944, in a review of the Whitney Annual, he 
worried aloud that "everybody shows a high level of 
competence, everybody is learned in the excellences of the 
past, but a community of excitement and ambition and a real 
richness of culture is missing." By 1948 he was even trying 
to turn this very lack of community into a positive, arguing 
that an "artist has to embrace and content himself, almost, 
with isolation... isolation is the natural condition of high 
art in America." But two years later he seemed to change his 
mind again: "The artist functions best in the company of 
other artists...art is an intensely social product and 
suffers in the long run under isolation."(45) The very next 
year he was warning of "a period of decadence, when talent is 
no longer borne up, swept along, and extended to its full by 
collective inspiration," and as an example he gave Braque in 
the '30s, who "is content to turn out luxury articles which 
offer us richness of paint quality and color, but only in 
isolation, not as integrated parts of a whole."(46)
During the mid '40s in particular, crucial years for the
development of New York School painting, Greenberg wrote 
nostalgically about an earlier golden age of avant-garde 
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activity, which he seemed to take as both norm and ideal, 
before professionalization and status mongering, when 
sensibility was unified and theory was at one with practice. 
"Standing off in the preserves of Bohemia, the 
impressionists, fauvists and cubists could still indulge in a 
contemplation that was as sincere and bold as it was largely 
unconscious; and the soberness of their art, a soberness 
indispensable to all the very greatest painting, from Ajanta 
to Paris, stemmed from this automatic contemplation." The 
same desideratum had appeared in one of his articles three 
years earlier: 
The milieu and the period were under intense critical 
pressure, created, as is usually the case, by competing 
activity in exploration of new possibilities rather than 
by the words of the critics.... Unlike the advanced 
artists of the period after 1918, when the reputation of 
being advanced was a goal in itself and meant eventual 
rewards, Pissaro and his fellows had little to encourage 
them except the excitement of discovery. Judgment could 
be exercised with relative purity and was unwarped by 
issues accidental to art. Whatever came out of the 
studios aroused an immediate, keen, and uncompromising 
response."(47)
No doubt such a vaunted image of artistic community was 
what Greenberg was hoping to find when he looked around 
Manhattan in the late '40s and '50s, and sometimes he thought 
he found it, albeit in a severely deformed state, at once 
prematurely hatched and already mutilated by hardship. "It is 
still downtown, below 34th Street, that the fate of American 
art is being decided--by young people, few over 40, who live 
in cold-water flats and exist hand to mouth." Always this 
milieu was on the brink of being engulfed in the shadow of a 
neighboring scene of corruption, a robust and beckoning 
commercial culture. Greenberg would map New York accordingly, 
with blocks of poetic integrity shouldering districts of 
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calculated packaging, the blue-chip galleries and museums. 
"The fate of American Art does not depend on the 
encouragement bestowed or withheld by 57th Street and the 
Museum of Modern Art," he continued.(48) The map was subject 
to frequent revising; earlier the same year he had written 
that "the more ambitious and serious of the youngest 
generation of American painters live south of 23rd Street, 
are shown now and then on 57th Street (at Art of This 
Century, Betty Parsons Gallery, the Egan Gallery and one or 
two other places), but never figure in the big annual group 
shows and get almost no publicity." A year later it was 
adjusted again: "Most of the best painting done in this 
country at the moment does not reach the public eye, but 
remains west of Seventh Avenue, stacked against the wall." 
Wherever it popped up, the milieu was always comprised of the 
same standard iconography, a certain telltale set design: "a 
shabby studio on the fifth floor of a cold-water, walk-up 
tenement on Hudson Street"; or again: "The genuine painters 
of the youngest generation remain in their cold-water flats, 
uncompromised."(49) It is hard not to speculate that for 
Greenberg cold water symbolized a medicine of sorts, a 
purifying or baptismal fluid that bestowed soberness and 
keenness, fostering something like Matisse's "cold, hard 
head" among fledging downtown bohemians.
As has often been noted, at the time and since, 
Greenberg not only desired the formation of an elite cultural 
milieu but did what he could to hurry it into being, shaping 
taste and tendencies of both artists and patrons through 
various means, which would come to include not only the 
pulpit of art criticism but also curating and gallery 
advising (the art historian Bradford Collins has gone so far 
as to christen Greenberg "the consummate manipulator").(50) 
Megalomania and monetary greed have been suggested as 
possible motivations, but it should be remembered just how 
much Greenberg believed in the twin ideals of a genuine 
culture on the one hand and a genuinely cultivated individual 
subject on the other, and in the historical project of 
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realizing such ideals under the conditions of modernism, a 
project kept alive up until the '20s with post-impressionism, 
fauvism and cubism, and still struggling to keep itself from 
being either pulverized or absorbed but either way lost for 
good. Such a belief wasn't just held by Greenberg. It was 
recognized as driving the tactics of people like Leavis, who 
Lionel Trilling described in 1962 as having "taken it to be 
his function to organize mobile people, those of them who are 
gifted and conscious, into a new social class formed on the 
basis of its serious understanding of and response to 
literature."(51) As late as 1967 Michael Fried, in the midst 
of declaring a "war" between modernist art and its pretended 
heirs and rivals such as minimalism, would also appeal to 
"serious understanding" as a way of separating out an elite 
caste: "Certain modes of seriousness...i.e., those 
established by the finest painting and sculpture of the 
recent past...are hardly modes of seriousness in which most 
people feel at home, or even which they find tolerable."(52) 
Even in 1948 Greenberg, long after he had ceased rallying for 
socialism, was still assuming the tone of an embattled 
militant, describing culture using war metaphors (or perhaps 
cold-war ones): "Middlebrow culture attacks distinctions as 
such and insinuates itself everywhere, devaluating the 
precious, infecting the healthy, corrupting the honest and 
stultifying the wise. Insidiousness is of its essence.... It
is necessary for each of us to suspect, and correct, himself. 
For we are all of us becoming guilty in one way or 
another."(53)
In the late '40s and early '50s it seems an ambitious 
artistic milieu was indeed forming, one with perhaps ample 
enough numbers and structure to keep itself internally cogent 
and thus not easily distracted or co-opted. It could achieve, 
in other words, some relative "detachment," figuratively and 
literally. "We had no general public," Barnett Newman 
recalled. "The only thing that we did have was an opportunity 
of seeing each other in shows.... It was not, in that sense, 
a true marketplace. It was not, in that sense, even a showing 
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place. It was a very special situation. It was a primitive 
cultural situation."(54) There was "what Robert Motherwell 
called an underlying network of awareness, in which everyone 
knew who was painting what and why." "Communication was 
entirely verbal," Robert Goldwater wrote in 1959. Goldwater 
reasoned that, because the New York School artists first 
convened through the WPA, they both gravitated toward a 
mural-sized painting and also more readily accepted the 
absence of a viable market for such unwieldy work. 
Frankenthaler in 1965 agreed that "in the early '50s, none of 
us expected to sell pictures. A few people knew your work...a 
small orbit." Many felt like Goldwater that "a good deal of 
the social history of American painting during the '50s 
belongs to 'The Club,'" the organization that Philip Pavia 
and others opened in 1949 with Leo Castelli's financial 
backing (in the form of rent money). But the work of 
threading the community together had begun earlier, when Hans 
Hofmann's school on 8th Street opened and quickly became, in 
Greenberg's words, "a focus of social activity." "Everybody 
went to his school," Pavia admits. "All the language and all 
the criticism in American art...all these were Hofmann's 
words he gave to his students, and his students were 
everybody we knew."(55)
With turf and an exclusive language all its own, the 
scene around 10th Street was perhaps enough of a self-defined 
subculture to provide, at least for a time, what Greenberg 
was asking for, just "a modicum of space in which personal 
detachment could survive and work up its own proper 
interestingness."(56) But the ideal very soon grew distant, 
becoming instead an object of nostalgia. The good immediacy 
of "automatic contemplation," of "immediate, keen, and 
uncompromising response" soon gave way to a bad immediacy, to 
a situation in which everyone seemed to "twitch at once." The 
Club had been established the same year that Pollock "broke 
the ice," and the growing attention from outside made 
denizens of the milieu by turns defensive, self-conscious and 
career-minded. The title of Goldwater's 1959 article about 
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the scene, "Everyone Knew What Everyone Else Meant," was 
already phrased in the past tense. That same year Art News
published the artists' panel discussions over the question 
"Is There a New Academy?" and three years after that The Club 
closed (followed the next year by the demise of the Cedar 
Bar). But disenchantment seems to have overcome Greenberg 
earlier; by the mid '50s he was already complaining about the 
"Tenth Street Touch." Within the tight-knit downtown milieu 
he observed a growing conservatism, a weakness for the 
security and sense of belonging gotten through group 
conformity and obligatory mutual affirmation. His first 
article of 1952 chastised downtown artists for "rejecting" 
Barnett Newman's two recent shows at Betty Parsons's: 
mounting paintings of "both nerve and truth...Newman took a 
chance and has suffered for it." "Those who so vehemently 
resent him," the critic continued, "should be given pause," 
since "art can make you angry only if it threatens your 
habits of taste."(57) Among the downtowners, habits of taste 
had congealed around de Kooning's seemingly less radical 
style of impetuous, painterly "action painting," which 
Greenberg took aim at three years later, accusing it of 
"nostalgia," of remaining too faithful to an outworn cubist 
approach founded on value contrasts that were themselves 
leftover from figurative illusionism. "If de Kooning's art 
has found a readier acceptance than most other forms of 
abstract expressionism, it is because his need to include the 
past as well as forestall the future reassures most of 
us."(58)
By 1960, the downtown milieu had become thoroughly 
"cosmopolitan." "Not being provincial," Greenberg judged, 
"has an effect all its own. A certain vehemence, confidence 
and even authority make themselves felt in hollow as well as 
resounding works of art.... Artists are buoyed by a sense of 
vast possibilities of attention and reputation.... Never 
before in New York has there been so much false and inflated 
painting and sculpture, never before so many false and 
inflated reputations." The main culprit was "the de Kooning 
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and Kline school, with its cubist hangover," which Greenberg 
accused of encouraging expressions of not individuality but 
other-directedness. "A cycle of virtuosity began with that 
school. Virtuosity implies performance, and performance 
implies conformity with received tastes."(59) Four years 
later Kaprow would agree: "Since 1952...artists have found 
their identities over and over in that white expanse of 
canvas, and many look remarkably alike." Beyond that, the 
"general public," which Newman had claimed was missing from 
downtown's "primitive cultural situation," had seemingly 
invaded and taken over. According to Kaprow, 
The old idea of an Artists' Clan or Group no longer 
exists...what has been called an 'art public' is no 
longer a select, small group upon whom an artist can 
depend for a stock response. It is now a large, diffused 
mass, soon to be called 'the public-in-general'... 
comprised of readers of the weeklies, viewers of T.V., 
visitors to Worlds Fairs, here and abroad, members of 
'culture' clubs and subscribers to mail-order art 
lessons, charitable organizations, civic-improvement 
committees, political campaigners, schools and 
universities...(60)
A number of commentators took this turn of events not as 
reason to seek out new pockets of resistance but as evidence 
that such resistance had now become impossible. There were no 
longer two different cultures, no dissociation within 
sensibility, no inside or outside--all was one. Lawrence 
Alloway, as early as 1958, argued that "the new role for the 
fine arts is to be one of the possible forms of communication 
in an expanding framework that also includes the mass 
arts."(61) In 1965 Susan Sontag, in an essay titled "One 
Culture and the New Sensibility" that ran in Mademoiselle, 
announced that "what we are witnessing is not so much a 
conflict of cultures as the creation of a new (potentially 
unitary) kind of sensibility." 
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The role of the individual artist, in the business of 
making unique objects for the purpose of giving pleasure 
and educating conscience and sensibility, has repeatedly 
been called into question.... All kinds of 
conventionally accepted boundaries have thereby been 
challenged: not just the one between the "scientific" 
and the "literary-artistic" cultures, or the one between 
"art" and "non-art"; but also many established 
distinctions within the world of culture itself--that 
between form and content, the frivolous and the serious, 
and (a favorite of literary intellectuals) "high" and 
"low" culture.... The problem of "the two cultures"...is 
not a problem for most of the creative artists of our 
time...most of these artists have broken, whether they 
know it or not, with the Matthew Arnold notion of 
culture [which] defines art as the criticism of life.... 
The new sensibility understands art as the extension of 
life--this being understood as the representation of 
(new) modes of vivacity.... The distinction between 
"high" and "low" culture seems less and less 
meaningful...[it] simply does not make sense for a 
creative community of artists and scientists engaged in 
programming sensations, uninterested in art as a species 
of moral journalism.(62)
Many others viewed as a foregone conclusion art's loss 
of a separate identity and its inability to maintain a 
detachment from--and thus critical vantage on--life. Not only 
had "art entered into the media system," Harold Rosenberg 
admitted, but "the history of art as a distinct category of 
artifacts seems to have reached a dead end." Another critic, 
Paul Cummings, noticed how "mass media with its half-page of 
art news" transformed "artists [into] celebrities vying with 
movie stars and politicians."(63) This "sweeping process," 
which Greenberg warned was "endangering" high culture back in 
1947, seemed to have reached completion--"wiping out the 
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social distinctions between the more and less cultivated, 
render[ing] standards of art and thought provisional." There 
would be no permanent home for culture. Now more than ever it 
seemed that, "to locate the constantly shifting true center 
of seriousness, the ambitious American writer and artist must 
from moment to moment constantly improvise both career and 
art. It becomes increasingly difficult to tell who is serious 
and who not."(64)
Greenberg would have to revise the map more radically 
than before. Throughout the '50s he had been developing a 
relationship with a few artists who lived in Washington D.C. 
In 1950, while teaching a course at Black Mountain, he met  
Kenneth Noland. That same year Noland married an ex-student 
of David Smith's, Cornelia Langer, who was also a classmate 
and good friend of Smith's first wife Jean. Beginning in 1953 
Greenberg and Smith would make frequent trips down to 
Washington, and Noland in turn would travel often to New York 
to visit Greenberg. In April that year Noland brought with 
him a teaching colleague and artist-friend from D.C., Morris 
Louis. Only nine months later, Greenberg included paintings 
by Louis, Noland and Langer in the show "Emerging Talent," 
which he curated for the Kootz Gallery. 
Greenberg often wrote about how art of any ambition 
needed to seek out "the master current" or "mainstream" of 
tradition and culture, and as late as 1950 he voiced 
leeriness about what he called "tributaries"--distant 
provinces where artists "feel less free to take liberties 
with the tradition than those in its center."(65) But all 
this seemed to change as circumstances worsened, as the 
center drew closer, establishing itself anew in New York; 
indeed, the title Greenberg gave a 1954 essay, published 
while the Kootz show was still up, was "Some Advantages of 
Provincialism." By 1960 he would proclaim Noland and Louis as 
the two painters he considered "serious candidates for major 
status," and the fact both lived in Washington D.C. was "not 
unrelated to the quality of their work." It was precisely 
because "250 miles separate them from the new Babylon of 
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art," Greenberg argued, that the two painters could "keep in 
steady contact with the New York art scene without being 
subjected as constantly to its pressures to conform.... When 
they return to Washington to paint it is to challenge the 
fashions and success of New York, and also its worldly 
machinery."(66) After all, detachment, as he had previously 
claimed, was "the last defense" and only real hope for a 
truly unified sensibility and culture. To be preserved, that 
detachment would now have to be measured, not in city blocks, 
but in hundreds of miles and across several state borders.
Allover and At Once
Greenberg himself would end up having to travel quite a ways, 
figuratively speaking, before he could feel comfortable 
supporting what would come to be known as color-field 
painting. The completion of that journey is perhaps what his 
essay "Louis and Noland," which appeared in the May 1960 
issue of Art International, celebrates. Only months earlier 
each of the painters had enjoyed a solo show arranged by 
Greenberg at the French & Company Gallery in New York. The 
essay starkly opposes the sensibility of the two D.C. artists 
against New York's "Babylon" and its metonymy, its 
"machinery" and "conformism"--"where painterliness in 
abstract art has degenerated almost everywhere into a thing 
of mannered and aggressive surfaces." The terms Greenberg 
uses to describe Louis's and Noland's work--its "open 
color...color as somehow disembodied, and therefore more 
purely optical," its "freshness and immediacy of surface," 
its "revulsion against the sculptural" in favor of "areas and 
zones," "its clarity and its energy," its sense of "limitless 
space, weightlessness, air"--these became evaluative keywords 
in a synecdochic terminology the critic had been laboring to 
develop ever since the mid-1950s when he started championing 
Newman, Rothko and Still over de Kooning and Kline. By the 
end of the essay Greenberg explicitly announces the two D.C. 
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painters as the rightful heirs to the first generation of New 
York School artists. They "are the only painters to have come 
up in American art since that 'first wave' who approach its 
level."(67) 
From the confidence and relaxed euphoria of the essays' 
tone, it is impossible to tell that in fact Greenberg's 
appreciation of such large-scale color abstraction--indeed, 
his very poetic sensibility--needed to overcome numerous road 
blocks, periods of tremendous worry and doubt, radical shifts 
and adaptations, all of which is well documented in the 
course of his earlier criticism. Twelve years before, when he 
was still a beat reviewer having to cover the art scene in 
Babylon, Greenberg most likely would have called Louis and 
Noland decorators. That is basically what he called the 
artists of the "first wave."
Greenberg's mixed feelings about such painting was 
already well established by the time the New York School hit 
its stride around 1948; it can be detected in his famous 
description from that year of Abstract Expressionism as "a 
large-scale easel art [made] by expanding Matisse's hot color 
into bigger more simplified compositional schemes...all this 
helped with Picasso's calligraphy."(68) In Greenberg's 
working out of the story the more heroic roles go to Matisse 
and Picasso, and to a lesser extent to Klee and Miro--that 
is, artists who never entirely broke from representation. 
Meanwhile, the more "pure" abstractionist Mondrian is viewed 
ambivalently at best, if not as downright villainous. That is 
because for Greenberg, that famous champion of abstraction, 
the problem with Mondrian is precisely the problem with 
abstract painting. Here, for example, is Greenberg in 1940, 
in only his third essay devoted to visual art: he writes 
that, at present, 
painting finds itself with almost nothing left to do. 
The path it has been forced to follow for the last 40 
years has narrowed now and closed into the cul de sac of 
the pure single-plane abstraction. ...The present crisis 
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may be the death agony of Western painting, of that 
tradition which, beginning in Northern Italy in the 13th 
century, has evolved continuously until Mondrian.... 
Mondrian and his fellow purists, by pushing the single-
plane abstraction as far as it can go, have reached 
something which escapes the definition of an easel
painting and threatens constantly to become 
decoration.(69)
What for Greenberg rescues painting at this crucial 
juncture, what pulls it back from the abyss of decoration, is 
something very much like literariness, paintings that retain 
the feel and space, the basic dramatic structure, of 
representation. It is, he writes, "Picasso, Miro and Klee who 
have in common, in their desire to save easel painting, a 
concern with poetry, with something that exceeds the purely 
visual. All three have rejected the confinement to the single 
plane which is the purist prison. They seek to preserve the 
ambiguity of the pictorial surface, making the hard surface 
of the canvas seem to vibrate, shift, cede." Nevertheless, 
Greenberg ends his account on a sour note; these three 
painters, he admits, "have not succeeded in saving the easel 
painting. Their success has been too intensely personal. They 
have established no style of which other painters can take 
advantage, no style on which those who come after can 
build."(70)
All these quotes are from "The Agony of Painting," an 
essay Greenberg intended as a follow-up to "Avant-Garde and 
Kitsch" and "Toward a Newer Laocoon" but which Partisan
Review found too unwieldy to publish. Yet it is an essay 
Greenberg often returned to, mining it for quotes and ideas. 
Seven years later, for example, he was still complaining that 
Picasso's "error...since 1930...consists in pursuing 
expressiveness and emotional emphasis beyond the coherence of 
style."(71) In 1948, Mondrian was still being made to 
epitomize the end of easel painting, his canvases being 
"perhaps the clearest anticipation of...the even, allover, 
140
polyphonic picture in which every square inch is rendered 
with equal emphasis and there are no longer centers of 
interest, highlights, dominating forms, every part of the 
canvas being equivalent in stress to every other part. 
Texture and surface carry everything and the picture becomes 
reversible, so to speak--with beginning, middle and end made 
interchangeable."(72)
Thierry de Duve has recently claimed that Greenberg 
never used the term "allover" except in relation to 
Pollock.(73) This is not true. While Pollock would indeed 
become crucial to what Greenberg meant by the term, as we 
have just seen the critic's first use of it was in reference 
to Mondrian, and precisely as Mondrian represented the threat 
of "pure" abstraction. In 1949 Greenberg would again apply 
"allover" to a whole group of artists and even to past 
styles: in response to a show of paintings by William 
Congdon, he writes, "We have already seen this kind of 
repetitious, all-over composition, without beginning, middle, 
or end, in analytical cubism and in the recent work of such 
painters as Mark Tobey, Jackson Pollock, Janet Sobel, and 
Mordecai Ardon-Bronstein."(74) De Duve further argues that 
Greenberg never regarded "allover" as a conceptual category, 
only ever using it as a descriptive adjective. But this again 
is misleading. For Greenberg the canvases of Mondrian, 
Pollock, Tobey et al. deserved the term insofar as they 
exemplified "the terminus toward which several of the most 
important threads in contemporary painting now converge."(75)
Greenberg came to use the word allover often as a 
pejorative; he spoke of "the danger of monotony that arises 
from the even, allover design." Another pejorative was 
uniformity--"the very notion" of which, Greenberg wrote, "is 
anti-aesthetic." Flatness, monotony, uniformity, allover--
these would at times be opposed in his thinking to unity and 
"at-onceness." For example, in 1944 Greenberg found fault 
with such artists as Pissaro and Courbet for "mistak[ing] 
uniformity for unity." Unity was "the supreme quality...the 
highest measure" of visual art, its "first requirement"; he 
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would repeat this staple of aesthetic theory time and again, 
that "the task of art is to impose the greatest possible 
organic unity upon the greatest diversity"; or that a 
"triumphant unity crowns the painter's work...when all parts 
fall into place and require and create one another...when one 
can experience the picture like a single sound made by many 
voices and instruments that reverberates without changing, 
that presents an enclosed and instantaneous yet infinite 
variety." And this unity, this dramatic emergence of 
conclusive form, is what constitutes the experience of at-
onceness: a picture's "unity should be immediately evident"; 
"ideally the whole of a picture should be taken in at a 
glance...in an indivisible instant of time...all there at 
once, like a sudden revelation."(76)
The tendency to replace unity with uniformity was not
confined to just contemporary painting either. Greenberg also 
complained about poets and their "inability to modulate, to 
distribute the emphasis so that a poem will move dramatically 
and take on shape"; instead "a kind of aesthetic pantheism" 
reigned in poetry, according to which "everything seems to 
exist on the same single plane....unrelieved and unshaded... 
monotonous."(77) All the same, why this remained such a 
pressing concern for Greenberg, and indeed became his primary 
concern by the end of the '40s, had to do foremost with 
developments in New York School art and in particular the 
emergence of Pollock's drip paintings. Of the many 
breakthroughs by painters between 1947-50, he would later 
write that "the flattening surfaces of their canvases 
compelled them to move along the picture plane laterally and 
seek in its sheer physical size the space necessary for the 
telling of their kind of pictorial story."(78) At the time, 
however, Greenberg felt exasperated that all the flattening 
and enlarging risked putting an end to the story of painting, 
its very tradition. He had cautioned against overly large 
pictures since early on: "Most contemporary painting is best 
when small in format," he wrote in 1941. "When the abstract 
painter grows tired, he becomes an interior decorator.... As 
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a rule the modern painter cannot cover large spaces 
successfully--the revival of mural painting has so far not 
disproved this. He is at his best when forced to compress and 
tighten."(79) About Pollock's show in 1943, Greenberg noticed 
that "the smaller works are much more conclusive...in larger 
format [Pollock] spends himself in too many directions at 
once." And yet flatness and alloverness seemed to mandate 
that pictures expand laterally: it was the "'allover' design, 
covering the picture surface with an even, largely 
undifferentiated system of uniform motifs that cause the 
result to look as though it could be continued indefinitely 
beyond the frame like a wallpaper pattern." Thus not only 
largeness but flatness too proved a threat, the one being a 
function of the other. "When the artist flattens...the easel 
picture begins to feel itself compromised in its very 
nature." The issue was brought to a head in the famous essay 
"The Crisis of the Easel Picture" of 1948, in which Greenberg 
writes of the Abstract Expressionists that, "using the easel 
painting as they do--and cannot help doing--these artists are 
destroying it."(80)
The tug-of-war between alloverness and at-onceness for 
the soul of modern painting continued to worry Greenberg well
into the '50s. About Newman, Still and Rothko, he wrote that 
"the crucial issue raised by the work of these three artists 
is where the pictorial stops and decoration begins." And when 
he thought Pollock's work failed it was usually because 
"space tautens but does not burst into a picture"; "the 
picture becomes merely a fragment"; it "does not finish 
inside the canvas." Meanwhile, those older, more poetic 
painters such as Picasso and Miro, whom Greenberg had opposed 
to the flattener Mondrian, their "best work has been in black 
and white and in reduced format.... The surviving old masters 
of our time...appear to have reacted to this crisis in a 
conservative way."(81)
This "crisis" or "death agony" of painting, as Greenberg 
referred to it repeatedly from 1940 on, marks one of the few 
instances when the critic felt indecisive, when he couldn't 
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judge. Greenberg didn't want to side with a backward-looking, 
nostalgic art (nostalgia was what he later would accuse de 
Kooning of). If nothing else, flatness offered a means for 
painting to continue its development ("to keep culture 
moving" was one of the slogans of "Avant-Garde and Kitsch"). 
In addition, it led to pictures that better satisfied the 
modern era's brutally honest, empirical, materialist 
sensibilities. Flatness was how modernism manifested itself 
in the visual arts in the first place. "Painting since Manet 
has emphasized that a picture has to have a 'back,'" 
Greenberg wrote. "It cannot simply fade off in depth into 
nothingness; every square millimeter of picture space, even 
if it represents only the empty sky, must play a positive 
role."(82) And yet this same flatness demanded by modern 
sensibility was at odds with painting's potential for 
aesthetic achievement beyond mere decoration. As Greenberg 
wrote in 1948:
This very uniformity, this dissolution of the picture 
into sheer texture, sheer sensation, into the 
accumulation of similar units of sensation, seems to 
answer something deep-seated in contemporary 
sensibility. It corresponds perhaps to the feeling that  
all hierarchical distinctions have been exhausted, that 
no area or order of experience is either intrinsically 
or relatively superior to any other. It may speak for a 
monist naturalism that takes all the world for granted 
and for which there are no longer either first or last 
things, the only valid distinction being that between 
the more or less immediate.(83)
The brutal match between harsh modern reality and its 
unshielded empirical reception within individual experience 
seemed to lead to a shell-shocked cultural sensibility, a 
numb, blank passiveness and acceptance. Greenberg ends the 
passage with a shrug: "Or maybe it means something else--I 
cannot tell." Like the paintings, he felt at a loss to 
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distinguish, and said so. One of the only other times 
Greenberg expressed outloud such ambivalence was when 
reviewing Pollock's 1947 show, with its bigger, flatter 
canvases that nearly filled the gallery walls. "Pollock 
points a way beyond the easel, beyond the mobile, framed 
picture, to the mural, perhaps--or perhaps not. I cannot 
tell."(84)
What so many later commentators take as Greenberg's 
emblem of purity was in fact treacherously two-sided. For him 
the flatness of modernism's "even, allover" paintings 
signaled both a promise and a danger; it offered a means for 
painting to consolidate its identity by emphasizing its 
essential material conditions and at the same time threatened 
rupture, loss of identity and dispersion, a kind of painting 
that merely spread out and blended in, that was 
indistinguishable from the general surroundings and décor. 
"The pristine flatness of the stretched canvas struggles to 
overcome every other element," he explained in "Towards a 
Newer Laocoon." Flatness is specific to painting, and 
therefore is what distinguishes it from the other arts; it 
secures painting's individuality, its "ownness," its poetics. 
"To restore the identity of an art," he continues, "the 
opacity of its medium must be emphasized." But the modern 
impulse toward flattening pictorial space also forces the 
easel picture to violate its very nature. "Painting of a kind 
that identifies itself exclusively with its surface cannot 
help developing toward decoration." The material identity of 
painting--flatness--was at odds with its historical identity, 
that of being an easel picture. "The form of the easel 
picture," Greenberg admits in 1948, "is conditioned by its 
social function--that is, to hang on a wall...it cut[s] the 
illusion of a boxlike cavity into the wall behind it and 
organiz[es] within this cavity the illusion of forms, light, 
and space." This is what makes easel painting "a unique 
product of Western culture," he writes. "We have only to 
compare its principles of unity with those of the Persian 
miniature or Chinese hanging painting, neither of which seems 
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to isolate itself quite as much...from its architectural 
surroundings [nor] show so much independence of the demands 
of decoration."(85) Rather than identify with the wall it 
spreads across, the easel picture claims a degree of 
independence by carving out a space of its own at that point 
(presumably any point) on the wall where it happens to rest. 
The easel painting, in other words, is, by its very nature, 
relatively detached.
In the easel painting, Greenberg identified a model for 
the kind of synthesis he was always calling for--in art as in 
people. Here was a perfect combination of detachment and at-
onceness, intelligence and sensibility, thought and feeling, 
theory and practice. As Greenberg saw it, the easel picture, 
with its vividly unified image separated off in an 
illusionistic box-like space that its frame carves out, 
allows for a detached view and larger comprehension but does 
so by feeding directly off dramatic experience rather than 
reasoning or intellectualizing such directness away. The 
easel picture has encoded within itself the very resources by 
which individuals--artists and viewers alike--can transcend 
modern conditions, can "expand the confines of immediate 
experience and a narrowly professional conception," precisely 
the infliction suffered by so much modern art. Moreover, the 
easel picture modeled for Greenberg individuality itself--
this was in fact its historical origin. As Greenberg tells 
the story, the reason why easel painting arose out of and 
differentiated itself from stained-glass windows, manuscript 
illuminations and church frescoes is because early 
Renaissance moderns such as "the magnates and clerical 
bureaucrats of Flanders found in framed pictures a proper 
means by which to celebrate themselves publicly in their 
character as individuals, for the framed picture spoke for 
itself and was not to be subordinated to its architectural 
surroundings in the role of mere decoration."(86) 
According to Greenberg, the framed easel painting 
privileges the individual viewer over its architectural 
support; it "subordinates decorative to dramatic effect."(87) 
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At the core of its pictorial structure lies an imaginary axis 
that runs parallel to an individual's line of sight, a line 
extending from the eyes past the plane of the wall where the 
painting sits to a vanishing point nested at the farthest 
reaches of the painting's illusory space. From out of this 
basic alignment the picture's "principles of unity" are 
derived. By contrast, a flat, tautened picture of the kind 
that began to dominate by the late '40s and early '50s turns 
this axis 90 degrees; it extends itself, like the wall it is 
hung on, perpendicular to the viewer's sight-line. So what 
are the principles unifying this kind of painting? If the 
space of the easel picture seems to mature and complete
itself at its vanishing point, and if the dimensions of the 
picture's framing edge in turn seem to dilate in accordance 
with the need to focus and unify this visual push inward, 
then where does the space of the newly flattened painting 
reach maturation, what needs or limits dictate its 
dimensions, where does it end? And what about its 
allegiances; what changes are wrought in this new kind of 
painting's relationship to its viewers and to its 
surroundings?
Again, for a long time Greenberg wasn't sure exactly
what final form the new "post-cubist painting," as he was 
calling Pollock's works by 1947, would take. Certain 
influences were posited--Greenberg pointed to the muralist 
Siqueiros (whose workshop both Pollock and Louis attended in 
1936). But the emerging paradigm seemed to suggest less 
murals than "wallpaper patterns capable of being extended 
indefinitely," and for this he felt the precedent lay in 
impressionism.(88) "Monet was a flat painter...a concern that 
leads from him straight to Mondrian," he stressed in 1945; 
while Pissaro was the one who made work so "egalitarian in 
treatment" it seemed to "mistake uniformity for unity."(89) 
Greenberg used the opposition between cubism and 
impressionism as a template with which to chart the New York 
School's development, although it wasn't always clear which 
direction he favored. In the early '40s he was consistent in 
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his praise of cubism as the grand plastic style of the 20th 
century: "The great painting tradition of our day," he wrote 
in 1944, "runs from Cézanne through fauvism and cubism." At 
the same time, he wasn't entirely condemning of 
impressionism: a month earlier he allowed that "there were 
possibilities in impressionism which the 19th century failed 
to exhaust."(90) But by the late-'40s cubism came to be 
portrayed mostly as the last refuge of easel painting; 
Greenberg constantly evoked it from 1947 on as both still 
necessary and already abandoned, as if he was unsure whether 
to contest or concede its loss. In 1948 he would publish an 
essay titled "The Decline of Cubism," albeit preceded a few 
months earlier by an even darker assessment of impressionism, 
expressed in a review in which he accuses Carl Holty's 
paintings of "remain[ing] trapped in impressionist feeling--
which by now is equivalent to academicism."(91) 
Later that same year, Greenberg seemed fed up with 
overly large, overly flat painting. He once again rallied to 
the defense of cubism, while singling out for harsh reprimand 
impressionism and its progeny of imagined alternatives to the 
easel convention--including many non-Western forms and even 
Pollock himself: 
Since impressionism, painting in western Europe and 
America has been engaged in unraveling its own 
tradition.... Since it has freed itself from the 
necessity of representation, painting seems at liberty 
to reject all but the most recent past; it feels that it 
has made a new start and created a new instrument for 
itself. I myself believe this is an illusion.... 
Abstract art is still western European art; one still--
even if only barely--paints easel pictures; one does not 
decorate Haida cloths or make sand drawings.(92)
Cubism once again set the criteria. Reviewing Pollock's show 
in early 1949, Greenberg wrote confidently that it "quieted 
any doubts this reviewer may have felt," and did so precisely 
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by seeming to embrace rather than challenge the easel format. 
Pollock's Number One (fig. 14) he found "as well contained in 
its canvas as anything by a Quattrocento master...this one 
avoids any connotation of a frieze or hanging scroll and 
presents an almost square surface that belongs very much to 
easel painting."(93) But the 1949 show also included works 
like the tall, thin Number Five, the skeins of which are 
mostly cropped in mid-flight. Also in abundance were canvases 
measuring only three feet high yet over nine feet in length. 
Fragments, friezes and hanging scrolls continued to amass 
like barbarians at the gate. By mid-1949, only months after 
Pollock's alleged return to the easel format, doubts once 
again surfaced, and Greenberg resumed his fretting over 
painting's future. "The fact is, I fear, that easel 
painting...may soon be unable to say enough about what we 
feel to satisfy us."(94)
During the course of such back-and-forth deliberations, 
Greenberg would at times oppose cubism's frame-bound 
structure to impressionism's indiscriminate "color texture" 
in culture-versus-nature or active-versus-passive terms, even 
along gender lines. Impressionist painting was allover and 
"formless"; it was passive and thus aligned with nature. 
Monet, for example, "saw the world as sadly reconciled to 
itself"; he held to a "notion of the picture as a slice of 
nature unmanipulated by 'human' interest." Like his 
paintings, he himself seemed passive, reconciled, 
"surrender[ing] almost in advance" to the canvas's allover 
flatness; thus his tendency of "dissolving objects and 
attacking identities." In contrast to Picasso's "potent 
personality," Monet lacked self-possession, even painted as 
if unconscious: he "forgot that art is relations, not 
matter"--for "all matter can do is repeat itself."(95)
If cubism and the framed easel picture stood for unity 
and drama, impressionism meant passivity and repetition. Or, 
as Greenberg regularly translated those terms into pictorial 
ones, it stood for wallpaper and decoration--precisely what 
he most often said was lying in wait beyond the historical 
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and cultural limits of the easel. It was in the form of 
decoration that Greenberg imagined painting being co-opted by 
society--even, or all the more so, when its practitioners 
dreamt of fashioning "new instruments" tied to esoteric 
predecessors like hanging scrolls and sand painting. 
Greenberg wrote in 1941 about "how easy it is for the 
abstract painter to degenerate into a decorator. It is the 
besetting danger of abstract art. We, with our tradition of 
easel painting, are not satisfied to have our pictorial art 
in the form of decoration. We demand of a picture what we 
demand of literature and music; dramatic interest, interior 
movement; we want a picture to be a little drama, something, 
even if only a landscape or still life, in which the eye can 
fix and involve itself."(96) It became a recurring theme of 
his criticism: Carl Holty's work only won approval when "at 
last decoration begins to be overcome by easel painting." And 
it particularly preoccupied his thinking about Pollock. Even 
the paintings he liked by Pollock left him uneasy: "I already 
hear: 'wallpaper patterns,'" he confides in the midst of 
praising the painter's 1948 show.(97) Greenberg wasn't the 
only one: that same year Francis Henry Taylor, director of 
the Metropolitan Museum, compared Pollock's work to wallpaper 
in Life magazine's "Round Table on Modern Art."(98) "This 
artist is much, much more than a grandiose decorator," 
Greenberg responded, albeit as part of a photo-feature on 
Pollock published amid fashion spreads and society gossip in 
Harper's Bazaar.(99)
In Greenberg's eyes, if there was an artist whose work 
still embodied a thriving cubist idiom by the end of the '40s 
it was David Smith, the only other artist the critic touted 
as highly as Pollock. What Greenberg saw in Smith's work 
(fig. 15) was precisely an allegiance between cubist 
structure and what he felt was some much needed cultural 
expression of masculinity. "Smith's virile elegance is 
without example in a country where elegance is otherwise 
obtained only by femininity or by [a] wistful, playful, 
derivative kind of decorativeness."(100) For Greenberg, not 
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only was decoration coded feminine, but so was passivity in 
general, including passive consumption. Indeed, Greenberg 
often let on that he feared modernism's encouragement of 
blank acceptance fed into passive consumption, and that the 
shift from the cultivation of individual sensibility to 
status mongering and the consumption of "knowingness" was 
gendered (such consumption being best suited to "permanent 
college girls, whether male or female").(101) Others did too: 
Meyer Schapiro, for example, worried a decade earlier over 
too close an identification between art and the women of the 
"rentier leisure class": "A woman of this class is 
essentially an artist.... Her daily life is filled with 
aesthetic choices." In The Lonely Crowd, Riesman observed 
that "women are the accepted leaders of consumption in our 
society."(102) At times Greenberg made it seem as if the 
predominance of a more decorative painting was not the result 
of material constraints upon the medium but rather due to an 
encroaching feminine sensibility inflicting male creation. He 
dismissed Stuart Davis's cubism, which he claimed the artist 
"appropriated as a decorative method," for making 
"immediately pleasing what more seminal artists produced at 
the cost of strain and frequent error." "The only salvation I 
can suggest for feminine artists such as Davis and Calder," 
Greenberg continued, "is that society give them fixed, 
exactly defined tasks that require them to fit their 
cheerfulness and discretion into the general décor of modern 
life in a systematic way. Let Davis and Calder create an 
atmosphere in which to move, not solo works of art. There are 
the examples of Boucher and Fragonard, whose spirit their own 
resembles."(103)
Two years later Greenberg used Davis and Calder as 
backdrop against which to contrast all the more dramatically 
Smith and his virility. Smith was descended from the potent 
Picasso; both were master-builders: ""Picasso asks you to 
construct...to survey the terrain of your emotion more 
consciously and build upon it the largest and most 
substantial edifice possible." Unlike Klee, who is "an 
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interior decorator rather than an architect...Picasso sees 
the picture as a wall."(104) And yet Smith went Picasso one 
better; as Greenberg pointed out, where the senior artist had 
abandoned cubism by the '30s for a mode of expression too 
intense and personal to fit within "the coherence of style," 
Smith's art had emerged by '47 into "a new unity of style...a 
style that is able to say everything he has to say with the 
maximum of economy," a style that the artist achieved by 
"streamlining without emasculating his invention." By the mid 
'50s Greenberg would even call Smith's style 
"classical."(105)
Greenberg's appreciation for Smith blossomed precisely 
at that time when the crisis of the easel picture came to 
dominate his thinking, and he fashioned for the sculptor's 
output a historical narrative that made it into the true heir 
to Picasso's and Braque's work during cubism's glory days of 
the early teens. Smith's constructions, as Greenberg told the 
story, grew out of cubism insofar as cubism gave birth to 
collage, which in its turn morphed into bas-relief before 
finally giving way to constructivism, of which Smith's work 
was the furthest development at present. It was a story about 
the flattening of modern painting that offered an 
alternative, more upbeat ending, and Greenberg repeated it 
insistently throughout the late '40s:
Collage...is the most succinct and direct single clue to 
the aesthetic of genuinely modern art.... The picture 
became indissolubly one with the pigment, the texture, 
and the flat surface that constituted it as an object. 
The next step in the denial of illusion was to 
lift...this or that part of the picture physically close 
to the eye, as in bas-relief...[which] laid the 
foundation for constructivism.... The picture had now 
attained to the full and declared three-dimensionality 
we automatically attribute to the notion, "object," and 
painting was being transformed, in the course of a 
152
strictly coherent process with a logic all its own, into 
a new kind of sculpture.(106)
"Cubist painting...transmitted the style, single-
handedly, to sculpture... The same process that has 
impoverished painting has enriched sculpture," he would later 
conclude. But it wasn't just sculpture that painting had 
transmuted itself into--what was emerging was a whole new 
aesthetic subspecies of industrialism itself. "David Smith's 
work, David Hare's recent show, Theodore Roszak's return to 
activity...all point to the possible flowering of a new 
sculpture in America, a sculpture that exploits modern 
painting and draftsmanship, new industrial methods, and 
industrial materials." A year later, in 1947, Greenberg again 
hailed the arrival of a new industrial high art, "not a 
renaissance, but a naissance of sculpture in America: 
sculpture that in its methods and very utensils no less than 
in its conceptions--which, like our architecture and 
engineering, tend toward linearism, flat surfaces, and the 
denial of weight and mass--attaches itself more intimately to 
industrialism than any other form of art now being 
practiced."(107) 
Greenberg would start calling such artworks 
"constructions" to stress their blood ties to engineering and 
architecture. As his excitement over these new constructions 
made clear, they seemed to point a way beyond many of the 
impasses the critic had been running up against. They were 
built up rather than spread out, handling large scale in a 
manner that was virile and masculine rather than passive and 
dissipating. Moreover, in their allegiance to structure and 
line over formless color and texture, they reconvened 
cubism's insistence on the frame, even when blown-up to 
nearly the size of a room. This was again something Greenberg 
thought the new sculpture inherited from early cubist 
collage. "The greatest success in collage so far," he wrote, 
"has been gained through compositions based on a 
preponderance of rectangular forms whose contours are kept 
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roughly parallel to the edge of the canvas--in other words, 
repeat the canvas's shape." He hailed Pevsner and Gabo as 
"establish[ing] an altogether new genre in visual art," and 
complimented their "abstract constructions" and "pictures in 
three-dimensional space" for holding to a sense of frame: "I 
like the pieces' frontality, their affinity with the easel 
picture, which makes them easy to see from a single point of 
view."(108)
The frame, of course, meant detachment; it meant
privileging the individual viewer over the surrounding décor. 
But what was formerly an antagonism now resolved itself 
through a synthesis. With the new alignment between cubist-
derived architecture and sculpture, the frame privileged the 
individual viewer in its very role as surrounding décor, a 
décor that circumscribed and ordered the surroundings through 
an emphasis on relations over repetition, thus "subordinating 
decorative to dramatic effect." For Greenberg the frame 
detached individuals not by isolating and privatizing them, 
but by subjecting a sense of order on their surroundings, by 
imposing something like judgment. "The control of some fixed 
point of view," as Greenberg explained the frame's function, 
"has an authority more than personal."(109) The frame, as the 
very figure of eyesight both as it separates and holds at a 
critical distance and as it also deliberately focuses 
attention, reaching forward and outward in an attempt to 
grasp, comprehend and empathize, negotiates between 
individuals and environment, subjects and objects, 
discouraging either too much inner-directedness or too much 
other-directedness, too much mindless self-expression or too 
much mindless conformity and blending in. As Greenberg 
described them, the new sculptural constructions assumed this 
task quite literally. Standing halfway between the frames of 
easel paintings and architectural frames, they negotiated 
between a pictorial inside and the real, industrial world 
outside--they were frames at once pictorial and "as palpable 
and independent and present as the houses we live in and the 
furniture we use."(110)
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 In addition to their preoccupation with framing and 
structuring, Greenberg also saw the new sculptures as 
inhabiting the cutting edge of developments in advanced art 
altogether. While painting endured its death agony throughout 
the '40s, "the new sculptor has the advantage of working in a 
virgin medium." In 1949 Greenberg announced that "we shall no 
longer be able to rely upon painting as largely as we used to 
for a visual ordering of our experience"; and yet sculpture, 
his essay continues, "has lately undergone a transformation 
that seems to endow it with a greater range of expression for 
modern sensibility than painting now has." And yet, 
paradoxically, this gravitation toward frame and edge seemed 
to locate sculpture away from the center of attention toward 
its margin. "Sculpture is slower to feel the pull and tug of 
public taste," Greenberg wrote. "The new sculpture is 
protected from public taste by its very novelty. This makes 
it rather hard, financially, for the sculptor himself, but he 
has the large or small satisfaction of knowing that his work 
will be bought for the right reasons in most cases. It still 
takes a certain independence of taste to invest in a Smith or 
a Hare."(111) 
Before Greenberg's search for new, uncorrupted painters 
led him to travel beyond New York all the way to Washington 
D.C., he seemed to be on the verge of abandoning his advocacy 
of painting altogether and picking up the torch for sculpture 
instead. Like the early century avant-garde bohemias he so 
idealized, the new sculpture seemed to enjoy independence, 
some relative detachment, "a modicum of space" in which 
creation, contemplation and judgment could be practiced 
innocently, for their own sake, as if "automatically." And 
yet the new makers of constructions didn't discover and 
safeguard this space on the margins of society but found it 
instead emerging from within its very fabric, in the 
materials and methods of its industrial infrastructure. In 
this, the new sculpture hinted at a possible overcoming of 
yet another impasse; it held out a fresh opportunity by which 
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advanced art could be reconciled on some practical level with 
middle-class society. 
Greenberg's advocacy of the new sculpture developed in 
tandem with a shift in his political outlook. In the early 
'40s the question of finding an adequate home within society 
for advanced art would be answered by Greenberg with a 
political prophecy--such a home was part of the promise of 
socialism. Present reality offered little in the way of even 
suitable architecture: "No adequate modern style has yet been 
developed for the dwelling," Greenberg wrote dismissively in 
1944.(112) But only a couple of years later, with the promise 
of socialism seemingly extinguished for good, available 
architectural offerings--or the lack thereof--became an issue 
of paramount importance, the defining issue for visual art as 
Greenberg saw it. The hopes of culture rested not on the 
establishment of a new political and economic order, but on a 
new cooperative understanding forged between architects and 
artists. 
One of the main problems standing in the way was the 
hostility, not just ideological but logistical, that New York 
School painting showed toward the homes of potential patrons. 
As Robert Motherwell explained, "American painters work in 
what were once small factories, whereas European artists work 
either in apartments or studios that were designed in terms 
of the scale of easel painting."(113) This Greenberg 
addressed in 1948:
Easel painting is on its way out; abstract pictures 
rarely go with the furniture; and the canvas, even when 
it measures ten feet by ten, has become a kind of 
private journal.... I do not know if there's anything in 
modern architecture itself that explicitly invites this 
tendency...while the painter's relation to his art has 
become more private than ever before because of 
shrinking appreciation on the public's part, the 
architectural and, presumably, social location for which 
he destines his product has become, in inverse ratio, 
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more public. This is the paradox, the contradiction, in 
the master-current of painting. Perhaps the 
contradiction between the architectural destination of 
abstract art and the very, very private atmosphere in 
which it is produced will kill ambitious painting in the 
end.... The only solution to the crisis would be an 
increasing acceptance by the public of advanced 
painting, and at same time an increasing rejection of 
all other kinds.(114)
Greenberg repeatedly lobbied for increased patronage of 
the new sculpture as well. "It is to be hoped that Smith's 
show sells sufficiently to permit him to embark on larger-
scale works," he advocated a year earlier. "Certainly, of all 
the arts, the new pictorial or constructivist sculpture 
relates best to American décor, understands it best, and 
would affect it most directly," was his pitch the year before 
that. "The future of art and literature," he continues, "will 
brighten in this country only when a new cultural elite 
appears with enough money and consciousness to counterbalance 
the pressures of the new mass market." And then the line, 
spoken as if under his breath: "The other alternative is 
socialism, but who talks of socialism in America?"(115) 
The campaign to nurture patronage among the American 
middle-class was intensified by the Museum of Modern Art and 
other cultural institutions and interests after World War II. 
In the exhibition season spanning 1948-49, 12 different 
museums mounted shows dedicated to applied design, including 
"For Modern Living" at the Detroit Institute of Art. At the 
same time that a collaborative model for "An Ideal Museum" 
made by Pollock and the architect Peter Blake was on view at 
Betty Parsons's gallery in late 1949 (fig. 16), MoMA opened 
"Painting and Sculpture in Architecture," an exhibition of 
photographs documenting the deployment of avant-garde art 
within modern architectural settings, while outside in the 
museum's sculpture garden a new "modern house" designed by 
Marcel Breuer was installed. That same year, MoMA also 
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mounted "Modern Art in Your Life," accompanied by a 
publication of the same name that marveled at how "the 
appearance and shape of countless objects of our everyday 
environment are related to, or derived from, modern painting 
and sculpture, and that modern art is an intrinsic part of 
modern living." The next year the museum began its four-year 
run of "Good Design" shows, with director Rene Harnoncourt 
proclaiming, "Of every 100 persons who come to the Museum we 
estimate that no more than 10 actually accept a geometric 
abstraction by Piet Mondrian as valid art...but when 
principles of good design permeate a home, the occupants tend 
to be more tolerant, more receptive to new ideas in 
art."(116)
Some New York School artists were proving more tolerant 
in return. In an interview conducted in the summer of 1950, 
Jackson Pollock confirmed that with "five or six of my 
contemporaries in New York...the direction that painting 
seems to be taking here is away from the easel into some kind 
of wall painting," and he also enthused about his recent 
attempts at painting on glass, which he found "very exciting. 
...I think the possibility of using painting on glass in 
modern architecture--in modern construction--terrific."(117) 
Also in 1950, Vogue magazine ran a pictorial spread touting 
large-scale painting as an interior decorating trend (fig. 
17). Titled "Make Up Your Mind: Many-Picture Wall or One-
Picture Wall," it juxtaposed a photograph of over 10 easel 
paintings hung salon style on an apartment wall against one 
showing Rothko's Number Eight, measuring eight feet tall, 
hanging majestically all by itself. A year later Rothko 
participated in "A Symposium on How to Combine Architecture, 
Painting and Sculpture," chaired by Philip Johnson, director 
of MoMA's Department of Architecture, and published in 
Interiors magazine.
Among Manhattan dealers handling New York School 
artists, Samuel Kootz was perhaps the most aggressive in 
expanding patronage by forging ties between the new art and 
architecture. In 1946 he anticipated the trend by mounting a 
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show titled "Modern Painting for a Country Estate: Important 
Painting for Spacious Living." Three years later, he devised 
an exhibition in which gallery artists posed problems to the 
architects Breuer, Gropius, Johnson, Fredrick Kiesler, and 
Wiener and Sert, whose responses were worked up into models 
for display. Throughout the '50s Kootz continued hatching 
schemes to solicit architectural commissions. "I watched our 
artists doing larger and larger paintings and sculpture, 
anxious for a wall. On the other hand, I saw that the 
architect was imprisoned in his belief that his pure white 
wall should not be embellished."(118) Other galleries 
followed Kootz's lead: for example, in January 1959, a year 
after mounting Morris Louis's first solo show in New York, 
the Martha Jackson Gallery opened "The Enormous Room," 
featuring mural-sized paintings by Alfred Leslie, Sam 
Francis, Fritz Bultman and Michael Goldberg. 
Key New York collectors began buying oversized canvases, 
even when it meant entirely reconstructing their homes. In 
the most famous example, Ben Heller hired the architects 
Kramer and Kramer to overhaul his Manhattan apartment (fig. 
18) so that it could fit such paintings as Pollock's One
(measuring roughly nine by 17 feet), which he bought in 
1954.(119) Toward the end of the decade Kootz was proclaiming 
victory: "After six years of architectural contacts, all the 
artists in the gallery...are now busily engaged in many 
commissions: sculpture, mosaics, tapestries, murals, etc."
The dream of a grand synthesis of the different branches 
of visual art was crucial to Greenberg's eventual acceptance 
of color-field painting during the '50s. "'International 
style' architecture, cubist and post-cubist painting and 
sculpture, 'modern' furniture and decoration and design are 
the manifestations of the new style," he would exalt in his 
last essay of 1949. Here a cubist-derived architecture and 
sculpture would encase, orient and ground wallpaper-like 
abstract paintings, and a sense of the detached and detaching 
frame would thereby be retrieved on a heroic scale. In 1950 
he sighed in relief, "We are now beginning to realize...that 
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impressionism has remained a major force all along without 
which it would be impossible to explain the concrete aspect 
of contemporary, post-cubist abstract painting. Cubism is 
still the plastic base, but color and feeling of the abstract 
art of...the best painters of this period derive greatly from 
impressionism." What Greenberg had hoped for--a detached, 
Apollonian art infusing the most ambitious theory into art 
practice--seemed to be settling into focus: "Despite all 
appearances to the contrary, our age may still contain a new 
principle of unity in itself; I seem to see one being 
generated empirically out of certain solutions dictated by 
the novel problems of an industrialized and urbanized 
society." There was an "affinity between the new style in the 
visual arts and modern physical science," perhaps all the 
more so because the new style "relies relatively little on 
expressive details." Unity would triumph over uniformity, and 
through a kind of art that "rested on rationality but without 
permitting itself to be rationalized." Art would reform 
society rather than be co-opted by it, because it would re-
enter the social matrix not as feminine décor but as 
masculine grand style, "a style that at last satisfies us 
integrally and comfortably to everything new we have 
experienced since the 18th century."(120) 
It is within the context of this widespread campaign to 
pragmatically accommodate modern art into middle-class 
culture that Greenberg's activities from the end of the '40s 
through the mid '50s should be situated. Much has been made 
in recent years about the turn in Greenberg's criticism 
during this time toward "opticality," his growing preference 
for the glowing color-field works of Rothko, Newman and Still 
over the thick painterliness of de Kooning and his followers, 
and his mounting enthusiasm for a pictorial sculpture like 
David Smith's that stressed its debt to painting. Rosalind 
Krauss, for example, has characterized this shift as a 
philosophical retreat from materialism to idealism, and 
traces it back to Greenberg's laudatory response to Pollock's 
black-stain paintings of 1951, with their relatively more 
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elegant, lyrical draughtsmanship. Greenberg's "mission" in 
the '50s, according to Krauss, was to "sublimate" Pollock's 
work--"to lift the paintings...off the ground where he made 
them, and onto the wall," and thus "evacuat[e] the work 
altogether from the domain of the object and install it 
within the consciousness of the subject."(121) This same 
argument has been repeated by Yve-Alain Bois, who writes that 
"by 1958, [Greenberg's] reading of Pollock's late work will 
have inflected his entire system and all he has to say about 
20th-century art...[he] will be less and less attentive to 
the materiality of the works he 'describes.'"(122) 
As with Thierry de Duve's more sympathetic reading of 
Greenberg, the problem with this more harsh criticism is that 
it suffers from a similarly narrowing preoccupation with 
Pollock. (Krauss's goal in particular is to supplant 
Greenberg's account of Pollock's legacy, which leads through 
Rothko, Frankenthaler, Louis and Noland, with her own 
account, which points instead toward Twombly, Robert Morris 
and Warhol). Greenberg's engagement with Pollock, though 
certainly intense, was not as myopic as such assessments 
imply. Rather, larger concerns having to do with the fate of 
art in general and painting in particular--namely its 
possible dissolution in the face of lost material support and 
social function--haunted Greenberg's every deliberation, and 
not just over Pollock; what the critic was calling for, after 
all, was a grand unifying style that transcended the 
intensely personal. Furthermore, the threat Greenberg 
perceived was not the materiality of post-cubist painting per
se, but how in such works matter appeared to only "repeat 
itself." The threat, in other words, had to do with 
repetitiousness, monotony; or, to be more specific, it had to 
do with passive and feminine decoration becoming the new 
social identity for art. It was this active arena of cultural 
practice and politics that served as the scene of reception 
for Greenberg; not yet had he moved more squarely into an 
academic discourse where philosophical aesthetics and art 
historical accounts mattered pre-eminently. If Greenberg did 
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have a mission at this time, it was at once broader and more 
down-to-earth than establishing Pollock's aesthetic and art 
historical appreciation; it was to worry over and advocate 
for the securing of a plausible system of patronage that 
could forestall the dissolution of advanced art, perhaps even 
expand it into the basis for a new overarching period style. 
Even if ambitious art could no longer escape a facile and 
superficial reception in the arena of cultural opinion, the 
hope was that it could perhaps firmly anchor itself within 
the very logic and structure of the industrial urban 
environment.
This vision helped Greenberg through a period when, 
absent hopes of socialism, the avant-garde motto of "keeping 
culture moving" had begun to lose its bearings. "Authentic 
culture," he wrote in 1953, "must...lie at the center, and 
from there irradiate the whole of life, the serious as well 
as the not serious." By 1955 his tone regained its certainty, 
and he was able to explain how "tradition is not dismantled 
by the avant-garde for sheer revolutionary effect but in 
order to maintain the level and vitality of art under 
steadily changing circumstances." Painting kept moving, and 
if it moved beyond its limits, even risked losing its 
identity, it would do so not through dissipation but rather 
by transcending itself. Largeness and flatness were now 
acceptable, even encouraged. In the post-cubist, 
impressionist-derived canvases he now favored, it seemed that 
color breathes with an enveloping effect, which is 
intensified by the largeness itself of the picture. The 
spectator tends to react to this more in terms of décor 
or environment than in those usually associated with a 
picture hung on wall.... The limits of the easel picture 
are in greater danger of being destroyed because several 
generations of great artists have already worked to 
expand them. But if they are destroyed this will not 
necessarily mean the extinction of pictorial art as 
such. Painting may be on its way toward a new kind of 
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genre...and what we now consider to be merely decorative 
may become capable of holding our eyes and moving us 
much as the easel picture does.(123)
Toward the end of the '50s Greenberg eventually lost 
enthusiasm for the whole idea of an impending dawn of some 
grand period style in industrial America. Over the course of 
the decade, and partly due to earlier museum advocacy and 
publicity, interior design became big business, and as it was 
increasingly mass marketed initiative passed from the hands 
of architects and engineers to interior decorators and 
finally to consumers themselves. The 1956 Complete Book of
Interior Decorating advised readers, "Don't be afraid to give 
expression to your own taste in making your selections. It is 
your home."(124) As the eclecticism of domestic interiors 
grew "beyond the coherence of style," Greenberg advocated 
"making work itself the main sphere of culture.... That some 
number of people now get an immediate satisfaction from the 
décors in which they work such as they do not from the décors 
of their homes, and that this is provided by advanced, 
'highbrow' architecture, may be considered at least one gain 
for high culture under industrialism." But public 
architectural commissions seemed to suffer as well. At least 
Greenberg felt that most commissions were being granted to 
inferior artists--Kootz's artists like Ibram Lassaw, Bernard 
Rosenthal and Philip Pavia. Greenberg even lost all interest 
in former hopefuls David Hare and Theodore Roszak. "The most 
conspicuous result of the diffusion of the use of the welding 
torch among American sculptors," he shook his head in 1957, 
"has been a superior kind of garden statuary and a new, 
oversized kind of objet d'art.... Ten years ago hopes were 
bright for sculpture...these hopes have faded." Smith seemed 
the one surviving sculptor Greenberg still held in high 
esteem, but "the art public and its mentors...have not yet 
accepted his work in a way that would bring prizes, 
commissions, and the purchases of important pieces by museums 
and other public or semi-public agencies."(125) 
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Yet another problem was surfacing for Greenberg, namely 
the "neo-dada" work that began finding an audience in New 
York in the late '50s. The year 1958 began with Johns 
enjoying his first solo show in New York and making the cover 
of Art News, with Robert Rauschenberg's "combines" at Leo 
Castelli and Allan Kaprow's happening at the Hansa Gallery, 
and with Newsweek reporting on "The Trend to the 'Anti-Art'." 
Artists like Kaprow and Rauschenberg seemed to usurp Smith's 
idea of "combining painting and sculpture into a new art form 
that would beat either one"; how they put into practice the 
lessons of cubist collage deviated radically from the 
rational grand style of "international-line" architecture and 
design. Junk, not engineering, became the operative term. It 
was a conspiracy theory Irving Sandler advanced in 1960, in 
what sounds like a nightmare rewrite to Greenberg's 
historical narrative: "The metal constructions of David Smith 
have been especially influential on the work of the Neo-
Dadas.... The line between painting and sculpture gets so 
blurred that Neo-Dada construction-collages are most 
fittingly called 'objects'... The size of Abstract 
Expressionist paintings, particularly those of Pollock, their 
'assault' upon the viewer--the picture as environment--has 
stimulated Kaprow, Grooms, Oldenburg, Whitman, Dine and 
others to create actual environments.... These artists have 
transformed the entire gallery space into a stage set." A few 
years later, Kaprow would smile over such a turn of events. 
"At one time, modern art, on its way from the gallery to the 
museum, stopped off at a collector's home and there it looked 
out of place because it was lived with. Now it is the 
reverse. 'Kitchen-Sink' art, 'Pop,' 'Common-Object' art, 
'Assemblage,' 'Junk Culture,' 'Re-arrangeables,' 'Multiples,' 
and 'Environments,' united in their appeal to, and often 
literal involvement in, the themes and space of daily 
existence, appear absurd and out-of-kilter in museums where 
they cannot be lived with."(126)
In the end Greenberg never abandoned painting for 
sculpture--indeed, quite the opposite. Sculpture had rescued 
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painting just as the crisis of painting had reached its peak. 
But once that crisis abated and sculpture's services were no 
longer needed, it was dropped. Now there was no advantage to 
being "as palpable as the furniture." Only reviewers hostile 
to color-field painting would still insist on an association 
between it and the domestic interior. "Never before has mere 
decoration been presented with more pretentiousness and 
remained mere decoration" was Harold Rosenberg's response to 
Louis's and Noland's canvases in the 1963 exhibit "Towards a 
New Abstraction" at the Jewish Museum.(127) Perhaps the only
time a critic sympathetic to such work mentioned its relation 
to private homes was when Lawrence Alloway wrote in 1961 that
a good deal of discussion about post-war painting, with 
its use of words like "ejaculatory" and "rococo," rests 
on an assumption about its orgiastic and indulgent 
character. In fact, however, sensuality in painting is 
simply absorption with the specialized means of the 
artist (liquids and pastes). The handling of these 
materials has nothing to do with bedrooms and 
boudoirs.... It is by accepting the (sensual) properties 
of paint and handling that the (transcendent) action of 
discovery, voyage, quest, and all that, can begin.(128)
Alloway here seems to have in mind the examples of Boucher 
and Fragonard--just as Greenberg did, when he first 
considered the relation between modern art and décor.
FRAMING MODERNIST PAINTING
Consistent throughout Greenberg's writing is its tone of 
activism, of lines needing to be drawn and battles waged. 
Never were circumstances not volatile, politicized on some 
level, historically in motion and overrun by competing 
interests; thus how to advance and advocate the best and 
brightest, how to keep culture moving, always needed to be 
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theorized anew. After World War II, when art had to find its 
way without the promise of socialism as its guiding light, a 
rapprochement seemed necessary; if not intellectual or 
spiritual support, perhaps some basic material, economic and 
institutional patronage of high art could be developed among 
sectors of the new managerial middle-class. Beginning in 
1950, only months after he quit reviewing for The Nation out 
of growing disgust with the moribund leftist intellectual 
milieu in New York, Greenberg mounted the first of what would 
end up a total of 13 gallery and museum exhibitions he'd go 
on to curate over the course of the decade. This doesn't 
include the shows he arranged as a paid consultant to the 
French & Company Gallery from 1958 to 1960. 
Greenberg's involvement with French & Company was an odd 
fit on certain levels. Holding out against modern and 
international style furniture and décor, the 117-year-old 
gallery was a bastion for antiques and furnishings in the 
"Old French" style. But in 1957, aware that, "outside of art 
firms with huge stocks of impressionists, the most successful 
and profitable art business throughout the world in the last 
five years has been in the contemporary art field," the 
gallery hired Publicity Inc.--run by Benjamin Sonnenberg, 
considered "the inventor of the public relations business"--
to head up a $70,000 publicity campaign to update its image 
and help launch a new wing devoted to contemporary art.(129) 
Greenberg had been trying to find shows in Manhattan for 
Louis and Noland, and in 1958 he even ended his friendship 
with Betty Parsons because she refused to bring the two 
painters into her stable. That fall Sonnenberg and French & 
Company president Spencer Samuels approached Greenberg, and 
by the following year the gallery was paying him an annual 
salary of $5,200 to be its "Contemporary Painting Advisor."
French & Company expressly picked Greenberg as a way to 
shed its image as "the High Priests of the Gothic and the 
Renaissance" and immediately fit into New York's contemporary 
art world.(130) The gallery's advertising strategy changed: 
an ad in Art in America from 1958 still pictures an American 
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colonial painting hung next to a vintage grandfather clock; 
in an ad the gallery ran a year later in Arts, a David Smith 
sculpture now stands next to a Gothic caisson, over which 
hangs a painting by Jules Olitski (fig. 19). Greenberg no 
doubt agreed to work with French & Company since the gallery 
had never fit in before, was so unfamiliar with things modern 
and thus would be completely beholden to his say on the 
matter. The gallery had no exhibition history to contend 
with, no standing commitments to living artists to work 
around. It was, in a sense, detached. Fittingly, the first 
show Greenberg organized there was of paintings by Barnett 
Newman, who was also detached, having not shown in New York 
since 1951.
 Moreover, to design the rooms of their contemporary 
wing French & Company hired Tony Smith, who would go on to 
build the new 57th Street exhibition space for Betty Parsons 
three years later, "the purest of pure environments" (in the 
estimation of Robert Storr). At French & Company Smith 
devised a similarly immaculate environment that "bathed art 
objects in an atmosphere of light."(131) Such a Platonic 
realm left society far behind, shedding all associations to 
either domestic or work-related interiors. It was a type of 
space perfectly suited for a new, post-cubist type of 
painting that likewise shed its connections to things 
tactile, that, as Greenberg put it in 1960, "tries to fulfill 
the impressionist insistence on the optical."(132) The rooms 
were spacious enough to easily accommodate the enormous 
canvases Greenberg would arrange for exhibition there, such 
as Noland's new concentric circle paintings, which a year 
before had proven too big for James Myer to show at his Tibor 
de Nagy Gallery, as well as Louis's abstract murals. ("You 
are quite aware," William Rubin would write Louis after his 
French & Company show in 1959, "that your exclusive 
commitment to outsized canvases has made it extremely 
difficult to sell your work").(133)
Despite Greenberg's increasing collaborations with 
commercial galleries, as well as with popular magazines 
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(between 1952 and 1961 he contributed to Harper's Bazaar, The
New York Times Magazine, American Mercury, The Saturday
Evening Post and Country Beautiful)--or perhaps because of 
these involvements, in so far as they reflected the arrival 
in New York of a substantial market and patronage of modern 
art--by the late '50s he seemed to be entering yet another 
phase, his third. The audience that now rallied to his views, 
and that he imagined himself expressing them to, was 
changing. He talked less and less about the prospects of 
someday delivering modern art to middle-class homes and 
workplaces. Instead, opportunities arose for Greenberg to 
profess on modern art in academic settings; in 1958, for 
example, he was invited to conduct the prestigious Christian 
Gauss Seminar in Criticism at Princeton. By that time 
Greenberg had developed a following of young art historians 
that included William Rubin and Michael Fried. In a 1962 
article titled "A Critic on the Side of History," Hilton 
Kramer commented on the new direction Greenberg was taking: 
"There was a time when Mr. Greenberg's articles on the 
current art scene appeared at weekly or monthly intervals.... 
His articles appear now at infrequent intervals and seem, as 
the result of their scarcity perhaps, to be unduly concerned 
to summarize rather than elucidate a point of view."(134) 
Greenberg had earlier been writing in what could be called a 
metaphoric vein, from a "perspective" or point of view that 
placed art in some relation to--related to but still 
different from--politics and the ideal of socialism; after 
this his concerns turned to negotiating a more piecemeal, 
practical reconciliation between art and liberal, middle-
class material culture, what perhaps signaled a more 
metonymic mode. Now his writing turned synecdochic, concerned 
to express a summational overview of art as a purely 
aesthetic phenomenon, a phenomenon that didn't exist as part 
of some "period style," but rather existed in, and elaborated 
on, its own inviolate history and tradition.
The impulse behind the avant-garde's insistence on the 
autonomy of the different arts, its demand that they be 
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"entitled to respect for their own sakes, and not merely as 
vessels of communication," was taken by Greenberg to be no 
longer political but philosophical. What he now famously 
called "modernist painting" was re-conceived as an off-shoot 
of "Kantian self-criticism," so that rather than Manet it was 
Kant himself whom Greenberg deemed "the first real 
Modernist." Adopting such a self-critical approach gave 
modernist painting a rigorous theory and method to guide its 
practice--it "brought [art] closer in real spirit to 
scientific method than ever before." Beyond that, what bore 
paramount relevance to the experience of such art, what gave 
it "scientific consistency," was art itself, the great 
artworks of the past that made up each new work's historical 
community. "Nothing could be further from the authentic art 
of our time," Greenberg wrote in 1960, "than the idea of 
rupture of continuity. Art is--among other things--
continuity, and unthinkable without it. Lacking the past of 
art, and the need and compulsion to maintain its standards of 
excellence, Modernist art would lack both substance and 
justification."(135) "The continuity from part to whole," to 
repeat again Paul de Man's observation, is what "makes 
synecdoche into the most seductive of metaphors."
Such a view--that "modernism has never meant, and does 
not mean now, anything like a break with the past"--was no 
doubt welcomed news to the art historians who were now 
flocking to Greenberg, and perhaps no one took it more to 
heart than Michael Fried. In the mid-'60s Fried was struck by 
how, among art critics at least, "disagreements tend to look 
more and more like disputes among historians."(136) According 
to Henry Geldzahler, artists, too, were becoming more 
preoccupied with art history. "The artist as art historian, 
as scholar of the history of art, makes the professional art 
historian his logical audience," Geldzahler wrote in 1965, 
"and in the past decade it has been in this professional 
group that much of the early appreciation of new and 
difficult art has taken place."(137) On the other hand, 
Greenberg also made clear that, in order to be "authentic," 
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the art of the present moment couldn't just rest complacently 
on the accomplishments of the past, repeating them passively; 
that would only make art "nostalgic." Thus, Greenberg 
continued, modernism "may mean a devolution, an unraveling, 
of tradition, but it also means its further evolution." Now 
Greenberg would confidently applaud Still, Newman and Rothko 
as the "the first serious abstract painters, the first 
abstract painters of style, really to break with cubism." 
Moreover, he would proclaim that their achievement brought 
about "the most radical of all developments in painting of 
the last two decades"--namely, "a more consistent and radical 
suppression of value contrasts than seen so far in abstract 
art."(138) Fried nodded in agreement: "The ultimate criterion 
of the legitimacy of a putative advance," he wrote two years 
later, "is its fecundity: whether in fact it proves to have 
been the road to the future."(139)
With the rise of color-field abstraction the future of 
painting turned considerably brighter; gone were references 
to crisis, and in their place emerged talk of "new modes of 
organization and seeing...which will somehow open up into a 
zone of freedom as large, in its own way, as that enjoyed by 
traditional painters during the past five centuries."(140) An 
exclusive emphasis on color was new, a break from previous 
painting and its preoccupation with modeling and profile 
drawing, those old conventions used to portray a fictive 
world of objects. But this unraveling of tradition was only a 
means to extend it further. Color-field painting remained 
tied to easel painting and thus to tradition by doing what 
Greenberg prized easel painting for doing, detaching vision 
from the architectural surrounding. Indeed, an emphasis on 
color seemed to resolve former conflicts, bringing to an end 
the struggle between the allover and the at-once. Color was 
applauded for opening up a pictorial depth without 
necessarily negating painting's surface, "as if that 
surface," in Greenberg's words, "were enlarged to contain a 
world of color and light differentiations impossible to 
flatness but which yet manage not to violate flatness."(141) 
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As was often claimed by champions of color abstraction 
in the '60s, it was in the very character of color to both 
spread along the surface, to not cut into pictorial space 
like value contrasts but to extend side by side, laterally; 
and at the same time to evince a motility that seemed to 
volatize and make that surface breathe and advance. The need 
for color to unfold laterally, parallel to the wall and thus 
perpendicular to the viewer's sight line, indeed required 
ever larger expanses in order to be effective. But that 
didn't mean surface dimensions would be set by the literal 
dimensions of the wall; rather where the picture finished 
would be set by and would reciprocate the dictates of 
intentional vision. Beginning in the late '50s Greenberg 
would amend his description of painting's essence to include 
not only flatness but now also the delimiting of flatness. 
The framing edge of the picture took on the key task of 
making color more dramatic than decorative. Over and above 
its spread, color was now said to advance on vision as 
vision's momentum toward its object was answered and embraced
by the frame's deliberate circumscribing and focusing of the 
field. Color-field painting locked into its frame; it 
replaced inscription with circumscription, relegating line 
and its cutting to the very edge of the picture's field; and 
together both frame and color seemed to figure and hold the 
viewer's eyesight, in unison and at once.
Especially for Noland color locked into the frame's 
synecdochic figuring of eyesight. In interviews he would 
repeatedly stress the tight connection he sought between 
painting and viewer, as if without any resistance or 
remainder. This connection he imagined to be like the one 
existing between a romantically involved couple: as he put 
it, "You're involved with someone as long as something is 
developing, changing or insightful. Painting is the same 
way." Connection is made paramount: it is "that quality of 
connection I'd like my colors to have."(142) But at the same 
time, Noland much more than Louis tended to treat color as a 
matter of side by side juxtaposition, lining up hues 
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laterally, extending perpendicular to sight. While Louis 
overlaid washes of pigment in his Veil series, Noland the 
same year was establishing relations and contrasts between 
colors as he separated them out in strict sequence. For 
example, in Noland's Beginning from 1958 (fig. 1), discrete 
bands of color encircle a central orb of red; all the colors 
possess roughly the same saturation and intensity and thus 
stake equal claim to the picture's surface, and yet they also 
alternate rhythmically in their progression outward from the 
center, skipping back and forth from warmly radiating reds to 
coldly constricted blues and blacks. It is up to the outer-
most band of black to negotiate between inner circular motifs 
and bounding square edge, and on the painting's far right 
side the negotiations appear most intense, as the black paint 
seems on the verge of elongating into a straight line that 
parallels the nearby frame. But this impulse to straighten is 
clearly no match for the band's much more dominant suggestion 
of clockwise rotation. Together, this sense of rotation along 
with the pulsating rhythm make all the circles appear to 
corkscrew at once inward and outward, as if drilling both 
ends of the visual cone, bringing the eye into the painting 
and the painting into the eye. 
The solution is typical of Noland's works from 1958, and 
by the end of the year he would state it even more blatantly: 
in the confrontation staged by Untitled, 1958-59, between 
outer-most circle and painting edge, it is the square frame 
that ultimately yields, as it literally rotates 45 degrees to 
transform into a diamond (fig. 20). Indeed, it is hard not to 
see in Noland's paintings a struggle between these two 
conceptions of color, as if color's lateral spread across the 
surface of the painting-as-object were being overcompensated 
for by its simultaneous advance toward and pull on the 
viewer. But here the question arises whether this forward 
advance constitutes a kind of spread in its own right, 
whether or not the threat of perpetual lateral extension is 
only being swiveled in Noland's paintings 90 degrees, being 
overpowered and superceded by a perpetual solicitation to 
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sight, a bidding for connection that can't seem to finish 
inside the picture, be made dramatic, at once. Phrased more 
generally, the question would be whether Noland's brand of 
color field painting really does resolve those problems posed 
by abstraction that Greenberg outlined in his earlier 
criticism. Having entirely escaped representation, having 
gotten rid of overlapping planes or any suggestion of bounded 
volumes and how they seem to turn away from vision at their 
edges, with absolutely nothing of its own to keep from 
vision, the problem becomes whether color abstraction really 
can achieve a dramatic finality, that sense of form that 
feels conclusive, even fatal, but precisely through that 
fatality arrives at self-definition and meaningfulness. With 
Mondrian, it is perhaps the dense object-quality of his 
paintings that in the end anchors and stops flatness and 
spread. Density of the medium, and the object-quality that 
results, also characterize Johns's paintings, especially his 
Targets, the thick, waxen surfaces of which certainly can't 
be said to "breathe." But in contrast, Noland's work, which 
avoids any suggestion of weight, aiming instead to have the 
color exist "on the thinnest conceivable surface, a surface 
sliced into the air as if by a razor," seems much more 
troubled by an inability to find such limits.(143) This is 
further born out by the fact that Noland himself has a hard 
time disconnecting from his work, leaving it be. Paging 
through exhibition photos and catalogs over the years, one 
finds that his paintings are constantly being reoriented. For 
instance, the catalog for his 1977 Guggenheim retrospective 
includes a pair of images of Lunar Episode, 1959, the two 
distinguished by a 45-degree rotation on the wall (fig. 21). 
Noland has belatedly changed the hanging of other Target 
paintings as well. Diamond paintings too, like And Again, 
1964, have been swiveled on their axis, as have certain 
needle point paintings like Approach, 1966.(144) 
What makes Noland's Target paintings so vulnerable to 
rotation has to do obviously with their point of origin--that 
famous moment in the late '50s when Noland "discovered the 
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center" of the canvas. There are over 150 paintings with 
concentric circles that Noland executed between 1957-58 and 
1962, and the vast majority of them are square in format. 
What defines the center of such a square field is the equal 
distance it measures out from each of the four edges as well 
as the equal distance maintained from each of the four 
corners. To stress the center of these symmetrical fields 
means disregarding any distinctions between top and bottom, 
left and right--that is, distinctions corresponding to 
gravity-bound, bodily and tactile experience--and instead 
treating all the sides as absolutely the same. The result is 
to separate out and make seemingly autonomous the visual 
axis. It also seems to achieve another of Noland's goals, 
namely to fold the allover into the at-once, as the field 
that uniformly spreads from edge to edge and corner to corner 
organizes itself in relation to a single, dead-centered 
point. ("You are summoned and gathered into one point...[a] 
pinpointing of attention," Greenberg would say, coining yet 
another synonym for the experience of at-onceness or 
aesthetic unity.)(145) And yet the point that organizes the 
pictorial field in Noland's paintings also seems to stretch 
back out again as it figures the very heart of the visual 
cone, the vector of intent that trains beholder to beckoning 
painting, a beckoning that seems to endure as if without end.
Of course not everyone who made paintings at the time 
conceived of the framing edge in this way. In 1964, in a one-
person exhibition at the Galerie Lawrence in Paris, Frank 
Stella seemed to comment on the idea of a painting's rotation 
by mounting side by side two works he'd finished a year 
earlier, Port Tampa City and Plant City (figs. 22, 23). Both 
are identically shaped canvases, cut in the figure of a 
symmetrical eight-pointed star, and have exactly the same 
dimensions (eight by eight feet). There are only two 
differences: both have hard, metallic looking surfaces, but 
one is painted in yellow zinc chromate while the other is 
covered in red lead. In addition, while both carry across 
their pictorial fields an even stripe pattern that mimics 
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precisely the 45-degree notches that articulate the stars' 
points, in Port Tampa City the stripes run in horizontal and 
vertical directions while in Plant City they stretch 
diagonally. By hanging them side by side, however, Stella 
allowed for the interpretation that the paintings were indeed 
identical--since if the one or the other were rotated 
slightly clockwise or counterclockwise, the direction of its 
stripes would match exactly that of the other. Yet this sort 
of rotation would have nothing to do with some kind of 
evolving visual interest, like that between "a romantically 
involved couple," but instead would be achieved literally, by 
grabbing the painting at its edges--that is, treating it as a 
three-dimensional object--and physically repositioning it on 
the wall. In which case the function of the color would also 
change, with neither the yellow nor the red allowed to exude 
some sort of character or emotion inherent to itself; rather 
the two would function only relative to each other, 
signifying a purely negative difference that makes possible 
distinguishing one painting (or standardized product) from 
the next. 
Yet another approach to the framing edge is represented 
by Louis's Veil paintings (fig. 2). What distinguishes these 
works is their ability to present forms that, although 
entirely flat and frontal, come across nevertheless as 
strongly sculptural and bodily, all the more so because they 
seem to prioritize their own weight over the onlooker's 
vision. Color and shape are displayed completely flat, with 
no shadows or overlap, and yet they retain a firm sense of 
their own footing, centered around their own gravitational 
axis rather than the axis running through the visual cone. 
Rather than float inside a window-like space, Louis's Veils 
perch on the frame's inner ledge, inhabiting what appears 
more like a theater stage. No longer does the frame only 
figure and organize the onlooker's vision, delimiting or 
"cutting out" a field for appropriation through sight. 
Instead, Louis suggests another side to the frame 
perpendicular to our line of sight, a side we can't see but 
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that we assume exists because the pictured color-forms stand 
on and support themselves with it. Moreover, because 
knowledge of this perpendicular side comes secondhand and 
only through the rendered forms and their more direct 
relationship to it, it therefore seems to belong to them. The 
result is an image that seems capable of openly and 
immediately disclosing itself while maintaining a sense a 
relative sovereignty from the viewer being addressed. Image 
and audience stand to and for each other in a metaphorical 
relation, establishing connection while also maintaining 
independence.
That such a radical difference between the work of Louis 
and Noland was never really owned up to by their earliest 
champions is revealing. By the early '60s the task that 
modernist critics had defined for themselves, and for the 
work they championed, had grown defensive, despite or even 
because of all their stated concern for the future. What they 
would herd into that future was characterized as increasingly 
exclusive. "One is either in or out," as Fried put it. On the 
one side was an allover mass threaded together by what 
Greenberg called "performance and virtuosity," which "implied 
conformity with received tastes," a mindless fulfilling of 
expectations, merely doing what one is suppose to do; and on 
the other was atomized individual expressions, 
experimentation and antics perpetrated for their own sake, 
what Barbara Rose called "mindless 'action' over critical 
deliberation," a kind of art too weighted on the side of 
practice and left unguided by theory, with spontaneity 
counting for everything, in the total absence of any 
premeditation or forethought. Either way there was no 
detachment; either art stood as a kind of innocent, felt 
expression without any defense against instrumentalization, 
or it stood as already fully instrumentalized, fitted in. For 
Greenberg and Fried, a key element was missing from the 
equation, something that would frame the practice of 
"modernist painting" and thereby separate it out, namely an 
air-tight theory and tradition. Criticism and historicizing 
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would need to intimately precede and follow every act of 
painting. Theory and practice were made nearly identical, 
losing their "dialectical interchange." Thus Greenberg would 
boast of his looming presence in the color-field studio, that 
he revealed the secret of Pollock's post-cubism by bringing 
Noland and Louis to Helen Frankenthaler's loft in 1953, and 
that "in 1957 I turned [Louis] back to 'veiling.'"(146) Fried 
and Greenberg became the frame.
"Variety is not a standard," Fried inveighed in 1964. 
"The true critic has no alternative but to try to determine 
what is genuine and what is spurious in the art of our time: 
he has got to make value-judgments." Yet this wasn't seen as 
the responsibility of critics alone. But neither was it 
merely the job of the artist; rather, it was their shared 
obligation, made so by designating value-judgments the sole, 
urgent content of modernist art. "The concept of art is, in 
our time, inextricably bound up with the question of value," 
Fried wrote in 1964. As such, "criticism that shares the 
basic premises of modernist painting can play a role in its 
development only somewhat less important than that of the new 
paintings themselves."(147) Modernist artists, detached from 
the New York art scene, drew closer to their modernist 
critics, a movement spurred by the modernist pledge to "self-
criticism." Through this pledge artist and writer, art's 
manufacture and its assessment, lost all distance from one 
another, disappeared into medium, tradition and judgment, yet 
in doing so picked up distance on all the rest, on the 
unpledged (so that the modernist work of, say, Jules Olitski 
"cannot be discussed without reference to Fried's criticism," 
as Lucy Lippard complained by 1966).(148) All became bound--
strategically, defensively--into the image of a true critical 
community, a cultural elite, a circuit of genuine production 
and reception, theory and practice, without dissociation, 
itself separate and distant from the larger, spurious system 
the art world had become. 
Against the backdrop of such a tight agreement between 
expressing and judging, presenting and receiving, the work of 
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certain contemporaries stood out in dramatic contrast as 
fundamentally disagreeable and irreconcilable. Johns's 
paintings, for example, seemed to take uncertainty as a 
governing principle, to thematize the inability to decide or 
judge, to fit in (fig. 5). Feeling annoyed that Johns dwelled 
over contradictions rather than effecting their resolution, 
Greenberg called his work "homeless." Leo Steinberg said much 
the same thing, and yet meant it as a compliment, seeing in 
Johns's work a mode of practice that did not flatter pre-
formulated theory but challenged it to reinvent itself anew. 
Such a challenge left the critic feeling abandoned, but in 
that abandonment the critic also became reacquainted with the 
hallmark solitariness of the poetic. "I am challenged," 
Steinberg wrote,  
to estimate the aesthetic value of, say, a drawer stuck 
into a canvas. But nothing I've ever seen can teach me 
how this is to be done. I am alone with this thing, and 
it is up to me to evaluate it in the absence of 
available standards. The value which I shall put on this 
painting tests my personal courage. Here I can discover 
whether I am prepared to sustain the collision with a 
novel experience.... It is a kind of self-analysis that 
a new image can throw you into and for which I am 
grateful. I am left in a state of anxious uncertainty by 
the painting, about painting, about myself.... It 
demands a decision in which you discover something of 
your own quality; and this decision is always a "leap of 
faith"...the picture seems arbitrary, cruel, irrational, 
demanding your faith, while it makes no promise of 
future rewards.(149)
"It seems a function of modern art," Steinberg continued, "to 
transmit this anxiety to the spectator." Something like 
anxiety was indeed what Fried expressed when encountering 
Donald Judd's first solo show at the Green Gallery in 1963. 
Here was an instance of criticism and art forming a tight 
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compact, indeed coming together in the very person of Judd 
himself, a regular art reviewer since 1958 and now an 
established artist. Not surprisingly, Judd's theory matched 
his practice, although not in the way the modernists 
proscribed. His judgments, in Fried's estimation, didn't seem 
to imply any prior comprehension of what was being judged. 
"What has not clearly emerged in the criticism--at least in 
my reading of it--is exactly how Judd means to discriminate 
between the objects he admires and those he does not."(150) 
Seeking specificity over generality, Judd overly privileged 
practice, with theory never preceding it but only approaching 
it after the fact, coming to terms with the completed art 
object as a fait accompli. This applied to not only Judd's 
criticism but his artwork as well. "I find myself unable to 
discover," Fried responded to the Green Gallery exhibit, "a 
convincing internal rationale for the particular decisions of 
style and structure Judd has made." In Fried's eyes, Judd's 
boxes appeared hollow in more ways than one: they had nothing 
to base themselves on; they fled from precedent and 
comparison, tried to outrun tradition rather than fuse with 
and disappear into it. Newness and originality were Judd's 
supreme values, which meant that even "painting has to be as 
powerful as any kind of art, it can't claim a special 
identity."(151) The future Judd saw opening up arrayed itself 
in isolated and incommensurate practices, the only thing 
common among them being their disparity and irreducibility. 
Under such circumstances real advance could only be measured 
relatively, tentatively, making obsolete all sweeping 
generalizations and grand theories about stylistic 
developments and the categorical imperatives of traditional 
media. He, too, considered history a valuable resource, yet 
its wealth could purchase newness only by being turned down; 
it was an encyclopedia to absorb without endorsing. Judd 
solicited all possible comparisons precisely in order to 
demonstrate his art's incomparability. Originality for him 
meant inviting, even constructing abandonment.
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In keeping with such a stance, Judd denounced the 
artworld habit of naming movements and attaching labels to 
heterogeneous artworks. Minimalism was a label he found 
particularly annoying, and he wasn't the only one. "The 
artists normally labeled Primary Structuralists," David Antin 
observed, "are not a group--some of them wouldn't even talk 
to each other at a party."(152) In stark contrast, many 
champions of color-field painting embraced group identity and 
insisted on the shared label "modernist" to distinguish 
themselves. "Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried 
have...construct[ed] what is undoubtedly the most serious and 
fruitful description of the development of modern (as opposed 
to simply contemporary) art," Rosalind Krauss wrote 
admiringly in 1966.(153) It could perhaps be argued that, 
confronted by a society at once overly fragmented and overly 
unified, Judd and the modernists developed opposite 
reactions, with Greenberg and Fried constructing synecdochic 
summaries that couldn't admit to being partial and premature, 
while Judd celebrated a metonymic individualism that played 
down such artworld unifying forces as increased 
professionalization and greater market development.
Modernists like Fried and Greenberg, having already 
collapsed the metaphoric structure of Louis's Veils with a 
generally synecdochic paradigm for post-cubist painting, now 
proceeded to reduce Judd's metonymy and Johns's irony, 
clearing the way for a rigidly dualistic outlook that pitted 
belief against skepticism, poetic integrity against 
rhetorical effects, painting versus the art world. This Fried 
spelled out clearly in 1965:
Dada in any of its manifestations and modernist painting 
are antithetical to one another.... Dada stands opposed 
to the notion of value or quality in art.... But there 
is a superficial similarity between modernist painting 
and Dada in one important respect: namely, that just as 
modernist painting has enabled one to see a blank 
canvas, a sequence of random spatters or a length of 
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colored fabric as a picture, Dada and Neo-Dada have 
equipped one to treat virtually any object as a work of 
art--though it is far from clear what this means. Thus 
there is an apparent expansion of the realm of the 
artistic corresponding--ironically, as it were--to the 
expansion of the realm of the pictorial achieved by 
modernist painting.... The expanded realm of the 
artistic may come into conflict with that of the 
pictorial; and when this occurs the former must give 
way.(154)
Any similarities said to obtain between the works of Johns, 
Stella, Judd and Noland were only "superficial." Or they were 
ironic, and thus a concern to those amused with the ironies 
of artworld machinations. Painting might bear some 
resemblance to what it was not, yet it remained aloof by 
conforming its practice to a definition and theory that arose 
as if organically out of itself, and to which its practice 
always naturally returned. Everything else was conferred its 
identity extraneously and belatedly, not unlike how Judd 
judged specific objects; such an artwork was comprehended and 
theorized only ever after the fact, like a readymade, an 
object standing under the sign of art through the 
manipulations of publicity.
Not surprisingly, such a strategic division was met with 
intense hostility by many in the art world who found 
themselves not in but out. "I have little confidence in 
people who habitually, when exposed to new works of art, know 
what is great and what will last," Steinberg was already 
grumbling in 1960.(155) The counter-charge that was often 
leveled at modernist critics and painters was that their 
exclusivity was itself conformist--all they had done was 
erect yet another specialization; what the modernist painter 
actually "disappeared" into was just a new profession. 
Steinberg considered the modernist program to be one more 
form of managerialism, "as though the strength of a 
particular artist expressed itself only in his choice to 
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conform with a set of existent professional needs," while 
each artwork "matters because it answers a problem set forth 
by a governing technocracy." Steinberg no doubt felt deeply 
troubled by such developments: if professionalization was how 
modern art would finally reconcile itself with society, then 
the subsequent narrowing of social interests and curiosity 
demanded by specialization would result in a narrowing of 
feeling and thought, and instead of completing itself through 
such reconciliation, art was bound to mutilate itself. But 
such worries didn't inflict everyone. Henry Geldzahler, who 
prided himself as a modernist insider, was much more upbeat. 
"Modernism is...a group research project, the way pure 
mathematics might be, so that the advances that are made in 
the field become available to everybody who's working in 
it."(156) Much the same compliment was paid by Susan Sontag:
The most interesting and creative art of our time is not
open to the generally educated; it demands special 
effort; it speaks a specialized language. ...The 
painting of Mark Rothko and Frank Stella...demand an 
education of sensibility whose difficulties and length 
of apprenticeship are at least comparable to the 
difficulties of mastering physics or engineering.(157)
What had begun a decade earlier as a crusade to 
transform the artist's isolation from society into something 
positive, what Harold Rosenberg called "the beginning of a 
new world," had come to fruition in the '60s as the full 
professionalization of art. The Abstract Expressionists' 
signature style and its painterly language of the self was 
now eclipsed by the modernist series and canvases that spoke 
a "language of painting," a disciplinary, group language with 
the capacity to, as Fried put it, objectively "signify 
related transformations of syntax in the interest of saying 
something new." No longer was it the individual artist who 
stood in opposition to society; rather, it was this 
impersonal language that provided a public face for the 
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modernists' private, professional knowledge, and would serve 
as "one of modernist painting's chief defenses against the 
risk of misinterpretation."(158) 
On the other hand, the problem also arose that no more 
than a handful of artists were in the end deemed worthy by 
Greenberg and Fried for inclusion in their system. It was 
widely noted that the big museum exhibit "Post-Painterly 
Abstraction," with which Greenberg attempted to canonize the 
color-field revolution, was filled with artists whose work he 
actually cared little for (Al Held, for instance, claims 
Greenberg "liked only about a third of the people" in the 
show).(159) One of the artists included was Alexander 
Liberman, the Vogue editor whose idea it had been to 
photograph fashion models posed in front of Pollock's allover 
paintings. Yet Greenberg had no choice but to be inclusive: 
three or four painters weren't enough to make for a new 
cultural style. A year later Fried came up with a possible 
remedy: "It's now possible," he wrote in Three American
Painters, "to conceive of stylistic change in terms of the 
decisions of individual artists."(160)
By coming together as a tight group and adopting a 
strict criterion--according to which, as Michael Fried 
notoriously put it, "no more than an infinitesimal fraction 
of the art produced in our time matters at all"--in this way 
color field painting sought a kind of unity or at-onceness on 
a macro scale, on the level of the culture and the historical 
moment, and in relation to a rapidly expanding, pluralistic 
art world.(161) Group identity was adopted precisely in 
opposition to what was seen as a kind of spread--the 
spreading out of art styles and critical criteria--and in 
opposition also to artworks that themselves spread out, that 
deliberately exceeded the limits of traditional media. From 
250 miles away, the Washington D.C. painters stood far enough 
back to get a proper perspective, to put a frame on things. 
But eventually even this proved not enough. The modernist 
retreat would continue, branching off into idyllic Vermont, 
to frequent long weekends spent alternately judging the 
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rightness of modernist paintings and swimming in Ken Noland's 
backyard pool, with everybody no doubt reminding themselves 
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composition board mounted on wood with aluminum pan. 48 1/8" 
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painting by Willem de Kooning. Fortune, January 1945.
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1952.
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FIGURE 10. Double-page spread from Life, November 16, 1959.
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FIGURE 11. Donald Judd. Untitled. 1962-68. Light cadmium red 
oil on plywood. 19 1/2" x 45" x 30 1/2".
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FIGURE 12. Donald Judd. Untitled. 1965. Aluminum and purple 
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FIGURE 13. Barnett Newman. The Third. 1962. Oil on raw 
canvas. 101 1/4" x 120 3/8".
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FIGURE 14. Jackson Pollock. Number 1A. 1948. Oil and enamel 
on canvas. 68" x 104".
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FIGURE 15. David Smith. Blackburn: Song of an Irish
Blacksmith. 1949-50. Steel and bronze. 46 1/4" x 49 3/4" x 
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FIGURE 16. Jackson Pollock and Peter Blake with model for "An 
Ideal Museum." 1949.
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FIGURE 17. Double-page spread from Vogue, April 1950.
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FIGURE 18. Living room of the Ben Heller apartment on Central 
Park West, New York (from Quadrum 13, 1962).
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FIGURE 19. French & Company advertisement, Arts Yearbook 3, 
1959.
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FIGURE 20. Kenneth Noland. Untitled. 1958-59. Acrylic on 
canvas. 84" x 84".
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FIGURE 21. Kenneth Noland. Lunar Episode. 1959. Oil on 
canvas. 70 1/2" x 68 1/2". (Above: after 1977. Below: 
installation view, exhibition at School of the Visual Arts, 
New York, 1975.)
219
FIGURE 22. Frank Stella. Plant City. 1963. Zinc chromate on 
canvas. 96" x 96". 
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FIGURE 23. Frank Stella. Installation view. Exhibition at 
Galerie Lawrence, Paris, April 1963.
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